Goff v. Nix
Decision Date | 16 January 1987 |
Docket Number | Nos. 84-1416,85-1119,s. 84-1416 |
Citation | 803 F.2d 358 |
Parties | George GOFF, Appellee, v. Crispus NIX, Warden; Hal Farrier, Director of Corrections; Kurt Gary, Correctional Officer; Correctional Officer Matlock, Appellants. (Two Cases) |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
John M. Parmeter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, for appellants.
Barbara A. Schwartz, Iowa City, Iowa, for appellee.
Before ROSS, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs George Goff, David Heaton, and Terry Schertz are inmates at the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP) in Fort Madison, Iowa. Asserting causes of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, plaintiffs allege that the conduct of visual body cavity (VBC) searches by ISP officials as a condition of any movement outside their living unit or before being taken outside the confines of the ISP violated their rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The District Court concluded that the VBC searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The court entered permanent injunctive relief prohibiting State officials from enforcing the VBC portion of their strip search policy except under limited circumstances. We reverse except as noted below.
Subsequently, plaintiffs' actions were consolidated for trial, after which the District Court entered a permanent injunction, affirming the earlier order but modifying it to permit ISP officials to conduct VBC searches of prisoners entering or leaving the University of Iowa Hospitals. The Court's order also suggests that plaintiffs may have a claim for damages. 5 In reaching this result, the District Court first held that prison inmates retain limited Fourth Amendment rights while incarcerated. Goff v. Nix, 626 F.Supp. 736, 741 (1984). The court then found, essentially for the reasons stated in the preliminary injunction, that the VBC searches were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 742-44. ISP officials appeal the District Court's ruling, contending that the District Court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the VBC searches violated the inmates' Fourth Amendment rights. 6
We begin by taking note of the repeated instruction that the Supreme Court has given courts must heed [the] warning that "[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters."
concerning judicial deference to the decisions of prison administrators. Although the Court has stated that "prisoners [must] be accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration," Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3198, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984), the Court also has observed that " '[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.' " Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) (citations omitted). In addressing claims that prison conditions or policies violate the Constitution,
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540-41 n. 23, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1874-75 n. 23, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 827, 94 S.Ct. at 2806; see Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 583-85, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3232, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984). The Court further noted that judicial deference to prison administrators should be "wide-ranging," particularly in regard to "the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. Just this term, the Court stated that judicial deference to prison security measures extends "to prophylactic or preventive measures" and indicated that while this deference "does not insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, ... it requires that neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice." Whitley v. Albers, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986).
The rationale for judicial deference has been explained by the fact that the management of corrections institutions is peculiarly the responsibility of the executive and legislative branches of government and by the fact that
courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (footnote omitted); see Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 548, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. Thus we must recognize the "limited scope" of our review of the policies and practices of State prison officials, Block, 468 U.S. at 589, 104 S.Ct. at 3234, and that their decisions are entitled to considerable deference by virtue of not only their expertise but also because of the proper role of federal courts in supervising state institutions. We are mindful that prison administrators and officials are constantly in close contact with the prison population and we believe that this entitles their views to significant weight. In addition, principles of federalism counsel that we accord State officials wide latitude in performing their legitimate duties.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appellate court may set aside a district court's findings of fact only if they are "clearly erroneous," giving "due regard ... to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." To conclude that findings of fact are clearly erroneous, our review of the record must leave us with the "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). But we are also cognizant that to uphold the District Court's ruling, there must be "substantial
evidence" to indicate that the prison officials exaggerated their response to the perceived security concerns when viewed in light of...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Skundor v. Coleman, Civil Action No. 5:02-0205 (S.D. W.Va. 7/31/2003)
...and use of law library was found constitutional, and inmate's cell was a reasonable place to conduct the search.); Goff v. Nix, 803 F.2d 358, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 835, 108 S.Ct. 115, 98 L.Ed.2d 73 (1987) (Visual body cavity search of segregation unit inmates before......
-
Morgan v. Ward
...Id. at 888. Body cavity search policies similar to that at issue in Arruda v. Fair and the present case were condoned in Goff v. Nix, 803 F.2d 358, 370-71 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 115, 98 L.Ed.2d 73 (1987), and Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 228 (7th Cir.), c......
-
Thomsen v. Ross
...finds the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated, and plaintiff has not claimed conduct which suggests an Eighth Amendment violation. Goff, 803 F.2d at 371. 6. Bell concerned visual body cavity searches, which are more intrusive than strip, searches. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (di......
-
Newkirk v. Sheers
...prisoners, other circuits have applied the Bell analysis to such searches and found them constitutional. See e.g., Goff v. Nix, 803 F.2d 358, 370-71 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 835, 108 S.Ct. 115, 98 L.Ed.2d 73 (1987); Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 228 (7th Cir.), cert. denie......