Goff v. Savage
| Decision Date | 08 November 1922 |
| Docket Number | 17098. |
| Citation | 122 Wash. 194,210 P. 374 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | GOFF v. SAVAGE. |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Hugo E. Oswald, Judge.
Action by Smallwood Goff against W. E. Savage. Judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
F. W Girand, of Spokane, for appellant.
Appellant brought an action against respondent for damages, alleging that the latter had refused to sell appellant a soft drink at a soda fountain maintained by respondent in the city of Spokane and for the reason that appellant is a negro. Upon the evidence introduced the trial court found in accordance with the allegations of the complaint, but concluded that the business of respondent does not come within the provisions of what is known as the civil rights statute of this state, and dismissed the action.
No authority is cited by appellant beyond the statute, and there is no appearance on the part of the respondent. Our present statute is section 2686, Rem. Code which reads as follows:
'Every person who shall deny to any other person because of race, creed or color, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'
This was passed in the year 1909, prior to which time there was in effect section 2760 of Rem. & Bal. Code, which enumerated certain kinds of places of business and concluded with the words 'other places of public accommodation and amusement'; and it is suggested by the annotator that the former section may still be in effect to the extent that it is not supplanted by the latter section. Inasmuch as the place in question is not one of those expressly named in the former section, we conclude that if the action lies at all it would be by virtue of the later section, and this is the section relied upon by appellant.
We believe it is clear that the word 'public,' as applied to the first division of section 2686, should also be understood to apply to each of the other three kinds of places named, and that the maxim 'Noscitur a sociis,' applies. Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) vol. 2, p. 803. it is only upon the theory of the public character of the places regulated that these statutes have been sustained as constitutional, for the right of private contract is one of those guaranteed by the same Fourteenth Amendment which is so frequently appealed to for the protection of colored people.
The only subdivision of this section which can be applicable here would be 'accommodation,' and whether the sale of soda water is a matter of public accommodation is the question presented for our consideration. The respondent in the present case operated a drug store and in connection therewith an ice cream stand and soda fountain, and he made it a rule of his business not to serve negroes. Statutes of this character have been passed in many states and there are a large number of decisions. In this state it was assumed that the right of action would lie where the keeper of a restaurant refused to serve a negro, but it was held that under the facts of that case it did not appear that this was the ground of refusal. That case arose under the former statute in which restaurants are expressly named. Chase v. Knabel, 46 Wash. 484, 90 P. 642, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115. Subsequently a right of action was sustained on our later statute in favor of one who had been ejected from a theatre. Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 P. 813. Most of the cases where recovery has been sustained have been cases where the business was clearly of a public character, such as theaters, race tracks, roller skating rinks, inns, and hotels. A well-considered case where the distinction is made between public and private business is that of Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa, 89, 123 N.W. 231, 124 N.W. 901, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 407, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 852. In that case the defendant maintained a booth rented by him in a pure food show where he served coffee, gratis, to prospective customers. As admission fee was charged to the show, but the purveyor of the coffee had no interest therein. Coffee was refused to a negro woman who sued for damages under a statute requiring equal rights in all 'inns, restaurants, chop houses, eating houses, lunch counters and all other places where refreshments are served.'
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Fell v. Spokane Transit Authority
...barbershops (In re Johnson, 71 Wash.2d 245, 427 P.2d 968 (1967)) have been held to be places of public accommodation. In Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194, 210 P. 374 (1922), this court held that a soda fountain was not a place of public accommodation.25 A carrier like Greyhound, after fully co......
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> FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES, TENINO AERIE NO. 564 v. Grand Aerie of …
...the meaning of "public accommodation" to remove judicial limitations placed on the act in this court's decisions in Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194, 210 P. 374 (1922) (holding that a soda fountain in a drugstore was not a place of public accommodation); and Finnesey v. Seattle Baseball Club, ......
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State v. Avent, 654
...Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 447; Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 19 S.W. 1109 ; Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194, 210 P. 374; De La Ysla v. Publix Theatres Corporation, 82 Utah 598, 26 P.2d 818; Brown v. Meyer Sanitary Milk Co., 150 Kan. 931, 96 P.2d 651......
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