Goffredo v. Indiana State Dept. of Public Welfare

• Citation: 419 N.E.2d 1337
• Decision Date: 11 May 1981
• Docket Number: No. 2-1180A390,2-1180A390
• Parties: Antoinette GOFFREDO, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellee (Petitioner Below).
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 1337

419 N.E.2d 1337

Antoinette GOFFREDO, Appellant (Respondent Below), v. INDIANA STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellee

(Petitioner Below).

No. 2-1180A390.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

May 11, 1981.

Ethel Belle to Choate, Indianapolis, for appellant (respondent below).

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Gary Brock, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee (petitioner below).

ROBERTSON, Judge.

Respondent-appellant Goffredo, an employee of the petitioner-appellee Department of Public Welfare (D.P.W.) was transferred from being a hearing officer to that of in-house counsel in the D.P.W. The second position had different work requirements and responsibilities, but was of the same status, classification, and salary as her original position. Goffredo contested the transfer by initiating proceedings with the State Employee's Appeal Commission (Commission). The Commission found that Goffredo was transferred for punitive reasons and directed Goffredo returned to her original Goffredo now appeals, raising these issues:

position. The D.P.W. sought judicial review of the Commission's decision and the trial court reversed the decision of the Commission.

1. Whether the trial court erred by failing to conform to the statutory requirements governing review;

2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact; and

3. Whether the trial court erred by overruling Goffredo's motion to dismiss or strike.

We affirm.

ISSUE I

Goffredo argues that the trial court's decision violates Ind.Code 4-22-1-18 because the proscribed functions of weighing the evidence occurred during judicial review. The administrative determinations of an agency may be found erroneous under five circumstances. IC 4-22-1-18 provides:

On such judicial review such court shall not try or determine said cause de novo, but the facts shall be considered and determined exclusively upon the record filed with said court pursuant to this act (4-22-1-1 4-22-1-30).

On such judicial review, if the agency has complied with the procedural requirements of this act, and its finding, decision or determination is supported by substantial, reliable and probative evidence, such agency's finding, decision or determination shall not be set aside or disturbed.

If such court finds such finding, decision or determination of such agency is:

1. Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; or

2. Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; or

3. In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory right; or

4. Without observance of procedure required by law; or

5. Unsupported by substantial evidence, the court may order the decision or determination of the agency set aside. The court may remand the case to the agency for further proceedings and may compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.

Said court in affirming or setting aside the decision or determination of the agency shall enter its written findings of facts, which may be informal but which shall encompass the relevant facts shown by the record and enter of record its written decision and order or judgment.

The essence of Goffredo's argument is that the trial court cannot determine the facts de novo and can only consider the facts set forth in the record compiled by the administrative agency. Furthermore, upon judicial review the court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, such that the reviewing court is limited to only determining whether there exists substantial evidence to support the findings of the agency. Goffredo's argument is correct in so far as it pertains to a factual review of an agency determination, but it is incorrect as it applies to a question of law. In Public Service Commission v. City of Indianapolis, (1955) 235 Ind. 70, 131 N.E.2d 308, the supreme court stated:

Under a strictly judicial review to which we are limited here, in addition to determining whether or not the order of the Commission is supported by substantial evidence, there is another matter in which the court may always properly inquire, and that is the question whether or not the order is contrary to law.

The trial court determined that the Commission's decision was contrary to law, and was properly within the scope of judicial review.

The trial court examined Ind.Code 4-15-2-24 and found that it precluded Goffredo from instituting her action before the Commission because she was laterally transferred and not demoted. Goffredo has argued that this finding is contrary to the finding by the Commission, and therefore, the trial court has reweighed the evidence. The Commission's finding was incorrect as a matter of law because...