Goffstein v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 84-1858
| Decision Date | 12 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1858,84-1858 |
| Citation | 764 F.2d 522 |
| Parties | 18 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 791 Frederic M. GOFFSTEIN and Andrea J. Goffstein, Appellants, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO. and State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins., Co., Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Robert D. Blitz, St. Louis, Mo., for appellants.
Daniel E. Wilke, Clayton, Mo., for appellees.
Before HEANEY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and HANSON, * Senior District Judge.
Frederic and Andrea Goffstein, husband and wife, brought this action against State Farm Fire & Casualty Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (collectively "State Farm") on homeowners and automobile insurance policies, to recover for fire losses occurring on their home premises in Creve Coeur, Missouri. The fire damaged their home and personal property in the dwelling, plus two automobiles in the garage. State Farm denied liability on grounds that Mrs. Goffstein had intentionally set the fire. At trial, the district court submitted a special verdict form to the jury and received the answer shown below:
On the question of whether or not the fire was intentionally set by either plaintiff or someone acting with the knowledge and consent of either plaintiff, we [the jury] find:
in favor of plaintiff
X in favor of defendants.
The court entered a judgment of dismissal for the defendants and this appeal followed.
The Goffsteins raise the following issues:
1. That the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Mrs. Goffstein had not been charged and would not be charged with a criminal offense for allegedly setting the fire.
2. That the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
3. That Frederic M. Goffstein, as an innocent coinsured, is entitled to collect one-half of the policy proceeds covering the dwelling house and personal property therein, plus the value of one automobile which he solely owned.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
The fire in question started in the Goffsteins' garage during the early morning hours of June 13, 1983. Mrs. Goffstein was the only person on the premises at the time. The fire spread quickly from the garage to the house and caused extensive damage to both. After the fire had been extinguished by the fire department, the St. Louis County Police Department investigated and concluded that the fire was incendiary in origin and that a liquid accelerant had implemented the blaze. The plaintiffs' expert witness testified that the fire had an accidental origin, from the arcing of an electrical wiring connection in the garage. Mrs. Goffstein denied setting the fire or knowing how it had started.
At trial, the defendant called two police department investigators to testify that the fire had been intentionally set. These witnesses revealed their affiliation with the official investigation of the fire and, in addition, one referred to himself as a detective in the Bureau of Arson and Explosives and the other testified that he was "responsible for investigating arsons." The defendant also called two of its employees, claims specialist Charles Page and claims supervisor Martin Carmody, to testify about their reasons for denying the claim. Both witnesses testified that they denied the claim because they believed that the fire had been intentionally set, based on information received from police and from State Farm's investigation of the fire. During this testimony, the trial judge cautioned the jury that this evidence was admitted solely on the question of whether defendant had vexatiously refused to pay the claim.
In their cross-examination of Carmody, the plaintiffs sought to elicit testimony that Mrs. Goffstein had not been charged with a crime in connection with the fire. The defense objected on relevancy grounds. In a bench conference, the defendant's attorney stated that he would ask for a mistrial if the evidence were admitted and that he would also want to bring in the prosecutor to testify (assuming that the mistrial motion was denied). The judge concluded the conference by stating that he would sustain the objection but he would solve the issue "by a suitable instruction," indicating that such instruction would be specific and not vague or nondescript.
The plaintiffs allege that the extensive reference to a criminal investigation during the trial necessarily suggested to the jury that the authorities intended to prosecute Mrs. Goffstein for arson. They argue that the court should have allowed them to negate this inference by demonstrating that the official arson investigation had been closed without charging anyone.
As a general rule, evidence that criminal charges were not brought is inadmissible in a civil case arising out of the same events as the criminal charges. See Galbraith v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 464 F.2d 225 (3d Cir.1972). Plaintiffs acknowledge this general rule, but argue that the evidence should nevertheless have been admitted under the doctrine of curative admissibility. "The doctrine of curative admissibility allows a trial judge, in his discretion, to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to rebut prejudicial evidence which has already been erroneously admitted." United States v. Nardi, 633 F.2d 972, 977 (1st Cir.1980). Plaintiffs argue that evidence concerning the police investigation of this fire was both prejudicial and improperly admitted.
We are not convinced that the evidence concerning the police investigation unduly prejudiced plaintiffs. The officers' testimony focused solely on the cause of the fire; neither discussed any subsequent criminal investigation. Plaintiffs did not object that these witnesses testified as police investigators. Additionally, the most pointed reference to the criminal investigation occurred as a result of plaintiffs' cross-examination. 1 Likewise, we conclude that any prejudice which might have resulted from Page's or Carmody's reference to a police investigation was cured by the court's prompt admonition to the jury. Finally, we note that Mrs. Goffstein did testify during direct examination that she had never been arrested, charged with, or convicted of a felony. We believe that this evidence...
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