Goforth v. State
| Decision Date | 30 June 1913 |
| Citation | 63 So. 8,183 Ala. 66 |
| Parties | GOFORTH v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from City Court of Gadsden; J.A. Bilbro, Judge.
Wiley Goforth was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
The letter referred to in the opinion was dated Birmingham, Ala August 22, 1911, addressed to Mrs. Zella Cohelia, Altoona Ala. The bill of exceptions states that the letter was offered by the defendant as the letter testified to by the witness Zeigler as the letter he wrote to Zella Cohelia. It seems that Zeigler was a detective, and was present when witness Cohelia made a statement to the solicitor concerning the crime; also that Zeigler went to Arkansas, arrested the parties, and brought them back, and that he wrote the above letter after the killing.
Culli & Martin, of Gadsden, for appellant.
R.C. Brickell, Atty. Gen., and W.L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
DE GRAFFENRIED, J.
In a criminal prosecution the state may always offer the flight of the defendant from the neighborhood of the crime as some evidence--a circumstance--tending to show the guilt of the defendant.
When a crime has been committed, and the state offers evidence tending to show that the defendant absented himself from the community in which the crime was committed, the value of this fact of flight depends entirely upon the purpose of the defendant in thus absenting himself from the community. The question as to why the defendant left the community and remained away from it becomes a question for the jury, and so, when the state offers the fact of the defendant's flight from the community in evidence, the law allows both the state and the defendant to show all those things which the defendant said and did when he left, and while away from the community, which tend to explain the quo animo of the flight, whether the absence of the defendant was due to his sense of guilt, or his desire to avoid, or through fear of, arrest, or on the other hand, whether his absence was due to other causes.
The evidence which the defendant may offer on this subject cannot be offered or received as self-serving declarations tending to show that he had no connection with the commission of the corpus delicti. The evidence which he may lawfully offer on this subject is evidence connected with his flight, and explaining the character of the flight. In other words, when the state, in a criminal case, offers evidence tending to show flight on the part of the defendant, then the acts and words of the defendant which are so connected with the flight as to give character to it, and to really give color to it, are parts of the res gestae of the flight, and are admissible as such. Flight, as used in this connection, means that the defendant absented himself from the community of the crime out of a sense of guilt, out of fear of or to avoid arrest, and any word or act of the defendant while in flight--i.e., while away from the community of the crime--tending to explain the reason for his absence is admissible as a part of it. Of course a defendant, in such a case, cannot get before a court or jury his declaration that he is not guilty of the crime, or any other mere self-serving declaration tending to show that he had no connection with the commission of the corpus delicti, but he may show, as evidence tending to rebut the idea that his absence was in fact a "fleeing from justice," such acts and declarations of his while absent which may tend to show that his absence from the community was due to an entirely different cause. In other words, when flight is offered as a circumstance tending to show the defendant's guilt, the question is at once at hand as to whether, during his absence, the defendant is to be regarded as having been a fugitive from justice, or whether he is to be regarded as having been absent for an innocent and lawful purpose disassociated with any idea of the crime. In this connection the manner in which the defendant left the community--whether openly or secretly, whether in a usual or in an unusual manner, and whether at a usual or in an unusual time--are all matters which may go before the jury as tending to illustrate the character of the flight. The manner in which the defendant traveled while en route to the point of his destination, whether openly or secretly, and whether in a usual or in an unusual way, are also matters for the consideration of the jury. The point to which the defendant went and the general character of his conduct while there before his arrest, whether usual or unusual, are also matters for the consideration of the jury.
A criminal may, of course, leave a community in an open and in an accustomed way; he may, while on his journey, conduct himself in the usual and accustomed way, and when he reaches the point of his destination he may remain in the open, do nothing to conceal his identity, conduct himself in the usual way, and openly keep those informed at the place of the crime of his whereabouts. But a fugitive from justice does not usually behave in this manner because such behavior usually defeats the object of the criminal in becoming a fugitive from justice. The criminal usually leaves a community secretly, conceals his identity while en route, and by changing his name, etc., conceals his identity when he reaches his destination, etc. It is for these indicated reasons that the law, on the question as to whether a particular person was, at a particular period, a fugitive from justice, permits the broad range to the testimony to which we have above alluded.
The general facts in the instant case strongly illustrate the proposition under discussion. Altoona is a small mining town. The defendant, who was, at the time to which we refer, 17 years of age, resided there with his parents. There was evidence tending to show that the defendant was a miner, and that, as the work in the mine at the named point was becoming nonremunerative, he and an adult acquaintance, Joe Salsbury had, for some time, contemplated going to Spadra, Ark., where there was a mine, and where they could find remunerative work. The evidence shows that on the...
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Kuykendall v. Edmondson
...Hill v. State, 156 Ala. 3, 46 So. 864; Williams v. State, 105 Ala. 96, 17 So. 86; Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587, 595. In Goforth's Case, 183 Ala. 66, 63 So. 8, the words and of the defendant while away from the community of the crime were held competent as tending to explain the reason for h......
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Douglas v. State
...(2d Ed.), Vol. 1, § 21.01(3), pp. 16-17. The circumstance of an accused's fleeing is admissible as an admission. Thus, in Goforth v. State, 183 Ala. 66, 63 So. 8, there were two men indicted for the murder of Nicholas Shintzen. The opinion refers approvingly to proof of various efforts (suc......
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State v. Wilson
...of the defendant's explanation is for the jury in determining the weight to be attached to the circumstances of the flight. Goforth v. State, 183 Ala. 66, 63 So. 8; McAllister v. State, 30 Ala.App. 366, 6 So.2d 32; People v. Jackson, 88 Cal.App.2d 747, 199 P.2d 322; State v. Rowe, 203 Minn.......
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Hill v. State
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