Goggins v. Fawcett
| Citation | 147 A.2d 187,145 Conn. 709 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Decision Date | 02 December 1958 |
| Parties | Jesse GOGGINS, Jr. v. Roscoe K. FAWCETT, Jr., et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
J. Ronald Regnier, Hartford, with whom were William R. Moller, Hartford, and, on the brief, George E. Merwin, Hartford, for appellants (defendants).
Milton Krevolin, Hartford, with whom was Leo Rosen, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before DALY, C. J., and BALDWIN, KING, MURPHY and MELLITZ, JJ. MURPHY, Associate Justice.
In this opinion the named defendant will be treated as though he was the sold defendant and he will be referred to as the defendant. The action against the defendant Avis Ford, Inc., was withdrawn. Agency of the named defendant for his father, the defendant owner of the motor vehicle, has not been contested. The complaint alleged the following: The plaintiff was operating his automobile in a southerly direction on route 8 in the town of Colebrook about 7:45 p. m. on April 24, 1955, when the defendant drove his vehicle from off the highway into the plaintiff's car. The defendant drove northerly from the scene without stopping. The plaintiff turned about and pursued him into Massachusetts. When the defendant was overtaken, he applied his brakes and swerved into the path of the plaintiff, who was forced off the road. His car rolled over and came to rest in a gully. He was injured. The defendant continued on his way without stopping.
The plaintiff sought recovery for personal injuries and damage to his automobile. The defendant filed a demurrer to the complaint, alleging misjoinder of two separate and distinct causes of action. The demurrer was overruled. When the case was reached for trial, the defendant renewed his claim of misjoinder, but the trial court heard the case on the merits and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant has appealed, alleging error in the ruling on the demurrer and error during the trial.
Section 7819(7) of the General Statutes permits the joinder in one complaint of both legal and equitable claims 'arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action.' Such a statute is liberally construed. 1 Am.Jur. 465, § 77. While the complaint alleges two separate torts, one in this state and the other in Massachusetts, they are acts having some connection with each other, in which both parties are concerned, and by which the legal relations of the parties have been altered. Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 561, 29 A. 76, 25 L.R.A. 856. The allegations describing the operation by the defendant of his vehicle from the time it was driven into collision with the plaintiff's car on the highway in Colebrook until it caused the plaintiff's car to veer off the road in Massachusetts were a recitation of a group of related acts which went to make up one entire course of conduct and constituted a single transaction within the meaning of the statute. Ripley v. Rodgers, 213 S.C. 541, 544, 50 S.E.2d 575. The same result would be reached if what is viewed as one transaction could be regarded as consisting of more than one transaction, since all would be connected with the same subject of action, that is, the operation of the defendant's vehicle. Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., supra, 63 Conn. at page 562, 29 A. at page 78. The demurrer was properly overruled.
Upon the trial, the evidence disclosed that the defendant's station wagon, facing south, had been parked along the westerly edge of route 8 in Colebrook about two miles from the Massachusetts state line. The defendant and a companion consumed some beer and wine while seated on a stone in a field. The defendant had not eaten since lunch at 1:30 p. m. A drizzling rain was falling. The windows in the station wagon were fogged. The defendant made a U turn onto the highway without regard to southbound traffic. His left front bumper struck the plaintiff's car on the right side. The plaintiff stopped his car and backed up but the defendant, though he knew that he had struck the plaintiff's car, drove northerly from the scene without stopping to ascertain the damage he...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Fernandez
...in endeavoring, without harm to the parties, "to bring the facts out more clearly and to ascertain the truth"; Goggins v. Fawcett, 145 Conn. 709, 713, 147 A.2d 187 (1958); in trying to bring out the facts to resolve a doubt it apparently had as to the admissibility of certain evidence; Hutc......
-
State v. Boone, s. 5703
...641, 500 A.2d 1303 (1985); State v. Day, supra, 129, 529 A.2d 1333; and "to bring the facts out more clearly." Goggins v. Fawcett, 145 Conn. 709, 713, 147 A.2d 187 (1958). There is absolutely no basis, from our review, to conclude that the court took a position of advocacy or otherwise abus......
-
Balog v. Shelton Restaurant, LLC, No. CV-04-0084313S (CT 8/2/2004)
...there is some substantial unity . . ." Ripley v. Rodgers, 213 S.C. 541, 50 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1948), cited in Goggins v. Fawcett, 145 Conn. 709, 710, 711, 147 A.2d 187 (1958). Historically, the Connecticut Supreme Court has taken a liberal approach to permissive joinder. See Goggins v. Fawcet......
-
Madero v. People's Bank, No. X01 CV-03 0185488 (CT 2/22/2005)
...here referenced) favoring consolidation. §52-104 being a remedial statute, it is to be liberally construed. See e.g., Goggins v. Fawcett, 145 Conn. 709, 710 (1958).11 3) Cases on the Complex Litigation Docket are there because the matters are "complex" and often combine various causes of ac......