Goggins v. Hoddes
| Decision Date | 05 May 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 5047.,5047. |
| Parties | Gertrude GOGGINS, Appellant, v. Irving N. HODDES, t/a Harris Beauty Supply Co., Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and KELLY and NEBEKER, Associate Judges.
Appellant complained in the trial court that she was libelled when her employer filed an allegedly false report with the District Unemployment Compensation Board (hereinafter the Board) charging her with dishonesty in a deliberate attempt to cause her to lose unemployment benefits. The trial court granted the appellee-employer's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Pursuant to the provisions of D.C.Code 1967, § 46-313(b) the Board promulgated certain rules and regulations. One of them, Employer Regulation VIII, B(1), requires that
[w]henever a worker is separated from his employment permanently, for an indefinite period or for an expected duration of seven or more days, under conditions which may disqualify such worker from benefits pursuant to the provisions of section 10 of the Act, such worker's employer shall mail within forty-eight hours after such separation a Separation Report, on the form supplied by the Board of such notice, to the office of the Board at the address specified in such notice.
D.C.Code 1967, § 46-313(f) provides, in pertinent part, that information supplied the Board shall be confidential.1 Except as provided in § 46-313(f), information obtained by the Board may not be divulged. D.C.Code 1967, § 46-317(b).
It appears that a report stating that appellant was "discharged for dishonesty, shortages in cash and stock * * *" was filed with the Board by her employer, for appellant was so notified by a Claims Deputy of the Board. This amounted to misconduct in the course of her work, the deputy said, which disqualified appellant from receiving unemployment benefits for a certain period of time.2
We hold that the court was correct in the grant of summary judgment. The communication alleged to have been made in this case is absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis of an action for libel. Simpson v. Oil Transfer Corporation, 75 F.Supp. 819 (N.D.N.Y.1948); Breuer v. Bo-Craft Enterprises, 8 Misc.2d 736, 170 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1957); Stafney v. Standard Oil Co., 71 N.D. 170, 299 N.W. 582, 136 A.L.R. 535 (1941).
Affirmed.
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. THOMPSON
...compensation board is "absolutely privileged" against a libel action based on the contents of the report. See Goggins v. Hoddes, 265 A.2d 302, 303 (D.C. 1970). Many years earlier, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had accordedan absolute privilege to communications by the Co......
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William Loveland Coll. v. Distance Educ. Accreditation Comm'n, Civil Action No. 17-2037 (ABJ)
...Services that the plaintiff had been discharged for theft had to be dismissed because the report was required by law); Goggins v. Hoddes , 265 A.2d 302, 303 (D.C. 1970) (applying absolute privilege to libel claim based on a report required by law to be filed with unemployment compensation b......
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McKethean v. WMATA
...liable for failing to repair a deteriorating median strip. 8 Appellants also challenge the trial court's ruling that under Goggins v. Hoddes, 265 A.2d 302 (D.C.1970), both WMATA and the District were immune from liability for any negligence arising from the initial decision to locate the bu......
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Turner v. Federal Express Corp.
...June 18, 1985) (holding that representations made during DOES hearing may not be the basis for a lawsuit); accord Goggins v. Hoddes, 265 A.2d 302, 303 (D.C.1970) (explaining that communication by employer to DOES concerning termination of employee is absolutely privileged). To the extent th......