Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford
| Decision Date | 30 March 1954 |
| Citation | 104 A.2d 365,141 Conn. 135 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | GOHLD REALTY CO. v. CITY OF HARTFORD et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
I. Oscar Levine, Harford, with whom were Ethel S. Sorokin, Hartford, and, on the brief, Melvin S. Katz, Hartford, for plaintiff.
Hugh M. Alcorn, Jr., with whom was Henry P. Bakewell, Hartford, for defendants.
T. Ward Cleary, Stamford, with whom, on the brief, were Richard L. Reilly, E. Haven, George W. Crawford, New Haven, Edmund J. Eshenfelder, New London, Robert B. Devine, Norwalk, Orrin Carashick, Norwich, Vincent J. Scamporino, Middletown, George J. Finn, Shelton, John M. Hanrahan, Stamford George J. Crocicchia, Waterbury, and Joseph F. Dannehy, Willimantic, appeared as amici curiae.
Before INGLIS, C. J., BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN and WYNNE, JJ., and DALY, Superior Court Judge.
This reservation poses the question whether the Connecticut Redevelopment Act, chapter 55 of the General Statutes §§ 383c-390c of the 1953 Cumulative Supplement, is unconstitutional.
The stipulated facts out of which this controversy arises are the following: On April 24, 1950, the common council of the city of Hartford adopted the provisions of the Redevelopment Act and created a redevelopment agency. Arrangements were then made with the united States in accordance with the provisions of title 1 of the federal Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 414, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1451, whereby the federal government has undertaken to make certain financial grants in aid of the execution of the redevelopment plan hereinafter described with the result that the federal government will bear two-thirds and the city one-third of the net financial loss incurred. It is contemplated that the city will expend an estimated amount of $209,000 for the construction of streets and related improvements in connection with the project and will make a cash grant in the amount of $346,000. All of the municipal outlays of money will be provided by the sale of general obligation bonds of the city.
The redevelopment agency, in May, 1953, adopted a plan in minute detail for the redevelopment of the so-called Front-Market area. This plan complies with the requirement of the statute. Cum.Sup.1953, § 384c. It delineates the area as containing two city blocks bounded by Market, Talcott, Front and State Streets with two extensions into adjacent blocks. It sets forth the finding of the agency that the area, located one block east of the central shopping districts and in one of the oldest parts of the city, is deteriorated, substandard and detrimental to the safety, health, welfare and morals of the residents of the city. This finding is supported by a large body of facts relating to the nature, structure, substandard condition and disrepair of the buildings and the high incidence of crime, juvenile delinquency and disease in the neighborhood. The finding states that the area is presently occupied by residential, commercial and light industrial buildings with some parking lots and that many of the buildings are used for both commercial and residential purposes. The description of the area contained in the plan is that of a typical slum.
On the basis of the findings of the agency it is proposed, as stated in the plan, to acquire, through purchase or otherwise, including the exercise of the power of eminent domain, all of the real property in the area and to demolish the structures, clear the site and provide for the redevelopment thereof. The redevelopment will involve a relocation of streets and utilities and a devotion of the area to retail and wholesale business and parking facilities. When the land is cleared, it will be offered for sale or lease at a fair value to redevelopers. Full opportunity will be given potential redevelopers to submit offers. The sale or lease of the property will be conditioned on the development and use of the property in conformity with the redevelopment plan. The plan also sets forth the methods to be adopted for providing housing for those persons who presently live within the area and for financing the project.
The area in question now consists partly of vacant or unimproved land and land with some structures not in themselves substandard or insanitary but which have been found by the agency to be essential to the completion of an adequate unit of development.
The plaintiff is a taxpayer of the city of Hartford and owns certain commercial real estate within the area, at the corner of State and Market Streets. In the event that the redevelopment plan is carried out and the plaintiff is not willing to sell its property, the defendants will acquire it by condemnation proceedings.
The questions propounded are set forth in the footnote. 1 They divide themselves into three groups. First, questions (a) and (b) are whether the Redevelopment Act is unconstitutional in granting to the city of Hartford the power of eminent domain to acquire the property involved in the Front-Market project even though a portion of that property is not substandard. Second, question (c) is whether the act is unconstitutional in permitting the use of public funds for financing the cost of acquiring, improving and disposing of the property within the area. Third, question (d) is whether the act, by giving the agency authority to select redevelopers and to determine the conditions and restrictions under which the property shall be used, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers.
Section 982 of the General Statutes provides that a redevelopment agency such as that set up in the city of Hartford 'may acquire real property by eminent domain * * * in accordance with the provisions of section 7181.' It is fundamental that, as an attribute of sovereignty, the state government or any properly designated agency thereof may take private property under its power of eminent domain if the taking is for a public use and if just compensation is paid therefor. Conn. Const. Art. 1, § 11; Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Collins, 138 Conn. 582, 586, 87 A.2d 139. Such a taking does not deprive a person of his property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution if the procedure prescribed accords him a fair hearing. In the present case there is no claim that the procedure provided by § 7181 of the General Statutes is defective. The principal contention of the plaintiff with reference to questions (a) and (b) is that the proposed taking of its property is not for a public use.
Board of Water Commissioners v. Manchester, 87 Conn. 193, 204, 87 A. 870, 873. Whether the purpose for which a statute authorizes the condemnation of property constitutes a public use is, in the end, a judicial question to be resolved by the courts; Farist Steel Co. v. City of Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278, 291, 22 A. 561, 13 L.R.A. 590; but, in resolving it, great weight must be given to the determination of the legislature. See New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Long, 69 Conn. 424, 436, 37 A. 1070.
By § 383c of the 1953 Cumulative Supplement, the General Assembly made a declaration of public policy with reference to redevelopment. It found that there 'exist in municipalities of the state substandard, insanitary deteriorated, slum or blighted areas which constitute a serious and growing menace, injurious and inimical to the public health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state; that the existence of such areas contributes substantially and increasingly to the spread of disease and crime, necessitating excessive and disproportionate expenditures of public funds for the preservation of the public health and safety, for crime prevention, correction, prosecution, punishment and the treatment of juvenile delinquency and for the maintenance of adequate police, fire and accident protection * * *; that this menace is beyond remedy and control solely by regulatory process in the exercise of the police power and cannot be dealt with effectively by the ordinary operations of private enterprise without the aids herein provided; that the acquisition of property for the purpose of eliminating substandard, insanitary, deteriorated, slum or blighted conditions thereon or preventing recurrence of such conditions in the area, the removal of structures and improvement of sites, the disposition of the property for redevelopment incidental to the foregoing, the exercise of powers by municipalities acting through agencies known as redevelopment agencies as herein provided * * * are public uses and purposes for which public money may be expended and the power of eminent domain exercised'.
In the act, a redevelopment area is defined as one 'which is deteriorated, substandard or detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community'. Cum.Sup.1953, § 384c. It is with reference to such an area that a local redevelopment agency is authorized to prepare a plan for redevelopment and, in the execution of the plan, take private property by condemnation. Cum.Sup.1953, §§ 383c-385c; General Statutes § 982. In the light of considerations such as those set forth in the legislative declaration of policy quoted above, there can be no doubt that the elimination of such substandard, insanitary, deteriorated, slum or blighted areas as are described therein and in the portions of the statute which authorize condemnation is for the public welfare. Private property taken for the purpose of eradicating the conditions which obtain in such areas is taken for a public use.
The Redevelopment Act contemplates that...
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