Goin v. Eater

• Decision Date: 14 July 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-561,81-561
• Citation: Goin v. Eater, 438 N.E.2d 234, 107 Ill.App.3d 887, 63 Ill.Dec. 496 (Ill. App. 1982)
• Parties: , 63 Ill.Dec. 496 John S. GOIN and Shirley V. Goin: and Marshall Hamilton and Virginia L. Hamilton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Edith EATER, Pauline Ellis, Irene Lynn, and Thomas Morlan, Defendants- Appellants, and Old Ben Coal Company, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 234

438 N.E.2d 234

107 Ill.App.3d 887, 63 Ill.Dec. 496

John S. GOIN and Shirley V. Goin: and Marshall Hamilton and Virginia L. Hamilton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.Edith EATER, Pauline Ellis, Irene Lynn, and Thomas MorlanDefendants- Appellants and Old Ben Coal Company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 81-561.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

July 14, 1982.

Elmer Jenkins, Benton, for defendants-appellants.

Vance I. Kepley, Reno, O'Byrne & Kepley, Champaign, for John S. and Shirley V. Goin.

Van Winkle & Van Winkle, McLeansboro, for Marshall and Virginia L. Hamilton.

HARRISON, Justice.

The defendants, Edith Eater, Pauline Ellis, Irene Lynn and Thomas Morlan, appeal from a final judgment of the circuit court of Hamilton County, which, pursuant to a complaint for declaratory relief, determined that the plaintiffs, John S. Goin, Shirley Goin, Marshall Hamilton and Virginia Hamilton, were the owners of the mineral interests in certain parcels of land.This appeal presents two issues for review.First, the defendants contend that the trial court erred in construing a deed containing the words "formerly reserved" to limit the exception of coal, oil, gas and other minerals to the life estate which was outstanding at the time of the conveyances in question.Second, the defendants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of laches to this controversy.We affirm.

Plaintiffs Goin instituted this declaratory judgment action against the defendants.Plaintiffs Hamilton were subsequently allowed to intervene in the action.The evidence introduced at trial consisted largely of certified copies of the conveyances at issue in this action.These revealed that on August 13, 1941, Nancy E. Hart conveyed the entire property in question to the defendants' parents, Thomas P. Morlan and Eunice B. Morlan, as joint tenants.On January 24, 1942, the Morlans reconveyed to Hart an undivided one-half interest in all the oil, gas, and other minerals in the tract.The conveyance provided that, at Hart's death, her interest would revert to the Morlans or their assigns.Thomas Morlan died on August 15, 1957.On March 24, 1958, Eunice Morlan conveyed the property to Herman R. Brechtefeld and Helen I. Brechtefeld as joint tenants by a warranty deed describing the real estate as

"[t]he Northwest Quarter (NW 1/4) of the Northeast Quarter (NE 1/4) of Section Sixteen (16), Township Four (4) South Range Five (5) East of the Third Principal Meridian, except One Hundred Fifty (150) feet for Roadbed now occupied by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and except, the Right-of-way of State Highway Route # 142, as recorded in Deed Record 113at page 378 in the Office of the Recorder of Hamilton County, Illinois; and except, all the coal, oil, gas and other minerals formerly reserved * * *."

Herman Brechtefeld died on July 24, 1964.Nancy E. Hart remarried and then died on January 15, 1965.

On March 11, 1969, Helen Brechtefeld conveyed to John S. Goin and Shirley V. Goin as joint tenants "that part of the Northwest Quarter (NW 1/4) of the Northeast Quarter (NE 1/4) of Section 16 in Township 4 South, Range 5, East of the Third Principal Meridian, lying North and East of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, except 150 feet for Roadbed now occupied by Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and except Right of S.B.I. Route 142, now U.S. Route 460, containing 19.2 acres.Subject to any prior reservations and conveyances of coal, oil, gas and other minerals."

On July 1, 1971, Helen Brechtefeld conveyed the rest of the property in question to LaVerne Lucky and Pearl Ann Lucky by a warranty deed containing essentially the same language as the Morlan to Brechtefeld conveyance.On August 11, 1972, LaVerne Lucky and Pearl Ann Lucky conveyed to George R. Koenig and Laura E. Koenig the property "lying South of U.S. highway route 460, and except all coal, oil, gas and other minerals formerly reserved * * *."On December 16, 1977, George R. Koenig and Laura E. Koenig conveyed that property to Marshall W. Hamilton and Virginia L. Hamilton by a warranty deed containing an identical description.

In summary, the claims of each set of plaintiffs arose under a chain of title common to both until March 11, 1969.At that time Brechtefeld conveyed one part of the property to the Goins while retaining another portion of the property.In 1971she conveyed the retained tract to the Hamiltons' predecessors in interest.The defendants' claim is predicated on the exception of "all the coal, oil, gas and other minerals formerly reserved," contained in the 1958 deed from Eunice B. Morlan to the Brechtefelds, the defendants asserting that this interest passed to them upon Morlan's death.

On April 4, 1978the defendants Eater, Ellis, Lynn and Morlan filed a notice of their claimed interest in the oil and gas underlying the real estate in question.On July 28, 1980 the Goins filed their complaint in the circuit court and on January 20, 1981 the Hamiltons' petition to intervene was granted.DefendantOld Ben Coal Company filed an answer but participated no further in this case.After a trial, judgment was entered in favor of both sets of plaintiffs and against the individual defendants.The defendants thereafter perfected this appeal from that judgment.

The defendants assert first that the trial court erred in construing the words "formerly reserved" to limit only the exception of coal, oil, gas and other minerals outstanding at the time of the conveyance from Morlan to the Brechtefelds.The defendants argue that, because a grantee under a deed is estopped from controverting recitals contained in the deed (seeWiley v. Lamprecht(1948), 400 Ill. 587, 592, 81 N.E.2d 459), the plaintiffs may not deny that the grantor, Morlan, excepted the coal, gas, oil and other minerals.By asserting that Morlan reserved to herself the mineral interests in question this argument assumes the point in issue and we therefore find this theory, and the cases cited in its support, to be inapposite.The real issue before us is what interest, if any, was retained by Eunice Morlan in 1958 when she conveyed the property to the Brechtefelds.Because all of the plaintiffs derived their asserted interests from this transaction, the following discussion will apply equally to each plaintif...