Goin v. Houdashelt
Decision Date | 10 June 2020 |
Docket Number | #28986,#28971 |
Citation | 2020 S.D. 32 |
Parties | MOLLY GOIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BRANDON KEITH HOUDASHELT, Defendant and Appellee. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
[¶1.] Keith Houdashelt employed Molly Goin for approximately one month to help him prepare to open his kombucha bar in Rapid City. After Houdashelt fired her, Goin brought an action in small claims court for unpaid wages, among other claims, which Houdashelt removed to circuit court. After ruling in favor of Goin on the unpaid wages claim at trial, the circuit court determined that Goin's request for attorney fees under SDCL 60-11-24 could not be granted, though reasonable, because the removal statute referenced in SDCL 60-11-24 had been repealed. Goin appealed that decision. By notice of review, Houdashelt raised two issues: whether the action was actually a wage claim; and whether the fees that would have been awarded under SDCL 60-11-24 were unreasonable. We affirm.
[¶2.] In early 2018, Molly Goin learned that Keith Houdashelt was opening a kombucha bar (Lone Pine Kombucha) in Rapid City. Goin called Houdashelt and expressed interest in working at the bar, and Houdashelt offered her a position as a tap server for $11.00 per hour. Goin and Houdashelt later met in person and discussed Goin having a different position until the kombucha bar opened that would include marketing, social media, and reaching out to potential partners. Goin had worked on websites and social media before, both personally and for the Society Pages in Minneapolis. Goin asked that the payment be increased to $13.00 per hour for the new responsibilities, and Houdashelt agreed. Goin worked her first day with Houdashelt on March 3, 2018.
[¶3.] Over the course of her work for Houdashelt, Goin worked on creating a website and Facebook page for Lone Pine Kombucha, experimented with some smoothie recipes which she introduced to Houdashelt, and went to local businesses in Rapid City and Spearfish to discuss those businesses potentially adding a kombucha tap to their bars. Goin worked in the kombucha bar, at home, and at the potential partners' businesses.
[¶4.] Houdashelt provided no formal method of tracking Goin's hours worked. Goin kept track of the hours she worked in her planner. Houdashelt knew that Goin was doing so, and Goin stated that Houdashelt indicated that was acceptable to him until the bar opened. When Goin was not in the shop, or when Houdashelt was out of town, they maintained contact by phone and text message. In late March, Houdashelt informed Goin for the first time that he would not be paying her for work done outside of the bar.
[¶5.] Houdashelt fired Goin on April 2 or 3, 2018, due to dissatisfaction with her work. At that time, he asked how many hours she had worked, and Goin responded with 22 hours, though she did not have her planner with her. Houdashelt told Goin he thought she worked more hours than that, and paid her in cash for 40 hours of work. Goin later looked at her planner and found that she had been undercompensated for the actual hours worked.
[¶6.] Goin sent a demand letter to Houdashelt on April 12, 2018, for compensation for wages owed and damages suffered from withheld wages and loss of her home mortgage, which she obtained conditioned upon her employment. Goin then filed a small claims action in May 2018 to recover unpaid wages for her timeworking for Houdashelt and other damages. In total, she sought $10,947.20, made up of unpaid wages, costs, reliance damages, filing fees, attorney fees and costs, and punitive damages to be claimed if the matter proceeded to trial. Goin's statement of small claims identified that she sought recovery of "the wages she is owed and damages suffered from withheld wages and termination of her mortgage."
[¶7.] Houdashelt removed the action to circuit court because the action involved "issues and questions of fact and law that are so complex and important that the parties cannot be adequately protected without the procedure of a formal trial." Goin filed a formal complaint on three counts: (1) breach of contract; (2) negligent misrepresentation; and (3) unjust enrichment. Houdashelt later made a motion for summary judgment, asserting there was no contract that could have been breached, Goin had no expectation of future employment, and that all assertions were speculative so no factfinder could find that Goin was not fully compensated. The circuit court granted Houdashelt's motion on the breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation claims, but allowed the unjust enrichment claim and the issue of whether Goin was paid for her work to go to trial.
[¶8.] The circuit court held a bench trial in January 2019. Finding both Goin's and Houdashelt's testimony credible, the circuit court found that Houdashelt owed Goin for 15 hours of wages at $13.00 per hour plus interest ($215.00) and ordered him to pay that amount, but ruled for Houdashelt in a directed verdict on Goin's claim for unjust enrichment. The court found that no testimony had been presented on the unjust enrichment claim. After taking the issue under advisement, the court also concluded that the attorney fees requested by Goin wereappropriate and reasonable and awarded them under SDCL 60-11-24. SDCL 60-11-24 provides: "In any action for wages brought in small claims court which is removed to magistrate court or circuit court under § 15-39-59, the court may, in addition to awarding judgment to the plaintiff, allow costs of the action including reasonable attorney fees to be paid by the defendant."
[¶9.] However, the circuit court later discovered that SDCL 15-39-591 had been repealed in 2000 by this Court and asked the parties to brief the issue of whether fees could still be awarded under SDCL 60-11-24 and whether the court should reconsider its ruling on attorney fees. Goin argued that removal actions brought after 15-39-59's repeal were now allowed under SDCL 15-39-57, which states in relevant part:
No party may appeal any decision entered under this procedure. In lieu thereof, defendant may, five days prior to the date upon which the defendant is notified to appear or answer, file in the court in which the action is pending, a petition to remove the action to the regular civil docket of the circuit court or magistrate court and state therein whether the defendant intends to proceed with a trial by jury or a trial to the court. Failure to make the request within the time provided shall be deemed an acceptance by the defendant to the jurisdiction of small claims court.
Goin argued that the substance of the removal process presented in SDCL 15-39-57 is unchanged from SDCL 15-39-59's process, so SDCL 60-11-24 can now be used in conjunction with SDCL 15-39-57. Houdashelt responded that allowing attorney fees under SDCL 60-11-24 would violate its plain meaning, as well as the general rulefollowed in South Dakota that attorney fees are disfavored absent specific contractual or statutory provisions to the contrary. See Crisman v. Determan Chiropractic, Inc., 2004 S.D. 103, ¶ 26, 687 N.W.2d 507, 513.
[¶10.] In an amended order on attorney fees, the court ultimately determined that it could not award attorney fees because SDCL 15-39-59 was repealed. However, the circuit court did still award Goin $377.68 in costs. Goin moved for reconsideration, but was notified that reconsideration would not happen before the time to appeal expired.
[¶11.] Goin now appeals raising the issue whether the circuit court erred in deciding the repeal of SDCL 15-39-59 prevented it from awarding attorney fees that were reasonable and warranted under SDCL 60-11-24. Houdashelt raises two additional issues by notice of review: whether the circuit court erred in characterizing Goin's action as a wage dispute subject to SDCL 60-11-24; and whether the circuit court erred in determining $10,850.09 was a reasonable award of attorney fees for a recovery of $215.00.
[¶12.] The circuit court concluded that no legal basis existed to grant attorney fees under SDCL 60-11-24 because the statute only applies to cases removed under SDCL 15-39-59 and cases can no longer be removed under SDCL 15-39-59 since its repeal in 2000. In doing so, the circuit court stated, "the [c]ourtcannot graft the right to fees into [SDCL 60-11-24 as it remains]." According to the circuit court, only the Legislature can.
[¶13.] Questions of statutory interpretation and application are questions of law reviewed de novo. S.D. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Federated Mut. Ins., Inc., 2000 S.D. 11, ¶ 10, 605 N.W.2d 166, 168. "When the language of a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, and the court's only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed in the statute." Id. ¶ 17, 605 N.W.2d at 169 . "We read statutes as a whole along with the enactments relating to the same subject." Faircloth v. Raven Indus., Inc., 2000 S.D. 158, ¶ 6, 620 N.W.2d 198, 201. We also assume that no statute was meant to be "mere surplusage." Id.
[¶14.] Goin argues that "[t]he only way to give effect to SDCL 60-11-24 is to interpret the language referencing wage claims under the same title and chapter." Goin asserts that SDCL 60-11-24 should be given effect by referencing...
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