Goins v. Lane

• Decision Date: 28 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-2941,84-2941
• Citation: 787 F.2d 248
• Parties: David GOINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael LANE, Director, Department of Corrections, State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 248

787 F.2d 248

David GOINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael LANE, Director, Department of Corrections, State of

Illinois, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 84-2941.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 31, 1985.

Decided March 28, 1986.

John Lanahan, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.

James E. Fitzgerald, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for respondent-appellee.

Before WOOD, ESCHBACH, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge. ^*

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge.

The primary question presented in this appeal is whether the failure of petitioner's counsel to move to quash the arrest of petitioner constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court concluded that it did not and denied the petition for federal habeas-corpus relief. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.

I

On April 5, 1977, four men wearing ski masks and carrying weapons robbed a grocery store and killed the owner of the establishment. A thirteen-year old girl who was in the store at the time said that she saw the men's faces when they lifted their masks. She later identified petitioner, David Goins, as one of the offenders. The four men left the scene of the crime in a yellow automobile, which was damaged on the driver's side. The investigating officers found a car matching that description and spoke to the owner of the automobile, who indicated that Goins had borrowed it from him earlier in the day. The officers went to the Goins's home, but were told by his family that he had left. The police gave Goins's mother a telephone number for the homicide unit. Goins called the police station when he returned home later in the afternoon. The officers went to the Goins's residence and took him into custody. Goins was placed in two line-ups and identified as a participant in the robbery. After several sessions of questioning, he confessed to his involvement in the crime.

Goins was charged with armed robbery and murder. His trial counsel filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the confession on the ground that it had been coerced and thus was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Counsel also moved to suppress in-court and out-of-court identification evidence. After a hearing, the state trial judge denied these motions. Goins's trial counsel succeeded in having the case assigned to another judge. Goins waived his right to trial by jury. The trial then proceeded, and Goins's trial counsel renewed the motion to suppress the confession as coerced. The motion was denied and the confession was received into evidence. The trial court found Goins guilty of armed robbery and murder, but concluded that the armed robbery offense had merged into the murder charge. Goins was sentenced to a prison term of 25 to 50 years.

Goins filed a direct appeal (in which he was represented by different counsel) from his state conviction and challenged only the length of his sentence. While the direct appeal was pending, Goins's new counsel filed a petition for post-conviction relief with the original state trial court, and argued that Goins had been denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel had failed to present a Fourth Amendment challenge to quash the arrest as obtained without probable cause. His new counsel also argued that Goins had been illegally arrested on a traffic warrant, that the police had acted in bad faith, and that the police did not have probable cause to arrest Goins. Goins's new counsel argued that an evidentiary hearing was needed on the ground that certain material facts were not in the record and thus were not available for the state appellate court's consideration in the direct appeal.

The state trial court dismissed the post-conviction petition and Goins filed an appeal from that ruling. His murder conviction was affirmed in the direct state appeal. In addition, the Illinois appellate court found that the issues raised in the post-conviction petition (including the issue of ineffective assistance) had been waived due to Goins's failure to raise them at trial or on direct appeal. The appellate court, however, went on to consider the merits of the ineffective-assistance claim and concluded that the performance of Goins's trial counsel had not fallen below the constitutional minimum. Goins's petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was denied.

Goins then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. He alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments due to the failure of his trial counsel to move to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest. The district court rejected the respondent's argument that Goins had waived his ineffective-assistance claim due to his failure to present these issues in a timely fashion to the state courts. A hearing on the merits was held. Goins's trial counsel, among other witnesses, testified and discussed his involvement in the state criminal proceeding. Goins's trial counsel also stated that, the day after Goins had been found guilty by the state trial court, he (the trial counsel) had pleaded guilty in contempt proceedings arising from unrelated federal criminal charges lodged against him. As a result of the guilty plea, Goins's trial counsel was ordered not to practice law in any court in Illinois for one year.

The district court held that the failure of Goins's trial counsel to move to quash the arrest (and thus the confession) had not denied Goins effective assistance of counsel. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was accordingly denied. This appeal followed.

II

As noted above, the district court rejected the respondent's argument that Goins's failure to raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal at the state-court level constituted a waiver of that claim. The court reasoned that the Illinois appellate court, although initially invoking the waiver rule, ultimately ruled on the merits of Goins's ineffective-assistance claim in the post-conviction proceeding. The respondent urges on appeal that the district court erred in reaching the merits without first determining whether Goins could demonstrate "cause and prejudice." See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 433 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). The respondent, as the prevailing party below, may of course assert any ground, appearing in the record, in support of the judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon by the trial court. Farmer v. Prast, 721 F.2d 602, 606 n.7 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475-76 n.6, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1156-57 n.6, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)).

We agree that the district court incorrectly ruled on the waiver question. If the state appellate court rules on the merits of a constitutional claim, but not on the state procedural issue regarding waiver, federal habeas-corpus review is available. Farmer, 721 F.2d at 605 n.5. However, federal habeas-corpus relief is precluded if the state appellate court affirms a state trial court decision on the "twin grounds" of (1) lack of merit for the constitutional claim and (2) the petitioner's failure, without justification, to comply with a state procedural rule, unless of course the petitioner demonstrates in federal court cause and prejudice for the procedural default. See United States ex rel. Merneigh v. Greer, 772 F.2d 322, 325-28 (7th Cir. 1985); Jentges v. Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 733 F.2d 1238, 1243 n.1 (7th Cir. 1984); Farmer, 721 F.2d at 605-06. In this case, the "twin ground" rule applies; the district court, therefore, should have required that Goins make a showing of cause and prejudice.

We could remand the case to allow the district court to determine whether Goins has satisfied the "cause and prejudice" requirement. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642, 650 (7th Cir. 1982). However, litigation concerning the validity of Goins's conviction has been in progress for nine years. In light of the unique posture of the instant case, the interests of quiescence and judicial economy will not be advanced if this action is remanded for further proceedings regarding the reasons for Goins's procedural default if his underlying constitutional claim is without merit. We will, therefore, consider the argument that Goins was denied effective assistance of counsel.

We first note that Goins's Sixth Amendment claim in this habeas action is predicated on the failure of his trial counsel to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to his confession. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), the Supreme Court held that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted habeas-corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was admitted at trial. There is a conflict among the circuits regarding the effect of Stone on a Sixth Amendment claim based on counsel's failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim. Compare LiPuma v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 84, 93 n.6 (2d Cir.) (Stone bars consideration of habeas petitioner's contention that counsel was ineffective due to failure to file motion to suppress), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861, 98 S.Ct. 189, 54 L.Ed.2d 135 (1977), with Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1978) (Stone does not bar relief in such circumstances), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 2009, 60 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); see also Christian v. McKaskle, 731 F.2d 1196, 1199 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussion of LiPuma and Sallie ).

We hold that the rule of Stone does not apply to a state prisoner's federal habeas claim of ineffective assistance based on his counsel's failure to pursue or present a Fourth...