Goins v. Newark Hous. Auth.
| Decision Date | 12 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 15-2195 (KM) (JBC) |
| Parties | CHERYL GOINS, Plaintiff, v. NEWARK HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
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This Opinion is the latest in a series regarding this matter. I write primarily for the parties and presume familiarity with the facts and procedural history.
This action arises from plaintiff Cheryl Goins's past employment with defendant the Newark Housing Authority ("NHA"). Ms. Goins has alleged that NHA asked her to participate in illegal conduct, engaged in discriminatory and retaliatory behavior against her, and failed to pay her overtime wages. Prior Opinions of the Court have disposed of the majority of the claims raised in Ms. Goins's Complaint.
Now pending before the Court is defendant NHA's third motion (DE 135)1 for summary judgment. That it is the third such motion is by no means defendant's fault; multiple errors and defaults by plaintiff's counsel, as outlined in a prior opinion, have accounted for the many delays and procedural false starts in this action. (DE 128)
NHA now seeks summary judgment on Ms. Goins's contract-related Conscientious Employee Protection Act ("CEPA") claim, which was reinstated after a prior dismissal. For the reasons provided herein, I will deny NHA's motion because Ms. Goins has raised issues of fact. (DE 135).
The procedural history was recited in detail in prior Opinions in this matter. I note only the most important details.
On March 27, 2015 Ms. Goins filed a Complaint against NHA, her former employer. (Compl. ¶4). The Complaint contained five counts, two of which were withdrawn. On June 19, 2018, NHA filed its first motion for summary judgment (DE 85) with respect to the remaining three claims: violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") (Count One); CEPA violations (Count Two); and claims for racial discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C § 1981 (Count Five). On March 29, 2019, I granted defendant's motions with respect to Counts Two and Five. (DE 98 at 33) Therefore, the sole surviving claim was for uncompensated overtime pursuant to the FLSA. (Id.).
Ms. Goins then filed a motion (DE 100) for partial reconsideration with respect to the dismissal of her CEPA claim. I dismissed the CEPA claim following defendant's first motion for summary judgment because I found that Ms. Goins had failed to identify the particular law that she believed NHA had violated. (DE 98 at 31) On reconsideration, Ms. Goins submitted that the Court overlooked evidence of particular legal violations. I found that, although Ms. Goins's briefing and statement of facts on summary judgment had failed to cite or specify any such violation, it could be found in an accompanying Declaration. The Declaration did articulate a specific law that Goins believed was violated: "N.J. Local Public Contracts Law and Regulation Reference Manual N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 et seq." (DE 128 at 13) (citing DE 90 at 6-9, Goins Declaration ("Decl." ¶¶14-26)). In particular, Ms. Goins pinpointed N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:11-15, "Duration of Contracts." (Id.). Because Ms. Goins did cite to aparticular legal violation, I reinstated her contract-related CEPA claim.2 (DE 128 at 13-14).
On March 13, 2020, I ruled on defendant's pending second motion (DE 110) for summary judgment and Ms. Goins's cross-motion (DE 112) for summary judgment. (DE 129 at 1-2). For the reasons articulated in the March 13, 2020 Opinion, I substantially granted, but denied in part NHA's motion. (DE 129 at 28). As to Ms. Goins's FLSA uncompensated overtime claim for the period of October 9, 2012 to April 20, 2014, I granted the motion and dismissed those claims. (Id.) As to Ms. Goins's FLSA uncompensated overtime claim for the period of March 24, 2013 to June 2014, I granted the motion in part, but denied the motion as to minor claim for 2.33 hours from the week of April 21, 2014. (Id.) As to Ms. Goins's contract-related CEPA claim, I denied the motion but allowed the parties to file supplemental briefs, to be treated as cross motions for summary judgment. (Id.) Also on March 13, 2020, I denied Ms. Goins's cross-motion for summary judgment on all issues. (Id.).
Now before the Court is the defendant NHA's third motion (DE 135) for summary judgment with respect to Ms. Goins's remaining, contract-related CEPA claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a Court must construe all facts andinferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof ... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (). "[U]nsupported allegations ... and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment." Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001) (). If the nonmoving party has failed "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, ... there can be 'no genuine issue of material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.Credibility determinations are the province of the fact finder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992). The summary judgment standard, however, does not operate in a vacuum. "[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.
CEPA was enacted to "protect and encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private sector employers from engaging in such conduct." Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ, 138 N.J. 405, 431, 650 A.2d 958, 971 (1994). To effectuate that aim, the statute provides, in relevant part:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory action against an employee because the employee . . . [d]iscloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer . . . that the employee reasonably believes . . . is in violation of a law.
N.J. Stat. Ann. §34:19-3(a)(l). A retaliatory action is defined as "the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment." N.J. Stat. Ann. §34:19-2(e).
CEPA retaliation claims are analyzed under the usual McDonnell Douglas framework. See Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 50 A.3d 649, 662 (N.J. 2012) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). The employee bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. Then, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse employment action. Id. If the employer articulates such a reason, the burden shifts to the employee to demonstrate that the employer's articulated reason is false and the real reason for the adverse employment action was retaliation. Id.
To establish a cause of action for retaliation under CEPA, an employee must demonstrate four elements: (1) she had a reasonable belief that her employer's conduct violated a law, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy; (2) she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity under the act; (3) the employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action. Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 828 A.2d 893, 900 (N.J. 2003); Samowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2007).
With respect to Ms. Goins's contract-related CEPA claim, the Complaint alleged that Ms. Goins "was asked to perform illegal acts in connection with the public contracts that she was instructed to prepare." (Compl. ¶39). The Complaint further alleged that Ms....
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