Goins v. Sec. of Corr. Jeffrey Beard, Civil Action No. 09-1223
| Decision Date | 15 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-1223 |
| Parties | MAURICE R. GOINS, Plaintiff, v. SEC. OF CORRECTIONS JEFFREY BEARD, SOBINA, HALL, GIROUX, CLARK, REILLY, DANIEL and JONES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
[Re: ECF No. 40]
Plaintiff, Maurice R. Goins ("Goins"), a frequent litigator in this Court,1 initiated this pro se civil rights action complaining about the procedure employed by the staff at the State Correctional Institution at Albion ("SCI-Albion") with regard to his placement in a Special Management Unit ("SMU") and transfer to the State Correctional Institution at Fayette ("SCI-Fayette"). The Complaint and Amended Complaint name eight defendants, all Department of Corrections ("DOC") personnel. Defendants purportedly each had a role in Plaintiff's placement in the SMU without a hearing and, allegedly, without regard to the impact such placement would have on his mental health. Because of the alleged impropriety of his placement in the SMU, Plaintiff seeks redress of alleged violations of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242; the American withDisabilities Act; the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts of 1974; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986; the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act; the Pennsylvania Drug and Alcohol Abuse Act; as well as the Pennsylvania Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act. The Defendants, represented by the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office, have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [ECF No. 40]. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Plaintiff commenced this action on September 9, 2009, with the filing of a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause for a Preliminary Injunction ("TRO") [ECF No. 1]. The TRO was voluntarily dismissed after the filing of numerous amendments and self-styled motions, including a motion to destroy his initial filings, which was denied [ECF Nos. 7, 9, 11]. Subsequently, on March 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint [ECF No. 17] and on April 16, 2010, a "Complaint 'Amended'" [ECF No. 22], with yet another supplement on May 13, 2010 [ECF No. 23]. On January 11, 2011, after service of the Amended Complaint and the supplement, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 40]. Plaintiff responded four months later with an "Affidavit in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss."2 [ECF No. 50].
Plaintiff, an inmate serving a sentence of 20 to 40 years, acknowledges that as a result of disciplinary issues, he was placed in the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") at SCI Albion on August 1, 2008. Plaintiff's current Complaint arises out of his subsequent placement and transfer to a more controlled Special Management Unit ("SMU") at SCI Fayette as a result of an assault on a staff member in the RHU at SCI Albion on July 3, 2009. Plaintiff alleges that on July 30, 2009, he had been scheduled for a routine Program Review Committee meeting with Defendants Giroux, Clark and Hall to determine the propriety of his continued placement in the RHU. However, the meeting was abruptly cancelled and Plaintiff later received notification that he was being transferred to the SMU at SCI Fayette. [ECF No. 22, ¶ V.C.1 and ECF No. 50, p.4 ¶ 21].
Plaintiff alleges that his transfer to the SMU at SCI Fayette occurred without a hearing, which he contends is required by DOC policy. [ECF No. 22, ¶ V.C.2]. He further alleges that while his psychological records were reviewed in conjunction with his placement in the SMU at SCI Fayette, this review was completed without his written informed consent and therefore violated his right to privacy. [ECF No. 22, ¶ V.C.9]. Plaintiff asserts that prior to his transfer to the SMU at Fayette, he was entitled to an in-person psychological evaluation to determine the propriety of placement in a more restricted environment. Because this evaluation was completedby a review of his psychological records instead of an in-person interview, Plaintiff contends his placement violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiff further alleges that he appealed his placement in the SMU at SCI Fayette to a lengthy list of DOC personnel. In response to one of his appeals, Deputy Superintendent Johnson informed him that as a result of the July 3, 3009, assault:
[a]fter a thorough psychological evaluation by the SCI Albion psychology staff, the Administration at SCI Albion recommended that you be reviewed and considered for SMU placement. At that time, a referral packet was submitted to Central Office, where a panel of qualified individuals reviewed and agreed that you were in fact an appropriate candidate for placement in the SMU program.
Plaintiff names as Defendants the DOC employees who either recommended his placement, failed to reverse the recommendation, granted access to his psychological records for use in determining the propriety of his placement, or failed to grant him a hearing. Plaintiff also alleges that certain DOC employees submitted "falsified information and records in [his] inmate records search relating to this process." [ECF No. 22, ¶ IV.C.13]. Plaintiff, however, does not describe the "falsified information" and merely asserts its existence.
As a result of the alleged violation of his privacy in using Plaintiff's psychological records for placement purposes, and the alleged violation of his rights by placing him in the SMU without affording him a hearing, Plaintiff seeks a compensatory damage award in the sum of $1,920,000 against each Defendant and punitive damages in the amount of $15,360,000 against each Defendant. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief including the destruction of all records pertaining to his placement in SMU and the elimination of all remaining time to be served in disciplinary custody. Plaintiff demands the full names and home addresses of allinvolved DOC personnel and a lien on each of their personal assets. Finally, Plaintiff seeks the revocation of Defendant Reilly's psychology license in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
As the United States Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a complaint may properly be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. Under this standard, the Court must, as a general rule, accept as true all factual allegations of the Complaint and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, under the 12(b)(6) standard, a "court need not ... accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit." Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, in making this determination, in addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994).
The Court also need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Public Employees' Retirement System v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 564, 127 S.Ct. 1955, at 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level...."Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Although the Court does not require "heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, No. 07-758-SLR, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D. Del. 2008) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead, 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3).
Recently, the Third Circuit expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal/Phillips line of cases:
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