Gokey v. Economidy
| Docket Number | SA-21-CV-00987-XR |
| Decision Date | 08 February 2022 |
| Parties | ROBERT WADE GOKEY, TDCJ #1496786 Plaintiff, v. JOHN M. ECONOMIDY, Attorney, ET AL.,, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Before the Court are Plaintiff Robert Wade Gokey's (“Gokey”) pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourth Amended Civil Rights Complaint, motion to proceed in forma pauperis for the purpose of service, and motions for leave of court for discovery of Defendants' addresses and extension of time to serve Defendants (ECF Nos 19, 24, 26). (ECF No. 26). Gokey paid the $402.00 filing fee. (ECF No. 18). Upon review, the Court orders Gokey's section 1983 claims against Defendants Judge Mary D. Roman Judge Catherine Torres-Stahl, District Attorney Joe Gonzales Former District Attorney Susan Reed, Assistant District Attorney Rita Spiegal, Assistant District Attorney Amanda Strickland, and Assistant District Attorney Tom Molina in their official capacities for monetary damages DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION based on sovereign immunity. (ECF No 26); see U.S. Const. amend. XI. It is further ordered that Gokey's remaining section 1983 claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE based on immunity or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (ECF No. 26); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii), 1915A(b).
Gokey was arrested in 2006 and charged with two counts of attempted capital murder of a police officer, two counts of aggravated assault on a public servant, and evading arrest/detention with a vehicle, enhanced. See Search Results (bexar.org) (last visited Feb. 8, 2022). The capital murder charges were dismissed in 2007, but Gokey was convicted in 2008 for the offenses of aggravated assault on a public servant and evading arrest. See Search Results (bexar.org). The trial court sentenced Gokey to thirty years' confinement for each offense. See Id. Since his convictions, Gokey has filed direct appeals and numerous post-conviction writs; however, his convictions were affirmed, and his writs were denied or dismissed. See TAMES Search (txcourts.gov) (last visited Feb. 8, 2022).
Gokey has now filed a civil rights action pursuant to section 1983 based on his 2006 arrest and 2008 convictions. (ECF No. 26). Gokey named as defendants in this matter: (1) John M. Economidy, his court-appointed trial attorney; (2) Judge Mary D. Roman; (3) Judge Catherine Torres-Stahl; (4) Joe Gonzales, Bexar County District Attorney; (5) Susan Reed, former District Attorney; (6) Amanda Strickland, Assistant District Attorney; (7) Tom Molina, Assistant District Attorney; (8) Rita Spiegal, Assistant District Attorney; (9) Bexar County Deputy Anthony Alvarado; (10) Bexar County Deputy Armando Lopez; (11) Bexar County Deputy Richard Escobedo; (12) Bexar County Deputy Aaron Von Muldan; (13) Bexar County Deputy Patricia Nava; and (14) Mary Angie Garcia, Bexar County District Clerk. (ECF No. 26). Gokey seems to contend the judges, the former DA, the ADAs, and the District Clerk violated his constitutional rights when they conspired with his trial counsel to prevent Gokey from discovering that the two counts of attempted capital murder of a police officer were dismissed in 2007.[1] (Id.). Gokey contends they did so in order to deprive him of his right to file a section 1983 claim for false arrest based on the attempted capital murder charges. (Id.). He alleges the Deputies falsely arrested him, lacking probable cause for any arrest. (Id.). Gokey further contends the Deputies conspired to cover up the false arrest to deprive him of his right to file a section 1983 claim. (Id.).
As relief, Gokey seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.). He also seeks a declaration that Defendants violated his constitutional rights based on the foregoing facts. (Id.).
Under section 1915A(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code, this Court is required to screen any civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks relief against a government entity, officer, or employee and dismiss the complaint if the court determines it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (directing court to dismiss case, notwithstanding any filing fee, if it is determined that action is (i) frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state claim on which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief from defendant who is immune from such relief). Such a dismissal may occur at any time, before or after service of process and before or after a defendant files an answer. Shanklin v. Fernald, 539 F.Supp.2d 878, 882 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986)).
An action is frivolous where there is no arguable legal or factual basis for the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). A complaint is factually frivolous when “the facts alleged are ‘fantastic or delusional scenarios' or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is ‘indisputably meritless.'” Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28).
In evaluating whether a complaint states a claim under sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court applies the same standards governing dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 570 (2007)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). These factual allegations need not be detailed but “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
When reviewing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe the allegations liberally, holding the pro se to less stringent pleading standards than those applicable to lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21(1972). However, a plaintiff's pro se status does not offer him “an impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
Gokey's claims are based on his 2006 arrest and 2008 convictions. (ECF No. 26). However, Gokey did not file this section 1983 action until 2021. (Id.).
Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations provision. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 39-40 (1989); Heilman v. City of Beaumont, 638 Fed.Appx. 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2016); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the forum state. Owens, 488 U.S. 235, 39-40; Heilman, 636 Fed.Appx. at 366. Texas has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001); Ashley v. Hawkins, 293 S.W.3d 175, 180 (Tex. 2009). The limitations period begins to run when the cause of action accrues, which is when the plaintiff knows or has sufficient information to know that he has suffered an injury. Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2002). Courts may raise the defense of limitations sua sponte where it is clear from the face of a complaint filed IFP that the claims are barred. Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999).
On the face of his Complaint, Gokey expressly states the events forming the basis for his section 1983 claims against Defendants occurred in 2006 and 2008. (ECF No. 26). Gokey filed his original Complaint in this matter on October 12, 2021, approximately fifteen and seventeen years after the events forming the basis of his civil rights claims. (ECF No. 1). Thus, it appears his claims in this matter are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. However, Gokey seems to contend his claims are not barred by limitations because he was unaware of the dismissal of the capital murder charges, and seemingly of his subsequent convictions, because Defendants fraudulently concealed the information. (ECF No. 26).
A section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff has knowledge of the events giving rise to his claim. Matthews v Speier, 123 Fed.Appx. 611, 612 (5th Cir. 2005). Limitations are not tolled for fraudulent concealment if the plaintiff is aware of the facts necessary to know a claim existed. Id. at 613. Here, in a 2007 letter to Gokey from Economidy, which is attached to Gokey's Third Amended Complaint, Economidy advises Gokey that the charges of capital murder were reduced to aggravated assault. (ECF No. 14, Exh. 1, p. 28). Thus, Gokey knew in 2007 that the capital murder charges were dismissed. (Id.). As for the offenses for which he was convicted, Gokey was obviously aware of those convictions when they occurred in 2008. Thus, any section 1983 claims Gokey might base on his arrest and convictions accrued no later than 2008. See Id. Gokey is not...
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