Golbert v. Walker

• Decision Date: 18 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 18 C 8176,18 C 8176
• Parties: CHARLES GOLBERT, Cook County Public Guardian, on behalf of Stephen W., Carrion C., Careale C., Jamya B., Charlie W., Joshua F., Erica C., Alana M., and Johnnise W., and Named Plaintiffs SKYLAR L., ISAAC D., ARCHIE C., BURL F., STERLING B., AND TYRESE B., on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BEVERLY J. WALKER, THE ESTATE OF GEORGE SHELDON, CYNTHIA TATE, BOBBIE GREGG, ARTHUR BISHOP, THE ESTATE OF RICHARD H. CALICA, ERWIN McEWEN, MICHAEL C. JONES, LAUREN WILLIAMS, LINDA STROUD, FELICIA GUEST, D. JEAN ORTEGA-PIRON, DEBRA DYER-WEBSTER, JANET AHERN, MARC D. SMITH, LISE T. SPACAPAN, DENISE GONZALES, DIXIE LEE PETERSON, AND THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

CHARLES GOLBERT, Cook County Public Guardian,on behalf of Stephen W., Carrion C., Careale C., Jamya B.,Charlie W., Joshua F., Erica C., Alana M., and Johnnise W.,and Named Plaintiffs SKYLAR L., ISAAC D., ARCHIE C.,BURL F., STERLING B., AND TYRESE B., on behalf of themselvesand a class of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BEVERLY J. WALKER, THE ESTATE OF GEORGE SHELDON,CYNTHIA TATE, BOBBIE GREGG, ARTHUR BISHOP,THE ESTATE OF RICHARD H. CALICA, ERWIN McEWEN,MICHAEL C. JONES, LAUREN WILLIAMS, LINDA STROUD,FELICIA GUEST, D. JEAN ORTEGA-PIRON, DEBRA DYER-WEBSTER,JANET AHERN, MARC D. SMITH, LISE T. SPACAPAN, DENISE GONZALES,DIXIE LEE PETERSON, AND THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OFCHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Defendants.

No. 18 C 8176

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 18, 2021

Judge John Z. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Charles Golbert, the Acting Cook County Public Guardian, and Plaintiffs Skylar L., Isaac D, Archie C., Burl F., Sterling B., and Tyrese B. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") have filed a four-count complaint on behalf of themselves and a putative class of persons younger than twenty-one years of age, who allegedly were detained by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") in psychiatric hospitals without legal basis. Plaintiffs bring Counts I and II under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against eighteen directors and current and former employees of DCFS ("the Individual Defendants") for violating their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Counts III and IV, Plaintiffs claim that the Individual Defendants as well as DCFS violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is denied.

I. Background

A. Facts¹

Every year, hundreds of children in the care of DCFS require a period of psychiatric hospitalization to address acute psychiatric symptoms. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 114-15, ECF No. 92.² Hospitalization is intended to stabilize the children, develop treatment plans, manage medications, and address acute issues. Id. ¶ 161. Hospitalized children should be released once they are stabilized, id. ¶ 33, because psychiatric hospitalization imposes "severe constraints on children's ability to maintain a healthy lifestyle": for example, schooling is limited to no more than one hour per day; recreational activities and time outdoors are either non-existent or extremely curtailed; phone use is limited to five or ten minutes per day; visits with family are short and usually cannot involve visits from siblings younger than eighteen; and the children are not permitted to maintain contact with friends and relatives using electronic devices. Id. ¶¶ 162-64. Psychiatric hospitalization is typically medically necessary for less than two weeks. Id. ¶ 161.

Plaintiffs allege that they and the class of children they seek to represent were hospitalized beyond medical necessity ("BMN"). Id. ¶ 2. In other words, although Plaintiffs were cleared for discharge to a less-restrictive placement, they continued to be held in locked psychiatric wards. Id. Plaintiffs assert that DCFS's practice of confining children BMN undermines or eliminates any stability that they gained during their admission, id. ¶¶ 4, 167, and subjects them to a dangerous environment where other patients may engage in physically or sexually violent behavior, id. ¶ 165.

For example, Plaintiff Alana M. was placed in DCFS's care when she was 13 years old. Her adoptive mother died, and her next-of-kin (her adoptive grandmother) was too sick to care for Alana and, in fact, passed away shortly thereafter. Id. ¶¶ 5, 21. When DCFS assumed temporary custody of Alana, she was hospitalized for depression and suicidal ideation. Id. ¶ 21. Once Alana was cleared for release, she was supposed to move in with her sister in Indiana. Id. ¶ 5. But by the time that placement was approved, Alana had been held BMN for four and a half months, spending her fourteenth birthday in the psychiatric hospital. Id. By that point, Alana's doctors determined that her detention BMNhad caused her mental health to deteriorate again—so much so that she could no longer go live with her sister. Id. ¶ 21. Instead, Alana was transferred to a residential placement and finally a specialized foster home. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have known since at least 1988 that DCFS has maintained a "widespread and unnecessary practice" of holding certain children BMN. Id. ¶ 6. Yet, Plaintiffs assert, despite having the ability and responsibility to ensure that children medically cleared for discharge were promptly placed in a less-restrictive setting, each Defendant failed to do anything about the problem, thereby violating Plaintiffs' constitutional rights and Defendants' obligations under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiffs divide Defendants into several groups based on their responsibilities and authority:

• Current and former Directors or Acting Directors (collectively, the "Director Defendants"), who were responsible for ensuring that "all children in DCFS care or under its guardianship are safe, appropriately placed, and receiv[ing] appropriate and timely care and treatment." Id. ¶ 40. The Director Defendants also "had the legal authority to increase"—or to direct their subordinates to increase—"the existing number of residential and other placements, including but not limited to entering into contracts to develop new placements, in order to provide safe and appropriate placements for every child held beyond medical necessity in psychiatric hospitals." Id. ¶¶ 41-42.

• Associate Deputy Directors for Placement Resources (collectively, the "ADDPR Defendants"), who "were responsible for supervising DCFS's Central Matching Unit and, in that capacity, for ensuring that every child had a therapeutically appropriate placement upon discharge from a psychiatric hospital." Id. ¶ 51. The ADDPR Defendants "had the legal authority to develop more placement capacity in existing placements and develop new placement resources, including residential placements, to ensure children did not stay beyond medical necessity in psychiatric hospitals," as wellas "the ability and authority to add DCFS supports to a placement, such as a one-on-one aide or additional funding, to ensure the child's well-being and safety and to increase the likelihood that a placement would be able to accept them." Id. ¶¶ 49-50.

• The heads of DCFS's Psychiatric Hospitalization Project (collectively, the "PHP Defendants"), who were "responsible for monitoring every child held BMN and ensuring that these children were discharged from the hospital as soon as hospitalization was no longer therapeutically necessary." Id. ¶ 56. The PHP Defendants further "had the responsibility and authority to identify and remedy any non-compliance with DCFS procedures or other systemic issues that were impeding the provision of appropriate services to hospitalized children in DCFS care, including the lack of proper or sufficient placements." Id. ¶ 59.

• The DCFS Guardianship Administrators (collectively, the "Guardianship Defendants"), who "were the court-appointed temporary custodian[s] or guardian[s] for numerous children in Illinois who were placed in the temporary care of DCFS" and "had a statutory and court-ordered responsibility to those children to find them a placement outside of their homes in the least restrictive environment possible." Id. ¶¶ 63-64. The Guardianship Defendants "were granted broad powers and authority over those children, including the powers to grant or deny consent for medical and psychiatric treatment, educational services, visitation and other daily needs." Id. ¶ 64.

• DCFS itself, which was mandated under state law to "place each of the children in its care in safe and adequate placements consistent with each child's health, safety and best interests." Id. ¶ 30.

Plaintiffs assert that each Defendant knew "the severe risks posed to children being held BMN" and was notified when children were being held BMN, "but failed to provide appropriate placements for the children despite having the responsibility and authority to do so." Id. ¶¶ 125, 128.

B. Procedural History

1. The B.H. Consent Decree

The procedural history of this case is intertwined with that of another federal case. See Entm't USA, Inc. v. Cellular Connection, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-317-HAB, 2019 WL 2138676, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2019) ("A court may take judicial notice of public court documents . . . without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment." (citing Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994)). In 1988, a class of plaintiffs who "have or will be in the custody of [DCFS], and who have or will be placed somewhere other than with their parents," sued DCFS seeking to enjoin practices that violated DCFS's "statutory and constitutional duties to protect children in state custody from unwarranted intrusions on their emotional and physical well-being" and to require DCFS to "provide safe and stable placements and minimally adequate medical care" and other necessities for children in state custody. See Pls.' Ex., 2d Am. Compl., B.H. v. Johnson, 88 C 5599 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 1989) ("B.H. Complaint") at ¶¶ 1, 3, ECF No. 118-1. The parties in this case agree that Plaintiffs here are also members of the B.H. class.

The B.H. court held that the plaintiffs' complaint "stated a substantive due process claim to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions upon their physical and emotional well-being, while directly or indirectly in state custody, and to be provided by the state with adequate [medical care and necessities]." B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1989). After that decision, theplaintiffs and DCFS entered into a consent decree ("the B.H. consent decree"). See Defs.' Ex., B.H. Consent Decree, ECF No 106-1 Pursuant to...