Golceff v. State

Decision Date22 December 2016
Docket NumberNO. 03-13-00809-CR,03-13-00809-CR
PartiesPaul Boris Golceff, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

NO. CR2013-052, HONORABLE R. BRUCE BOYER, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted appellant Paul Boris Golceff of one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child and two counts of sexual performance by a child.1 The district court rendered judgment on each verdict and assessed punishment at 40 years' imprisonment for each count, with the sentences to run consecutively.2 In eight points of error on appeal, Golceff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of his convictions, asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his status as a sex offender and his prior conviction for the offense of solicitation of a minor, and claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to preserve error in the admissibility of certain evidence. We will affirm the judgments of conviction.

BACKGROUND

The jury heard evidence tending to show that Golceff and another man, Rudolph Figueroa, had multiple three-way phone conversations with A.K., a 13-year-old girl living in Illinois. A.K. testified that she came into contact with the men after meeting someone online who identified himself as "Jake Mancini" and who claimed to be a seventeen-year-old boy. According to A.K., "Jake" (allegedly Figueroa) eventually introduced her over the phone to his two uncles—"Uncle Rick" (also allegedly Figueroa) and "Uncle Paul" (allegedly Golceff). A.K. testified that her conversations with "Uncle Rick" and "Uncle Paul" involved "sexual stuff" that they had asked her to do, including acts of masturbation and bestiality, and that she had complied with their requests. Based on this and other evidence, which we discuss in more detail below, the State charged Golceff with one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child and two counts of sexual performance by a child. Because both Golceff and Figueroa were implicated in the offenses, the jury was instructed that it could convict Golceff as either the principal actor or as a party to each offense. The jury found Golceff guilty of each offense as charged and the district court rendered judgment on each verdict and sentenced Golceff to three consecutive 40-year sentences as noted above. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Evidentiary sufficiency

In his first point of error, Golceff asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove that any of the offenses were committed in Texas. In his second, third, and fourth points of error, Golceffchallenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of the charged offenses.3 In his fifth point of error, Golceff asserts that the evidence is insufficient to establish his identity as "Uncle Paul."

Standard of review

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, "the standard of review we apply is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"4 "This standard tasks the factfinder with resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts."5 "[A]n inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them."6 "On appeal, reviewing courts 'determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'"7 "Thus, '[a]ppellate courts are not permitted to use a 'divide and conquer' strategy for evaluating sufficiency of the evidence' because that approach does not consider the cumulativeforce of all the evidence."8 "When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination."9 Moreover, "[o]ur review of 'all of the evidence' includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted."10 Finally, "the same standard of review is used for both circumstantial and direct evidence cases."11 "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient" to support a conviction.12

Whether the offenses were committed in Texas

In his first point of error, Golceff asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the offenses were committed in Texas.13 A person commits an offense in Texas if "either the conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs inside this state."14 It is undisputed that the results of the charged offenses—A.K. penetrating herself and performing sexual acts—occurredin Illinois, where A.K. lived at the time of the offenses.15 Consequently, to prove that the offenses were committed in Texas, the State needed to produce evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that the prohibited conduct—in this case, calling A.K. and asking her to penetrate herself and perform sexual acts—occurred in Texas.16

The evidence tending to show that the phone calls originated from Texas included the following: (1) A.K. testified that "Uncle Paul" and "Uncle Rick" talked to her about visiting them in Texas and that "[t]hey wanted to buy [her] a train ticket" to Texas; (2) according to the testimony of Detective Jeremy Thayer, an Illinois police officer who had investigated the case, "Jake" had claimed to be from Corpus Christi; (3) Thayer also testified that officers had confirmed that the phone number that "Jake" had used to call A.K. belonged to Figueroa, who was a Corpus Christi resident; (4) Thayer testified that at around the time the calls were made, Figueroa had sold a computer at a pawn shop located in Corpus Christi; (5) Thayer further testified that while the investigation was ongoing, Figueroa had sent text messages to A.K.'s phone (which was in Thayer's possession at the time), and other officers had confirmed that these messages were sent by Figueroa while he was at his residence in Corpus Christi; (6) following Figueroa's arrest, voice and text messages were recovered from his phone that had been sent to Figueroa by a person named "Paul," who was subsequently identified as Golceff, who was a New Braunfels resident; (8) Detective Richard Groff of the New Braunfels Police Department, who had investigatedGolceff's involvement in the offenses, testified that the cell phone that Golceff had used to communicate with Figueroa had been recovered at Golceff's residence in New Braunfels; (9) Detective Joe Tovar of the New Braunfels Police Department, who had also participated in the investigation, testified that following a search of the phone that had been seized from Golceff's New Braunfels residence, officers had recovered multiple photographs of A.K. in which she was posing partially clothed and engaging in sexual activity with a dog, as well as text messages from Figueroa to Golceff in which Figueroa had described some of his conversations with A.K.; (10) according to Detective Groff, the same phone that was seized from Golceff's New Braunfels residence also contained records of multiple phone calls between Figueroa and Golceff and also a record of a phone call between Golceff and A.K.; and (11) also according to Groff, at the time Golceff was communicating with Figueroa, Golceff worked in Austin and, according to text messages and call logs that were recovered from Golceff's phone, Golceff was meeting with Austin-area real-estate agents and attempting to buy a house in the Austin area.

In arguing that the above evidence is insufficient to prove that the offenses were committed in Texas, Golceff points to other evidence in the record tending to show that Golceff had a friend who lived in Colorado, that Golceff's parents had an address in Oregon, and that Golceff had indicated to a friend that he had at one time traveled overseas to Japan. Additionally, Golceff argues that calls from a cell phone are capable of being made from anywhere and that it was therefore possible for the calls to have been made from somewhere other than Texas. However, when the record supports conflicting inferences, we are to presume the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination.17 We conclude thatthe combined and cumulative force of the above evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports a reasonable inference by the jury that Golceff was in Texas at the time the calls to A.K. were made and thus that the calls in which A.K. was asked to penetrate herself and perform sexual acts were made in Texas. On this record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that the offenses were committed in Texas.18

We overrule Golceff's first point of error.

Aggravated sexual assault of a child

In Count III of the indictment, Golceff was charged with intentionally or knowingly causing the penetration of A.K.'s sexual organ with A.K.'s finger.19 In his second point of error, Golceff asserts that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he committed this offense. Specifically, Golceff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the element of causation. Relying on one dictionary definition of "cause," Golceff asserts that causation requires some element of compulsion, either "by command, authority, or force,"20 and he argues that there was no evidence presented that he had ever "compelled" A.K. to penetrate herself in any manner.

However, as the State observes, compulsion is not an element of causation in the Penal Code. Section 6.04 of the Penal Code, entitled "Causation: Conduct and Results," providesthat "[a] person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating...

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