Gold v. City of Miami, No. 95-4996.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Citation: 121 F.3d 1442
• Parties: Michael C. GOLD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida Municipal Corporation, Defendant, Calvin Ross, individually, Rafael Suarez, individually, Jorge Perez, individually, William Campbell, Individually, Defendants-Appellants.
• Docket Number: No. 95-4996.
• Decision Date: 17 September 1997

121 F.3d 1442

Michael C. GOLD, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, a Florida Municipal Corporation, Defendant,
Calvin Ross, individually, Rafael Suarez, individually, Jorge Perez, individually, William Campbell, Individually, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 95-4996.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

September 17, 1997.

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Kathryn C. Pecko, Asst. City Attorney, A. Quinn Jones, III, Leon M. Firtel, Theresa L. Girten, Miami, FL, for Defendants-Appellants.

Charles M. Baron, North Miami Beach, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, COX, Circuit Judge, and MESKILL^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Rafael Suarez, Jorge Perez, William Campbell, and Calvin Ross appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment predicated on qualified immunity in this civil rights action filed by

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Michael Gold. For the reasons that follow, we reverse

I. Facts¹

The incident giving rise to Gold's action occurred on October 18, 1991. On that day, Gold pulled into a congested bank parking lot so that his passenger could use the bank's automated teller machine (ATM). While waiting for a parking space to open up, Gold noticed a uniformed police officer keeping watch over the area. He also noticed a woman who did not appear to be handicapped walk to her car parked in a handicapped space, get in, and start to drive away. Disturbed by this, Gold yelled to the officer, "aren't you supposed to give them a ticket for parking in a handicapped spot?" (R.2-91 at 28.) The officer did not respond. Gold then found a parking space, parked his car, walked toward the ATM, and loudly remarked to no one in particular, "Miami police don't do shit." (R.2-91 at 34.)

Upon hearing Gold's remark, a plainclothes officer who had been standing in the ATM line stated to the uniformed officer, "I think this guys sic got a problem." (R.2-91 at 36.) To this, Gold replied, "I don't have a problem. I'm just saying that `Miami police don't do shit.'" (R.2-91 at 36.) A different plainclothes officer who had been standing next to the uniformed officer then approached Gold and asked him for identification. After Gold produced his Florida driver's license and Florida Bar membership card, the officer headed toward the uniformed officer's patrol car to do a radio-check on the identification. The officer soon was joined by the uniformed officer and the other plainclothes officer.

Upon observing all of this, a couple in the ATM line remarked, "I can't believe they're doing this." (R.2-91 at 40.) Gold talked to that couple for a few minutes then approached the three officers and asked them what was going on. At that point, the officers arrested him for "disorderly conduct" and asked him to put his hands behind his back. Although Gold did so without resistance, the officers later charged him, along with the disorderly conduct charge, with "resisting arrest without violence."

After handcuffing Gold, the uniformed officer assisted Gold into the back of his patrol car. Some moments later, Gold complained to him that the handcuffs were applied so tightly that he was in pain. However, the uniformed officer did not loosen the handcuffs until roughly twenty minutes after Gold complained.

II. Procedural History

Gold sued the three officers, Campbell, Perez, and Suarez, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they (1) violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by falsely arresting him for disorderly conduct; and (2) violated his Fourth Amendment rights by applying the handcuffs too tightly and leaving them that way for an unreasonable amount of time. He also sued the now-former Miami Police Chief, Calvin Ross, under § 1983, alleging that Ross violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to train and supervise subordinate officers regarding the constitutional limitations of Florida's disorderly conduct statute and regarding the proper response to an arrestee's handcuff complaints.²

The officers eventually moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and Gold moved for partial summary judgment on the basis of liability. The district court concluded that factual issues remained, and, without explicitly conducting a qualified immunity analysis, denied both motions. The officers appeal that denial, raising one issue: whether the district court

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erred in implicitly concluding that they violated clearly established law.³

III. Discussion

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from civil litigation and damage liability where "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).⁴ Under this standard, a plaintiff must show that "when the defendant acted, the law established the contours of a right so clearly that a reasonable official would have understood his acts were unlawful." See Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1993).

A. False Arrest

We first determine whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Gold's claim that the officers violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by falsely arresting him for disorderly conduct. In making this determination, the central issue is whether, on the date of Gold's arrest, the officers had arguable probable cause to believe that Gold had committed the offense of disorderly conduct. See Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir. 1990). The standard for arguable probable cause is "whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of well-established law." See Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.1994). As we have emphasized before, arguable probable cause is distinct from actual probable cause. See Post, 7 F.3d at 1559.

Florida statutory law defines disorderly conduct as "acts that ... are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness them, or ... brawling or...