Gold v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n

• Decision Date: 14 May 1943
• Docket Number: No. 26878.,26878.
• Citation: 48 N.E.2d 391,383 Ill. 11
• Parties: GOLD et al. v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

383 Ill. 11

48 N.E.2d 391

GOLD et al.

v.ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al.

No. 26878.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 16, 1943.

Rehearing Denied May 14, 1943.

Appeal by Benjamin Gold and others from an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission dismissing complaint asking that prior order of the Commission in proceeding against the Commonwealth Edison Company be set aside and that a general rate and valuation case be instituted against the Commonwealth Edison Company. From a judgment affirming the order of dismissal, complainants appeal.

Judgment affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; John Prystalski, judge.

Bernard Yedor and Charles Liebman, both of Chicago, and Edward A. Leslie, of Glen Ellyn, for appellants.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, of Chicago, of counsel), for the Commerce Commission.

Isham, Lincoln & Beale, of Chicago (Harry J. Dunbaugh and David F. Taber, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

GUNN, Justice.

The Illinois Commerce Commission of its own motion in 1933 instituted a certain proceeding against Commonwealth Edison Company which resulted in an order dated October 2, 1936, establishing a base rate for service, and directing certain reductions in electric rates. In May 1940, eight residential electric customers of the Commonwealth Edison Company filed their complaint with the Commerce Commission setting up three distinct matters in separate counts. Count one alleged the previous proceeding before the commission was not properly concluded and should not be considered as a final order, and prayed that the commission disregard or set aside the said order made October 2, 1936, and proceed as if no order had been entered. The second count was based upon a claim for reparations. And the third count sought to have the commission institute a general rate and valuation case against the Commonwealth Edison Company.

The purport of complainant's petition was to require the commission to proceed further with the complaint upon which they had entered an order October 2, 1936. Upon motion the commission dismissed count one. Commonwealth Edison Company answered counts two and three and the matter proceeded to a hearing, in which testimony of several hundred pages was taken. September 17, 1940, a final order was entered by the Commerce Commission dismissing the complaint which, among other things recites: ‘The essential matter before the commission is an attempt of a small group of customers and lawyers to institute and demand the aid of public authority in the prosecution of a rate case which by its nature must necessarily be protracted and expensive, and which will necessarily be carried on largely at the expense of taxpayers and ratepayers, all without showings of reasonable cause.’ In addition to the foregoing the commission set out general findings and conclusions on all the issues involved preliminary to its final order dismissing the case.

The petitioners filed their application for rehearing containing twenty-seven specifications of error, including twenty objections to the findings and conclusions of the commission, which application for rehearing was denied by the Commerce Commission. Thereupon the plaintiffs perfected their appeal to the circuit court of Cook county, which on March 24, 1942, entered an order reciting it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and that the order appealed from was within the jurisdiction of the commission, and was supported by the commission's findings of fact, and that such findings of fact were supported by evidence considered by the commission, and the order of the commission was thereupon affirmed. The plaintiffs appealed directly to this court, and assign as the only error that the circuit court erred in not showing in its judgment the decision on the issues raised in the petition for rehearing.

The pleadings are not completely abstracted, and none of the evidence in the case is abstracted. In their brief petitioners rely solely upon the case of Dubin v. Department of Registration and Education, 380 Ill. 57, 43 N.E.2d 554, as requiring the circuit court to specify the grounds upon which it based its decisions, and suggests further that if the Dubin case does not apply that leave be given appellants to file a full abstract and brief and argument upon the merits within thirty days of this court's decision.

Appellants misconceive the effect of the Dubin case. It construed the provisions for a hearing and appeal from actions taken by the Department of Registration and Education in recalling dental licenses, and the statute in that case provides: ‘No department order of suspension or revocation shall be set aside or vacated on any ground not specified in the written motion for rehearing provided in this Act.’ Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 91, par. 62f. In that case we held that while the appeal was authorized to be taken to a court of general jurisdiction, nevertheless, where such court exercised special powers conferred by statute and not exercised by the courts of the common law, it does not in such case differ from a court of limited...