Gold v. Nat'l Default Servicing Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-CV-1232 JLS (AGS) |
| Parties | MICHELLE GOLD, as Trustee of the Michelle Gold Separate Property Trust dated December 23, 2002, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING CORPORATION; U.S. BANK, NA, successor trustee to Bank of America, NA, as trustee, on behalf of the holders of the WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT, Series 2007-OA2; SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING; DOES 1-25; STEPHAN PAUL NIEDNAGEL; DANIEL DEANS NIEDNAGEL; and BIRDROCK HOME MORTGAGE, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER (1) DENYING REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (ECF NO. 21-2); (2) GRANTING REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (ECF NO 22-2); (3) GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 21); (4) GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 22); AND (5) DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 19)
Presently before the Court are Defendants National Default Servicing Corporation (“NDSC”); U.S. Bank, NA, successor trustee to Bank of America, NA, as trustee, on behalf of the holders of the WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates WMALT Series 2007-OA2 (“USB”); and Select Portfolio Servicing's (“SPS,” and collectively the “Deed Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (“Deed Mot.,” ECF No. 21) and Request for Judicial Notice in support of the same (ECF No. 21-2). Defendants Stephan Paul Niednagel, Daniel Deans Niednagel, and Bird Rock Home Mortgage, LLC (collectively, the “Bird Rock Defendants”) also filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Bird Rock Mot.,” ECF No. 22) and Request for Judicial Notice in support of the same (ECF No. 22-2). Plaintiff Michelle Gold, as Trustee of the Michelle Gold Separate Property Trust dated December 23, 2002 (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se, filed a Consolidated Opposition to the two Motions to Dismiss (“Opp'n,” ECF No. 27). The Deed Defendants and Bird Rock Defendants filed Replies to Plaintiff's Opposition (“Bird Rock Reply,” ECF No. 28; “Deed Defendants Reply,” ECF No. 29). Having carefully considered Plaintiff's Verified First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” ECF No. 19), the Parties' briefing, and the law, the Court DENIES the Deed Defendants' Requests for Judicial Notice, GRANTS the Bird Rock Defendants' Requests for Judicial Notice, GRANTS the Deed Defendants' Motion, GRANTS the Bird Rock Defendants' Motion, and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.
This case concerns real property located at 3342 Randy Lane, Chula Vista, California 91908 (the “Property”). FAC ¶ 9. The Property is Plaintiff's personal residence. Id. ¶ 9b. Plaintiff claims that the Deed Defendants illegally foreclosed on the Property, see id. ¶¶ 9a-z, which was then purchased by the Bird Rock Defendants at a public non-judicial foreclosure sale, see id. ¶¶ 9y-z. Plaintiff's FAC asserts causes of action for “cancellation of deeds,” fraudulent transfer, violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and quiet title. Id. ¶¶ 12-24.
Plaintiff initiated this action in state court against the Deed Defendants, who removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1) ¶¶ 3-4. The Deed Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's initial Complaint. See ECF No. 2. On October 5, 2022, the Court granted the Deed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss while affording Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint. See ECF No. 16. Plaintiff filed the FAC on November 5, 2022, adding as defendants the Bird Rock Defendants. See FAC. The FAC was met with the instant Motions to Dismiss from the Deed and Bird Rock Defendants. See generally Deed Mot.; Bird Rock Mot. Both groups of Defendants argue that Plaintiff's FAC should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See generally Deed Mot.; Bird Rock Mot. The Bird Rock Defendants additionally argue that the FAC should be dismissed for lack of standing and for failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. See generally Bird Rock Mot.
The Bird Rock Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the following exhibits: (1) Certified Copy of Grant Deed dated July 20, 2005, recorded as Document No. 2005-0621725 on July 22, 2005; (2) Certified Copy of Deed of Trust dated July 21, 2006, recorded as Document No. 2006-0551257 on August 3, 2006; (3) Certified Copy of Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust dated March 20, 2012, recorded as Document No. 2012-0202325 on April 6, 2012; (4) Certified Copy of Substitution of Trustee dated February 5, 2019, recorded as Document No. 2019-0054311 on February 14, 2019; (5) Certified Copy of Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust dated February 13, 2019, recorded as Document No. 2019-054312 on February 14, 2019; (6) Copy of Order on Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay filed in In re Michelle Gold dba The Gold Firm, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California, Case No. 21-03467-LA7, dated March 8, 2022; (7) Certified Copy of Notice of Trustee's Sale dated March 21, 2022, recorded as Document No. 2022-0126988 on March 22, 2022; (8) Certified Copy of Trustee's Deed Upon Sale dated October 11, 2022, recorded as Document No. 2022-0399025 on October 13, 2022; (9) Certified Copy of Quitclaim Deed dated July 19, 2013, recorded as Document No. 2013-0451285 on July 19, 2013; (10) Certified Copy of Grant Deed from The Michelle J. Gold Separate Property Trust dated December 23, 2002 to Ellena F. Gonzalez-Gold dated April 2, 2019, recorded as Document No. 2019-0117068 on April 2, 2019. See generally ECF No. 22-2. / / / As a general rule, a district court cannot rely on evidence outside the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998)). “A court may, however, consider certain materials-documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice- without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908 (citing Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002); Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994); 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 12.34[2] (3d ed. 1999)). Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides that “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
While the Court has already judicially noticed several documents that are similar, if not identical, to those submitted by the Bird Rock Defendants, see ECF No. 16 at 5-6,[1] the Court will nevertheless GRANT the Bird Rock Defendants' Requests for Judicial Notice in their entirety for convenience in ruling on the present Motions. All the proposed documents are matters of public record and therefore subject to judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nder Fed.R.Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record.'”); Lopez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 16-CV-0811-AJB-DHB, 2017 WL 1336764, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2017) ().
The Deed Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of three documents, each of which is included in the Bird Rock Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice. See ECF No. 21-2; ECF No. 22-2. The Court DENIES the Deed Defendants' Requests for Judicial Notice as duplicative. See Hinshaw v. China Times Media Grp., No. 220CV04302ODWJEMX, 2020 WL 6203571, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2020) (), appeal dismissed, No. 20-56224, 2021 WL 5822547 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2021).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' . . . it [does] demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A complaint will not suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that ...
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