Goldberg v. Cameron
| Decision Date | 11 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. C-05-03534 RMW,C-05-03534 RMW |
| Parties | NEIL B. GOLDBERG, Plaintiff, v. JAMES CAMERON, GALE ANN HURD, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Defendants Gale Anne Hurd and Pacific Western Productions, Inc. (collectively "Hurd"), and defendant James Cameron ("Cameron") have both filed motions for attorneys' fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 in this copyright infringement action brought by plaintiff Neil Goldberg ("Goldberg"). Defendant Cameron requests attorneys' fees in the amount of $100,677.50. Defendant Hurd requests $244,077.75 in attorneys' fees incurred through April 15, 2011, an additional $4,140 for estimated time spent for this motion, and $4,760.25 pursuant to the Bill of Costs filed with defendant Hurd's motion for attorneys' fees, for a total amount of $252,978. For the reasons stated below, the court grants defendants' motions.
Goldberg filed this action on August 31, 2005. Goldberg filed a First Amended Complaint on December 19, 2006, alleging that he sent a script and soundtrack to New World Pictures in or around 1979, when defendants gained access to these materials, and that defendants incorporated these materials into the motion pictures "The Terminator" ("T-1") and "The Terminator 2: Judgment Day" ("T-2"). Goldberg further alleged that defendants engaged in infringing activity in connection with subsequent Terminator projects: "Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines" ("T-3"), "Terminator 4: Salvation" ("T-4"), and a spin-off television series entitled "The Sarah Connor Chronicles" ("Terminator television series") (collectively, with T-1, T-2, T-3, and T-4, "Terminator Franchise"). Cameron was the director and co-writer of T-1 and T-2, but had no involvement with any other Terminator projects. Shephard Decl. ¶ 3. Hurd co-wrote and produced T-1 and T-2, then assigned her rights to develop further projects in connection with the Terminator Franchise in 1998.
In February 2007, the court ruled that the statute of limitations had run and granted defendants' motions to dismiss all copyright claims accruing before August 31, 2002. The court denied defendants' motions to dismiss with respect to any copyright claims arising after August 31, 2002. In July 2007, after Goldberg filed a Second Amended Complaint, the court granted defendants' motions to dismiss all state law claims. On November 4, 2008, defendants moved separately for summary judgment. Goldberg appeared at the December 12, 2008 hearing with counsel he had retained the day before, and the court granted a continuance of the summary judgment motions to allow him time to file opposition. Shephard Decl. ¶ 9.
Following a hearing, the court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to all claims for direct copyright infringement, and gave Goldberg leave to amend his complaint in order to pursue a claim against Hurd for contributory copyright infringement in connection with Hurd's 1998 assignment of rights in the Terminator Franchise and the subsequent production of T-3, T-4, and the Terminator television series. Shephard Decl. ¶ 12. On April 4, 2011, the court granted Hurd's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claim for contributory copyright infringement.
On May 25, 2007, after the court granted defendants' motions to dismiss for claims barred by the statute of limitations, counsel for Cameron wrote to Goldberg's counsel, putting him on notice that prevailing parties in copyright infringement suits are eligible to recover attorneys' fees, and encouraging him to dismiss the case and pursue this matter against companies who had been "exploiting" the Terminator Franchise after August 31, 2002. Shephard Decl. ¶15.
Defendants now seek attorneys' fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505. Defendants argue that they are entitled to attorneys' fees because Goldberg's action was frivolous, objectively unreasonable, and motivated by a desire to force well-known defendants with deep pockets to pay a settlement rather than litigate the case. Defendants also argue that attorneys' fees are appropriate in order to deter future plaintiffs from filing meritless claims, and to compensate defendants for successfully defending their copyright interests.
Section 505 of the Copyright Act provides that "the court may . . . award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party" in a copyright infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 505. "Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike," and "fees are to be awarded . . . only as a matter of the court's discretion." Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994). Indeed, "[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations, but instead equitable discretion should be exercised in light of the considerations . . . identified." Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted). In determining whether to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party, courts may consider multiple nonexclusive factors, including (1) the degree of success obtained; (2) frivolousness; (3) motivation; (4) objective unreasonableness "both in the factual and legal arguments in the case"; and (5) the need "to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence." Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 1994). Blameworthiness, including a finding of bad faith or frivolousness, can be an influential consideration, but "is not a prerequisite to awarding fees to a prevailing defendant," and these nonexclusive factors "need not all be met." Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir.1996). Ultimately, "[f]aithfulness to the purposes of the Copyright Act is . . .the pivotal criterion" in the decision to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. Id.
Weighing each of these factors and taking into account other relevant considerations as set forth below, the court grants defendants' motions for attorneys' fees.
In Fogerty, the Supreme Court held that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in copyright infringement actions are to be treated alike in determining whether to award attorneys' fees. 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994). There, the Court expressly rejected the "British Rule for automatic recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party." Id. While success may be a prerequisite to obtaining fees, it does not automatically support awarding fees in the absence of other considerations. Nevertheless, here, defendants prevailed on summary judgment and have obtained a final judgment.
Defendants argue that Goldberg's claims were frivolous due to Goldberg's delay in bringing this action, and because Goldberg continued litigation of the case as to T-1 and T-2 when the only potentially timely claims remaining were claims arising out of conduct related to T-3, T-4, and the Terminator television series, with which defendants were not involved. Goldberg's direct infringement claims were frivolous, and even his claim for contributory infringement, permitted by the court, approached frivolousness. See Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 614-15 (9th Cir. 2010) ()
Cameron argues that Goldberg's claims were frivolous because he pursued claims that were barred by the statute of limitations, and because he continued to litigate against Cameron after he was told repeatedly that Cameron did not commit any infringing acts within the three years before the case was filed.
The court agrees that Goldberg's direct infringement claims against Cameron were frivolous. Goldberg brought suit in August 2005, over twenty years after the release of T-1 and fourteen yearsafter the release of T-2, after which Cameron's involvement with the Terminator Franchise ceased. Shephard Decl. ¶3. The three-year statute of limitations provided by the Copyright Act had clearly run at the time Goldberg brought suit; all direct infringement claims against Cameron were time-barred. Goldberg did not assert any copyright infringement claims against Cameron apart from the direct infringement claims.
Goldberg submitted that he had embarked on a twenty-year spiritual journey in the 1980s which prevented him from learning of defendants' allegedly infringing activities within three years of the statute of limitations. Goldberg's asserted lack of knowledge of the alleged infringement was not reasonable and was an insufficient excuse for bringing suit long after the statute of limitations had run. Thus, Goldberg's claims against Cameron were frivolous.
Hurd argues that Goldberg's claims were frivolous because Goldberg waited over twenty years to bring a lawsuit, sued the wrong parties, and continued to litigate claims relating to T-1 and T-2 after the court ruled those claims were barred. Hurd further asserts that Goldberg did not prove access to his works and did not demonstrate substantial similarity between protectable elements of his work and the Terminator Franchise works.
As with respect to claims against Cameron, all direct infringement claims asserted against Hurd were frivolous, as the statute of limitations barred any claims arising out of activity occurring before August 31, 2002, which included all activity in connection with T-1 and T-2. As Hurd had no further involvement with the Terminator Franchise aside from her 1998 assignment of rights, all direct infringement claims against her were time-barred and frivolous.
Goldberg's contributory infringement claim against Hurd was potentially viable from a time standpoint. Even after the court dismissed claims arising from conduct before August 31, 2002, and...
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