Goldberg v. East Orange Rent Control Bd.
| Decision Date | 10 June 1980 |
| Citation | 175 N.J.Super. 19,417 A.2d 557 |
| Parties | Robert GOLDBERG t/a Robert Goldberg Management Company, Agent for Crescent Park Associates, Plaintiff, v. EAST ORANGE RENT CONTROL BOARD, Defendant, and Samuel Klein, Intervenor. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
Harvey M. Douglen, Elizabeth, for plaintiff (Stier & Douglen, Elizabeth, attorneys). Ernest R. Booker, Newark, for defendant.
Harry Schaffer, West Orange, for intervenor.
This action is before the court on a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs by reason of a decision of the Rent Control Board of the City of East Orange. The action is filed by plaintiff, Robert Goldberg t/a Real Estate Management Company (hereinafter Goldberg), against the East Orange Rent Control Board (board). Samuel Klein, the affected tenant, was permitted to cross-appeal the board's determination as an intervenor.
The facts are briefly as follows. Intervenor Klein, a tenant in an apartment house managed by plaintiff, entered into a lease which commenced on October 1, 1975 and ended November 30, 1978. The annual rent stated in the lease was $6,612 or $551 monthly. By separate document plaintiff permitted a one-month rental concession for each year of the lease term.
On or about October 25, 1978 Goldberg served Klein with a notice terminating his tenancy as of December 1, 1978 and advising him that Goldberg would be willing to enter into a new one-year lease at $617 a month. This amount represented a 12% or $66 increase based on the stated rent of $551. Klein advised Goldberg that he was willing to pay a 12% increase equal to $60 based on the alleged effective rent of $505 for a total rent of $565. Goldberg refused. Klein then filed a complaint with the board on March 17, 1978 to establish the correct base rent and allowable increase under the city's rent control ordinance.
The board determined the rental concession was a waiver of rent, and considered the concession as rent not received for purposes of computing the base rent. The base rent calculated by the board was $505. The board limited plaintiff to a $60 increase effective from December 1, 1978, establishing a new maximum rent of $565 a month.
Plaintiff argues that the rent control board does not have the authority to fix a base rent under the ordinance other than the rent stated in the tenant's lease. Plaintiff alleges the ordinance is silent on the topic of rental concessions and fails to specifically define the term "rent."
The powers of the board under Ordinance 52 of 1975, amended June 15, 1978 and October 25, 1977, are as follows:
Section 1. 2:38-9 Establishment of Rents
Establishments of rents between a landlord and a tenant to whom this act is applicable shall hereafter be determined as follows:
a. For a periodic tenant (i. e., month to month, week to week) whose lease term is less than one year, said owner, agent or employee of same shall not demand, receive or accept any rental increase which is greater than six percent (6 percent) of the existing rent at the time the notice of increase is delivered to the tenant. . . .
b. For a year to year tenant, or for a tenant under a lease term in excess of one year, said landlord, owner or agent of same shall not seek or demand an increase in rental which exceeds six percent (6 percent) of the prior rent for each twelve (12) month period the existing lease has been in effect. (Example: A written lease runs for three (3) consecutive years at a fixed rent without increases. At the end of the third year, the landlord is entitled to a maximum increase in rent of eighteen percent (18 percent).
. . . Any rental increase given a tenant which exceeds that allowed by this Ordinance may be voided in its entirety by the Rent Control Board or may be adjusted by that Board to conform to the amount allowed by this Ordinance . . .
In the interpretation of rent control ordinances, it has been stated that
. . . the principle and policy of the ordinance should be given expression rather than the literal sense of the particular terms, standing alone. The particular words are to be made responsive to the essential principle of the law . . . Statutes are to be interpreted in light of their purpose and logic. (Apartment Managem. Co. v. Union Tp., 140 N.J.Super. 220, 224, 356 A.2d 20 (App.Div.1976))
Here, the purpose, as stated in the preamble of the ordinance, is to control rents due to a prevalent housing shortage which has forced rents up dramatically in recent years. Central Towers Co. v. Fort Lee, 160 N.J.Super. 546, 549, 390 A.2d 677 (Law Div.1978). This purpose is in accord with the courts finding that the object of a rent control ordinance is to prevent exorbitant and oppressive rental increases in a milieu where tenants have been deprived of freedom to contract by the absence of a competitive housing market. Albigese v. Jersey City, 127 N.J.Super. 101, 111, 316 A.2d 483 (Law Div.1974), mod. and aff'd 129 N.J.Super. 567, 324 A.2d 577 (App.Div.1974).
Since "rent" is not specifically defined in the ordinance, it must be given its usual and normal meaning, in light of the purpose of the ordinance, i. e., the consideration paid for the use and occupation of a property. Modular Concepts, Inc. v. South Brunswick Tp., 146 N.J.Super. 138, 141, 369 A.2d 32 (App.Div.1977).
The subject of rental concession in this context has not been dealt with previously by the New Jersey courts. However, we are not without guidance from other jurisdictions who have considered the problem. In Beach-Gasper Co., Inc. v. Strauss, 185 Misc. 930, 58 N.Y.S.2d 82 (C.C.N.Y.1945), the court concluded that a one-month rental concession provided in an annual lease was to be considered in the calculation of a base rent under the Emergency Rent Laws of 1945. The court concluded that rent actually received by the landlord was the implied definition of rent under the ordinance and deducted the one-month concession from the stated annual rent. Whether the rent was to be divided into 11 or 12 parts was immaterial since the issue was the determination of the annual rent.
In La Barbera v. Housing & Develop. Auth., 44 App.Div.2d 835, 355 N.Y.S.2d 465 (App.Div.1945), the tenant's three-year lease provided for a one-month concession for each...
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