Goldberg v. Kelly, No. 62

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBRENNAN
Citation397 U.S. 254,90 S.Ct. 1011,25 L.Ed.2d 287
PartiesJack R. GOLDBERG, Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York, Appellant, v. John KELLY et al
Docket NumberNo. 62
Decision Date23 March 1970

397 U.S. 254
90 S.Ct. 1011
25 L.Ed.2d 287
Jack R. GOLDBERG, Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York, Appellant,

v.

John KELLY et al.

No. 62.
Argued Oct. 13, 1969.
Decided March 23, 1970.

Page 255

John J. Loflin, Jr., New York City, for appellant.

Lee A. Albert, New York City, for appellees.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question for decision is whether a State that terminates public assistance payments to a particular recipient without affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the recipient procedural due process in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This action was brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York by residents of New

Page 256

York City receiving financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State's general Home Relief program.1 Their complaint alleged that the New York State and New York City officials administering these programs terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid without prior notice and hearing, thereby denying them due process of law.2 At the time

Page 257

the suits were filed there was no requirement of prior notice or hearing of any kind before termination of financial aid. However, the State and city adopted procedures for notice and hearing after the suits were brought, and the plaintiffs, appellees here, then challenged the constitutional adequacy of those procedures.

The State Commissioner of Social Services amended the State Department of Social Services' Official Regulations to require that local social services officials proposing to discontinue or suspend a recipient's financial aid do so according to a procedure that conforms to either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of § 351.26 of the regulations as amended.3 The City of New York

Page 258

elected to promulgate a local procedure according to subdivision (b). That subdivision, so far as here pertinent, provides that the local procedure must include the giving of notice to the recipient of the reasons for a proposed discontinuance or suspension at least seven days prior to its effective date, with notice also that upon request the recipient may have the proposal reviewed by a local welfare official holding a position superior to that of the supervisor who approved the proposed discontinuance or suspension, and, further, that the recipient may submit, for purposes of the review, a written statement to demonstrate why his grant should not be discontinued or suspended. The decision by the reviewing official whether to discontinue or suspend aid must be made expeditiously, with written notice of the decision to the recipient. The section further expressly provides that '(a)ssistance shall not be discontinued or suspended prior to the date such notice of decision is sent to the recipient and his representative, if any, or prior to the proposed effective date of discontinuance or suspension, whichever occurs later.'

Pursuant to subdivision (b), the New York City Department of Social Services promulgated Procedure No. 68—18. A caseworker who has doubts about the recipient's continued eligibility must first discuss them with the recipient. If the caseworker concludes that the recipient is no longer eligible, he recommends termination

Page 259

of aid to a unit supervisor. If the latter concurs, he sends the recipient a letter stating the reasons for proposing to terminate aid and notifying him that within seven days he may request that a higher official review the record, and may support the request with a written statement prepared personally or with the aid of an attorney or other person. If the reviewing official affirms the determination of ineligibility, aid is stopped immediately and the recipient is informed by letter of the reasons for the action. Appellees' challenge to this procedure emphasizes the absence of any provisions for the personal appearance of the recipient before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses.4 However, the letter does inform the recipient that he may request a post-termination 'fair hearing.'5 This is a proceeding before an inde-

Page 260

pendent state hearing officer at which the recipient may appear personally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and have a record made of the hearing. If the recipient prevails at the 'fair hearing' he is paid all funds erroneously withheld.6 HEW Handbook, pt. IV, §§ 6200—6500; 18 NYCRR §§ 84.2—84.23. A recipient whose aid is not restored by a 'fair hearing' decision may have judicial review. N.Y.Civil Practice Law and Rules, Art. 78 (1963). The recipient is so notified, 18 NYCRR § 84.16.

I

The constitutional issue to be decided, therefore, is the narrow one whether the Due Process Clause requires that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits.7 The District Court held

Page 261

that only a pretermination evidentiary hearing would satisfy the constitutional command, and rejected the argument of the state and city officials that the combination of the post-termination 'fair hearing' with the informal pre-termination review disposed of all due process claims. The court said: 'While post-termination review is relevant, there is one overpowering fact which controls here. By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without funds or assets. * * * Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of * * * 'brutal need' without a prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it.' Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 893, 899, 900 (1968). The court rejected the argument that the need to protect the public's tax revenues supplied the requisite 'overwhelming consideration.' 'Against the justified desire to protect public funds must be weighed the individual's overpowering need in this unique situation not to be wrongfully deprived of assistance. * * * While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process. Under all the circumstances, we hold that due process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits, and the fact that there is a later constitutionally fair proceeding does not alter the result.' Id., at 901. Although state officials were party defendants in the action, only the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction, 394 U.S. 971, 89 S.Ct. 1469, 22 L.Ed.2d 751 (1969), to decide important issues that have been the subject of disagreement in principle between the three-judge court in the present case and that convened in Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 90 S.Ct. 1026, 25 L.Ed.2d 307. We affirm.

Appellant does not contend that procedural due process is not applicable to the termination of welfare bene-

Page 262

fits. Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.8 Their termination involves state action that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are 'a 'privilege' and not a 'right." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327 (1969). Relevant constitutional restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to disqualification for unemployment compensation, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); or to denial of a tax exemption, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958); or to discharge from public employment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956).9 The extent to which procedural due process

Page 263

must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 647, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. Accordingly, as we said in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, etc. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748—1749, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961), 'consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.' See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1513, 1514, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960).

It is true, of course, that some governmental benefits may be administratively terminated without affording the recipient a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.10

Page 264

But we agree with the District Court that when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969). For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.11 Cf. Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235, 239, 88 S.Ct. 362, 366, 19 L.Ed.2d 438 (1967). Thus the crucial factor in this context—a factor not present in the case of the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended—is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while...

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4962 practice notes
  • Part II
    • United States
    • Federal Register November 30, 2005
    • November 30, 2005
    ...time and manner; access to legal counsel; and review of the government's actions by an impartial decision-maker. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-268 (1970) (discussing due process in the context of terminating welfare benefits). Because quarantine implicates an individual's liberty......
  • Quarantine, inspection, and licensing: Communicable diseases control,
    • United States
    • Federal Register November 30, 2005
    • November 30, 2005
    ...time and manner; access to legal counsel; and review of the government's actions by an impartial decision-maker. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-268 (1970) (discussing due process in the context of terminating welfare benefits). Because quarantine implicates an individual's liberty......
  • United States v. Fatico, No. 76-CR-81.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
    • December 1, 1977
    ...Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). The question is not merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but whether the nature of the......
  • Javits v. Stevens, No. 73 Civ. 5339-LFM.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • September 24, 1974
    ...447 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 719, 30 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4932 cases
  • United States v. Fatico, No. 76-CR-81.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
    • December 1, 1977
    ...Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). The question is not merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but whether the nature of the......
  • Javits v. Stevens, No. 73 Civ. 5339-LFM.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • September 24, 1974
    ...447 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 719, 30 ......
  • Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, No. 71-1113.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • August 2, 1972
    ...is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, the Court reiterated that statutory entitlements are interests so protected. The Wisconsin statutory sch......
  • Thompson v. Washington, No. 71-2049.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • December 10, 1973
    ...In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court noted that welfare benefits are a matter of "statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them." 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1017, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (emphasis added). Although the right-privilege distinction may have limited utility, there......
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9 books & journal articles
  • THE BURDENS OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE.
    • United States
    • William and Mary Law Review Vol. 63 Nbr. 2, November 2021
    • November 1, 2021
    ...to determine whether the constitutional meaning has been complied with"). (9.) 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (10.) See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68. 77-84 (1984) (criminal procedural rules); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (civi......
  • Schoolhouse Property.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 5, March 2022
    • March 1, 2022
    ...50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 591-99 (1998) (summarizing "the debate about the direction of procedural due process"). (9.) Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (10.) Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1974 (1996) (noting that until Gold......
  • The Public–Private Distinction: Insights for Public Administration from the State Action Doctrine
    • United States
    • Public Administration Review Nbr. 75-1, January 2015
    • January 1, 2015
    ...382 U.S. 296 (1966).Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).Lovell v. City of Grif‌f‌i n, 303 ......
  • DELEGATION, ADMINISTRATION, AND IMPROVISATION.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 97 Nbr. 1, November 2021
    • November 1, 2021
    ...money...."). (325) See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. (326) HAMBURGER, supra note 9, at 3 n.b (first citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); and then citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); see also Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. RE......
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