Goldberger v. City of Perth Amboy

• Decision Date: 14 February 1938
• Parties: GOLDBERGER v. CITY OF PERTH AMBOY.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

197 A. 267

GOLDBERGER

v. CITY OF PERTH AMBOY.

Supreme Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County.

February 14, 1938.

Action by Leo Goldberger against the City of Perth Amboy to recover money allegedly due plaintiff on his salary while serving as judge of the district court of the defendant city. On motion to strike amended answer and counterclaim, and on a stipulation of fact, verdict was entered for plaintiff for $3,126.20.

David Goldsmith, of Perth Amboy, for plaintiff. Harry S. Medinets, of Perth Amboy, for defendant.

BARBOUR, Supreme Court Commissioner.

This matter comes before me as Supreme Court Commissioner on motion to strike amended answer and counterclaim and on stipulation of fact.

The plaintiff sues to recover money alleged to be due him on his salary while serving as judge of the district court of the city of Perth Amboy, from January 19, 1931 to July 1, 1936, alleging that the defendant illegally deducted certain sums from the salary due him and has refused to pay the same.

It is admitted that on January 19, 1931, the plaintiff was duly appointed and commissioned by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to the office of the judge of the Perth Amboy district court and acted as such during his term and until July 1, 1936; that the plaintiff was entitled to receive for his services a salary of $3,500 per annum; that on March 18, 1931, there was established as part of said district court a division known as "Division of Small Claims," pursuant to resolution of the board of commissioners of the city of Perth Amboy, approved March 18, 1931, which action was in accordance with the provisions of chapter 225, page 371, of the Laws of 1926, Comp.St.Supp. 1930, § 61 —221a et seq., and chapter 161, page 315, of the Laws of 1927, Comp.St. Supp.1930, § 61 —221r; that such latter act provided for payment to the judge of such district court of a salary of $600 per year in addition to the amount theretofore fixed by law as the salary of such judge; that the plaintiff's total salary as judge of such court amounted to the sum of $19,074.99, and that his total salary as judge of the small claims division of such court amounted to the sum of $3,171.60; that he was paid on account of the first-mentioned salary the sum of $16,386.63, leaving a balance of $2,688.36, and was paid on account of salary as judge of the small claims division the sum of $2,692.41, leaving a balance of $479.19. These two balances amount to the sum of $3,167.55; the total amount set forth in the amended complaint being, however, the sum of $3,126.20.

The defendant contends that the 1926 act and the 1927 act were both unconstitutional and that, therefore, the plaintiff has been paid more than is due to him and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment on its counterclaim in the sum of $2,692.41, being the amount paid to the plaintiff for the services rendered by him in the small claims division of such court.

The defendant on the argument alleged that the only point was the question of the constitutionality of the acts of 1926 and 1927 providing for the establishment of the division of small claims and the payment of salary to the judge of the district court by reason thereof, and stated that if such acts were declared constitutional the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount alleged to be due to him, conceding that under Delmar v. Bergen County, 117 N.J.L 377, 189 A. 75 the acts pursuant to which deductions were made from plaintiff's salary were unconstitutional.

This action, therefore, differs from the actions which have been and are being instituted by persons who have held office pursuant to appointment by the Governor, but whose salaries were paid by municipalities or counties, and who sue for the amount deducted pursuant to the so-called "Economy Acts," in that the defendant city admits the unconstitutionality of such acts, but contends that the balance alleged to be due to the plaintiff is for services in the small claims division of the court and that such act is unconstitutional. It alleges the plaintiff, therefore, cannot recover the moneys claimed, but, on the other hand, should repay to the city the moneys already paid to him on account of such services in such small claims division allowing credit, however, for the balance due on what might be termed the main salary as judge of the district court.

The defendant contends that the 1926 act is unconstitutional, alleging it amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the governing body of the municipality.

Chapter 225, P.L.1926, is entitled, "A Supplement to an act entitled 'An act concerning District Courts (Revision of one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight),' approved June fourteenth, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight," and the first section thereof, Comp.St.Supp.1930, § 61 —221a, provides as follows:

"1. In all places in this State where there is a District Court there shall be established as part of said court a division known as the 'Division of Small Claims' of the District Court of the (naming the court as already established); provided, the governing body of the municipality, or, of the court be a Judicial District Court, the board of chosen freeholders of the county shall so determine."

The defendant contends that because it required the affirmative action of the governing body of the municipality there was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The 1926 act covers four pages in the pamphlet laws and contains 17 sections, setting up a complete scheme for the bringing of suits where the amount involved does not exceed the sum of $50, exclusive of costs, fixing costs for such at considerably less than the cost fixed for regular district court actions, setting up a simplified method of procedure, so that services of an attorney are not necessary, and limiting jurisdiction to debts, claims, and demands sued upon by the original creditor and not by assignee or transferee.

It is, therefore, to be noted that...