Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. Pirillo

• Decision Date: 27 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. CV00-04691DDPCTX.,CV00-04691DDPCTX.
• Citation: Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. Pirillo, 118 F.Supp.2d 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: GOLDEN DAY SCHOOLS, INC., a California non-profit corporation; et al., Plaintiffs, v. Carolyn PIRILLO, an individual; et al., Defendants.

118 F.Supp.2d 1037

GOLDEN DAY SCHOOLS, INC., a California non-profit corporation; et al., Plaintiffs, v. Carolyn PIRILLO, an individual; et al., Defendants.

No. CV00-04691DDPCTX.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

October 27, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James P. Clark, Gregory L. Doll, Joel D. Scott, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiffs.

Richard J. Rojo, CAAG Office of Atty. Gen. of California, Los Angeles, CA, Vladimir M. Shalkevich, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

PREGERSON, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the defendants' motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs' request for judicial notice. After reviewing and considering the materials submitted by the parties and hearing oral argument, the Court adopts the following Order.

I. Background

Plaintiff Golden Day Schools, Inc. ("Golden Day") is a non-profit corporation which operates child development and educational programs, including a child day care center, in South Central Los Angeles. (Pl.'s First Am. Compl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff Clark Parker ("Parker") founded Golden Day in 1963, and now serves as its Chief Executive Officer. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 16.) Plaintiff Rosa Little ("Little") is a Golden Day employee. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

Defendant Carolyn Pirillo ("Pirillo") is a Staff Counsel for the California Department of Education ("CDE"). (Id. at ¶ 6.) Defendants Keesha Woods ("Woods"), Jennifer Hua ("Hua"), Sergio Ramirez ("Ramirez"), and Susan Neeson ("Neeson") are employees of the California Department of Social Services ("DSS"). (Id. at ¶¶ 7-10.)

Golden Day applied for and began receiving subsidies from the State of California through the CDE in 1966, and continued to receive CDE subsidies until 1998. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 22.) On April 22, 1998, CDE notified Golden Day that it intended not to renew Golden Day's funding in 1999 because Golden Day's 1992-93, 1993-94, and 1994-95 audits were unacceptable.¹ (Id. at ¶ 22.)

Pursuant to California law, Parker appealed CDE's decision not to renew Golden Day's funding through an administrative hearing held on March 4, 1999.² (Id. at ¶ 23, 24.) However, the plaintiffs allege that Golden Day was precluded from calling witnesses or cross-examining adverse witnesses at the March 4, 1999 administrative hearing. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Parker also alleges that at least three administrative review panel members, including defendant Pirillo, were not impartial, and therefore Golden Day did not receive a fair hearing.³ (Id. at ¶ 24.)

The plaintiffs allege that, soon after the panel's decision to stop funding Golden Day, the CDE demanded to enter Golden Day's premises and to examine Golden Day's files.⁴ (Pl.'s Opp., p. 3.) The plaintiffs speculate that the CDE assumed that Golden Day would be unable to continue operations without CDE funding, and therefore the CDE needed access to Golden Day's files to relocate Golden Day's students. (Id.) However, the plaintiffs claim that the relocation of Golden Day's students was unnecessary because Golden Day had adequate reserve funding to continue its programs during the 1999-2000 academic year. (Id.)

On June 10, 1999, defendant Pirillo brought an ex parte application for an order shortening time for a contempt hearing based on Golden Day's refusal to provide the CDE with its students' names and addresses; the court denied the ex parte application the same day. (Id.)

The plaintiffs allege that, the day after the ex parte application was denied, Pirillo "[took] the law into her own hands" by filing a complaint with DSS. (First Am. Compl., ¶ 32.) As a result, the DSS employee defendants went to two Golden Day office sites with Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") officers to search for and seize Golden Day's files. (Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33.) The defendants did not have a warrant to search Golden Day's offices or to seize Golden Day's property.

Before the search began, Parker allegedly informed the DSS employees that they could not lawfully remove Golden Day's files without a court order. (Id. at ¶ 34.) The plaintiffs claim that the LAPD officers told plaintiff Little that they would arrest her unless she allowed the removal of Golden Day's files; the plaintiffs further allege that a DSS representative struck Little in the head while removing Golden Day's files. (Id. at ¶ 35.) According to the plaintiffs, "[t]he DSS representatives indiscriminately seized hundreds of Golden Day's files[,] ... threw Golden Day's files into boxes without keeping any record of which files they were taking, and when they took the files—which were not secured —outside, many papers were dropped onto Crenshaw Boulevard and lost to the wind. To date, Golden Day does not know for certain which files were taken and which files were lost." (Id. at ¶ 36.)

The plaintiffs allege that DSS representatives copied Golden Day's files and returned some, but not all, of the files approximately six hours after the seizure occurred. (Id. at ¶¶ 44, 46.)

The plaintiffs filed this action to challenge the legality of the searches and seizures conducted by the defendants on June 11, 1999. They assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and for the assault and battery allegedly suffered by Little. The defendants now seek dismissal of all the plaintiffs' claims based on the plaintiffs' failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted and this Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Legal Standards for Dismissal

A. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is appropriate when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations set forth in the complaint. See Newman v. Universal Pictures, 813 F.2d 1519, 1521-22 (9th Cir. 1987). The court must view all allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-movant and must accept all material allegations—as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them—as true. See North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.1983).

B. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and must dismiss claims over which they have no subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts have jurisdiction over claims "arising under" federal law. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2. If a plaintiff asserts one claim arising under federal law, a federal court may assert supplemental jurisdiction over, and thereby adjudicate, state law claims that are transactionally related to the federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

III. Discussion

A. Did the Searches of Golden Day's Offices and the Seizures of Golden Day's Files Violate the Fourth Amendment?

The plaintiffs claim that the warrantless searches of Golden Day's offices and the warrantless seizures of Golden Day's files violated the Fourth Amendment. In response, the defendants argue that no warrant was required for the searches and seizures at issue, and therefore the Court must dismiss the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

1. The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, an individual is protected against unjustified government intrusion only where he has a "reasonable expectation of privacy". Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). People's reasonable expectations of privacy are not limited to their homes; thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of both private residences and commercial facilities. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987). Further, a business owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his commercial property not only with respect to criminal investigations conducted by police, but also with respect to administrative inspections designed to enforce regulatory statutes. Id. at 699-700, 107 S.Ct. 2636.

2. Reasonableness of the Searches

As noted above, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. See e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). The Supreme Court, however, has established several exceptions to the warrant requirement. Generally, the Supreme Court deems exceptions to the warrant to be constitutionally proper where an important government interest greatly outweighs an individual's privacy interest. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (exigency exception to the warrant requirement).

The defendants in this case argue that the pervasively regulated business exception to the warrant requirement excused their need to obtain a warrant. The Supreme Court has held that the expectation of privacy is reduced for businesses in closely regulated industries. Burger, 482 U.S. at 700, 107 S.Ct. 2636. Thus:

in [] situations of "special need," where the privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a...