Golden v. Board of Selectmen of Falmouth

• Decision Date: 30 December 1970
• Citation: 265 N.E.2d 573,358 Mass. 519
• Parties: , 2 ERC 1156, 1 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,095 Irwin M. GOLDEN v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF FALMOUTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 573

265 N.E.2d 573

358 Mass. 519, 2 ERC 1156, 1 Envtl.

L. Rep. 20,095

Irwin M. GOLDEN v. BOARD OF SELECTMEN OF FALMOUTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable.

Argued Nov. 4, 1970.

Decided Dec. 30, 1970.

Robert Clayton, Boston, for defendant.

George T. Shaw, Boston, for Conservation Law Foundation, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before TAURO, C.J., and SPALDING, KIRK, REARDON and QUIRICO, JJ. KIRK, Justice.

This is a bill in equity brought by the plaintiff against the board of selectmen of the town of Falmouth (the board). The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of land in Falmouth extending from the edge of a pond through a tidal marsh to upland property. In May of 1967, pursuant to § 36 of the Falmouth zoning by-law, he applied to the board for a special permit to construct in the tidal marsh a twenty-four foot wide channel in which to dock his two boats. Under § 36 it is the board which is authorized to grant such a permit. See G.L. c. 40A, § 4. He also filed with the Director of Marine Fisheries, pursuant to G.L. c. 130, § 27A (the Act), a notice of his intention to construct the channel and a plan of the proposed project. The Director of Marine Fisheries issued an 'Order of Conditions' authorizing the project. Thereafter, the board voted to deny the special permit to excavate in the tidal marsh.

The plaintiff then brought this bill in the Superior Court by way of appeal from the board's decision. The judge, after a hearing, ruled that the board exceeded its authority in refusing to grant the plaintiff the special permit. The final decree annulled the board's decision and ordered the board to issue the permit subject to the shall be borne by the person filing Fisheries.

The board appeals from the final decree. The evidence is reported. The judge made findings of fact and rulings of law. The plaintiff did not submit a brief. Counsel for Conservation Law Foundation, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. The only issue presented by the appeal is whether the Act deprives the board, acting under a local zoning by-law, of the power to forbid the filling, dredging, or excavating of coastal wetlands in the town despite the approval of the undertaking by the Director of Marine Fisheries acting under the Act.

The purpose of the Act is to regulate the removal, filling, and dredging of areas bordering on coastal waters. ¹ It has been held to be valid legislative enactment. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co. Inc., 349 Mass. 104, 107, 206 N.E.2d 666.

1. The construing the Act the judge ruled that the board acting pursuant to the Act had the authority only to make recommendations to the appropriate State agencies and had no power to prevent the plaintiff from making the channel once the Director of Marine Fisheries approved it. ² We read this ruling to be entirely based on the proposition that the Act in and of itself does not permit boards of selectmen to regulate local coastal wetlands once regulation by the director has been imposed. The ruling is framed within the context of the Act and it considers only whether the Director of Marine Fisheries or the board has the ultimate authority under the Act. We do not so view the case. The board made its decision pursuant to § 36 of the zoning by-law, not pursuant to the Act. ³

2. Section 36 of the Falmouth zoning by-law is a permissible exercise of municipal zoning power. ⁴ MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, Mass., 255 N.E.2d 347. ^a In the MacGibbon case, this court held that a zoning by-law having the same purposes as § 36, the one before us (protecting the town's natural resources along its coastal areas) and similar operative provisions (requiring a permit prior to obstructing streams or tidal rivers or dredging and filling wetlands and marsh areas), was expressly authorized by the Zoning Enabling Act, G.L. c. 40A, § 2. The board, therefore, had the power to deny the permit as long as its decision was not 'based on a legally untenable ground, or * * * (was not) unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.' MacGibbon, supra, at 84, 255 N.E.2d at 350, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 277, 244 N.E.2d 311. There is nothing before us showing that the board's decision did not comply with this standard.

3. Having upheld the validity of § 36 we turn to the question whether in enacting the Act the Legislature intended to repeal existing laws relating to the same subject. We find nothing in the language of the Act expressly, impliedly or inferentially suggesting that municipalities are deprived or preempted from exercising regulatory control of wetlands situated therein by means of zoning by-laws. The Act establishes a regulatory machinery at the State level in which local boards of selectmen, the Department of Public Works and the Director of Marine Fisheries each has a role. There is no express reference in the statute that municipalities may or may not otherwise undertake wetlands control independent of the Act.

Similarly, we do not construe the Act as impliedly precluding regulation by municipalities. Although it is an established rule of statutory construction that '(T)he enactment of a statute which seems to have been intended to cover the whole subject to which it relates impliedly repeals all existing statutes touching the subject,' (Doyle v. Kirby, 184 Mass. 409, 411--412, 68 N.E. 843, 844), this rule has been applied with caution. Doherty v. Commissioner of Adm., 349 Mass. 687, 690, 212 N.E.2d 485. In the Doherty case, the test was stated to be whether the prior statute or by-law is so repugnant to and inconsistent with a later enactment covering the same subject that both cannot stand. Doherty v. Commissioner of Adm., supra, at 690, 212 N.E.2d 485. In applying this test, the court endeavors to determine whether the Legislature intended to repeal earlier related laws, including existing town by-laws, as well as whether there is a need for uniformity in the subject of the legislation. Homer v. City of Fall River, 326 Mass. 673, 96 N.E.2d 152. McDonald v. Justices of Superior Court, 299 Mass. 321, 13 N.E.2d 16.

4. We see no repugnance between the provisions of the Act and § 36 of the Falmouth zoning by-law. Each confers a separate and distinct type of authority upon the respective government bodies involved. The first sentence of the Act provides that no person shall remove, fill or dredge in any marsh, bank, and so forth, without giving notice to the local board of selectmen, to the State Department of Public Works, and to the Director of Marine Fisheries. Subsequent clauses confer limited jurisdiction on the State Department of Public Works to ban any project if there is a violation of G.L. c. 91, §§ 30 and 30A. Since the Department of Public Works took no part in this case, those provisions of the Act which confer limited authority upon it need not be construed. In aid of interpreting the statute as a whole, however, we observe that although the Act expressly gives the Department of Public Works final authority in certain instances, it does not necessarily follow that the Act repeals all local by-laws relating to the same subject. In Crawford v. Building Inspector of Barnstable, 356 Mass. 174, 180, 248 N.E.2d 488, 492, it was held that 'No special rights accrue to Harbor View because the pier was constructed under a license granted by the Commonwealth's Department of Public Works. The license was 'subject to all applicable Federal, State, County and Municipal Laws, ordinances and regulations.' Such licenses may not be used contrary to the terms of zoning by-laws.' See Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 204 N.E.2d 513.

If a local board acting under the zoning by-law authorizes a project in violation of G.L. c. 91, §§ 30 and 30A, and the Department of Public Works vetoes it, that board would clearly be governed by the express legislative enactment and the decision of the Department of Public Works would prevail. There is no provision in the Act, however, which grants to the Department of Public Works the authority to authorize a project which such local board has vetoed. In most cases, a decision of this type by such local...