Golden v. Perrin

• Decision Date: 15 July 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21-CV-00187-RAL
• Parties: MAURICE GOLDEN, Plaintiff v. U.M. PERRIN, AND C.O. SIBBLE, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

MAURICE GOLDEN, Plaintiff
v.
U.M. PERRIN, AND C.O. SIBBLE, Defendants

No. 1:21-CV-00187-RAL

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania, Erie Division

July 15, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ECF NO. 29

RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Maurice Golden (Golden), an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) at its State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), initiated this pro se civil rights action against Defendants Yvette Perrin (Perrin), a unit manager, and Leo Sibble (Sibble), a corrections officer, employed at that institution.^[1] The Defendants moved to dismiss some claims in Golden's original complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 18, 19. Golden filed a motion to amend his complaint; the Court granted that motion, docketed his amended complaint, and denied the motion to dismiss as moot.^[2] ECF Nos. 24-26.

1

Golden's amended complaint includes three claims against Perrin and Sibble in their individual capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, and a First Amendment retaliation claim. ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 53, 55-65. Golden also claimed that the Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., by denying him a “sanitary environment.” ECF No. 26, ¶ 54. He also brought one state law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Id., ¶ 66.

The Defendants have moved to dismiss the retaliation and state law IIED claims of Golden's amended complaint.^[3] ECF Nos. 29, 30. The motion is fully briefed and ready for decision. ECF No. 33.

The motion to dismiss will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

2

its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).

While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts in the complaint. See California Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as' factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).

Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:

First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific

3

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court may consider “the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record” as well as “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). While a district court may not generally consider matters extraneous to pleadings in this posture, it may consider documents integral to or explicitly relied on in a complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).

While the foregoing principles apply to all complaints in federal court, pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read the factual allegations of a pro se complaint to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite the plaintiffs failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).^[4]

4

III. Allegations of the Amended Complaint

The Court accepts the following factual allegations in Golden's amended complaint as true for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). On November 16, 2020, Golden turned in his dirty laundry for washing, including one winter coat, two pairs of state-issued pants, and one blanket. ECF No. 26, ¶ 14. Three days later, he was transferred to a different housing unit. Id., ¶ 15. Concerned that his laundry would not be forwarded to his new cell, Golden told a corrections officer on his new housing unit about his laundry. Id., ¶ 20. That officer told him to wait and see whether he received his laundry and, if he did not, to contact the unit manager, Defendant Perrin. Id. A unit manager's job duties include ensuring inmates have clothing, bedding, and the like. Id., ¶ 44. Laundry usually takes about a week to return, so he waited that long. Id.

When his laundry never arrived, he submitted two request slips on November 23, 2020: one to a unit counselor in his old housing unit and one to Perrin in his new housing unit. Id. He explained the situation and said that he needed replacements. Id., ¶ 20. The unit counselor disclaimed responsibility for such matters, and Perrin did not respond. Id., ¶¶ 21-22.. From November 19 through December 10, 2020, Golden spoke to three corrections officers and Perrin about his laundry. Id., ¶ 23. He sent two more written requests to Perrin during that timeframe. Id. He also told Perrin and Sibble that, during that period, “he was freezing and shivering

5

throughout the nights due to the low temperatures and lack of a winter coat and blanket.” Id., ¶ 26.

Golden spoke to Sibble again on December 1, 2020. Id., ¶ 28. He complained about the cold temperatures. He told Sibble that if he did nothing about the situation, he would file a' grievance. In response, Sibble “verbally threatened Plaintiff that, if Plaintiff did so, that he would issue Plaintiff a misconduct for complaining too much.” Id., ¶ 29.

Golden filed a grievance about Sibble's reaction, writing that he had threatened him with a misconduct. Id., ¶ 41. He wrote Grievance No. 903257 on December 4, 2020, and it was received on December 8, 2020.

On December 10, 2020, Golden asked Perrin if she had received his most recent request for a blanket. AZ.,¶ 30. She replied that she had not, and that she had been “too busy.” Id. But Golden had requested that corrections officer Knapp speak with Perrin about his winter coat and blanket. Id., ¶ 31. When Golden later asked Knapp about this, she told him that she had orally told Perrin and handed her the written request. Id.

At this point, Golden felt “helpless and desperate.” Id., ¶ 32. He told Perrin that “he intended to commit suicide because he could not stand the cold any longer.” Id. After this, Golden was taken to the Mental Health Department and interviewed by a mental health professional. Id., ¶¶ 33, 34. He explained that he was cold without his winter coat and blanket. Id. He said that he would not commit suicide if he was given a blanket, a winter coat, and two pairs of pants. Id., ¶ 38. He then spoke with Lieutenant Hollis. Golden was moved for mental health reasons, Hollis said. Id., ¶ 35. He had not received a misconduct, he added. Id. Golden was then taken to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU). Id., ¶ 38.

6

That same day,...