Goldenstein v. Repossessors, Inc., Civil Action No. 13-cv-02797
| Decision Date | 17 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13-cv-02797 |
| Parties | HEIKO GOLDENSTEIN, Plaintiff v. REPOSSESSORS, INC.; CHAD LATVAAHO; SHADY OAK ENTERPRISES, INC., doing business as PREMIER FINANCE ADJUSTERS; and PHILIP J. HOURICAN, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
APPEARANCES:
NEAL A. THAKKAR, ESQUIRE
On behalf of Plaintiff
ROBERT F. SALVIN, ESQUIRE
On behalf of Defendants
OPINIONJAMES KNOLL GARDNER
This matter is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Defendants, Repossessors, Inc., Chad Latvaaho, and Shady Oak Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Premier Finance Adjusters, which motion was filed on April 11, 2014 together with a brief in support of motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on May 5, 2014 together with plaintiff'smemorandum of law. Defendants filed their Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Defendants, Repossessors, Inc., Chad Latvaaho, and Shady Oak Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Premier Finance Adjusters, on June 19, 2014. Plaintiff's Motion to Bring Additional Authority to the Court's Attention was filed on July 16, 2014.1
This case involves the repossession of a debtor's vehicle as collateral for a loan. Plaintiff Heiko Goldenstein alleges that defendants, Repossessors, Inc., Chad Latvaaho, Shady Oak Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Premier Finance Adjusters, and Philip J. Hourican, repossessed his vehicle in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act2 ("FDCPA") and the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act3 ("PFCEUA") (Count One), and the Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act4 ("RICO") (Count Two).
For the following reasons, I grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on both counts.
Defendants' motion is granted with regard to Count One because this Count presents no genuine dispute of material fact and because I conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case to support his claims under FDCPA and PFCEUA.
Defendants' motion is granted with regard to Count Two of his complaint because this Count presents no genuine dispute of material fact and because I conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case to support his claim under RICO.
Jurisdiction is based upon federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff brings claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). This court also properly has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over plaintiff's state law claim under 73 P.S. § 2270.4, which is part of the same case and controversy.
Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to these claims occurred in Exton, Chester County, Pennsylvania and in Pottstown, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, both of which are located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 118, 1391(b).
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a two-count Complaint on May 21, 2013. Count One alleges violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A) and Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, 73 P.S. § 2270.4. Count Two alleges violations of the Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
As noted above, on April 11, 2014, defendants filed their within motion for summary judgment and on May 5, 2014, plaintiff filed his response in opposition. On June 19, 2014, defendants filed a reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is now before the court for disposition.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to seek summary judgment with respect to a claim or defense, or part of a claim or defense. Rule 56(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People "NAACP" v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2012).
For a fact to be considered material, it "must have the potential to alter the outcome of the case." Id. (citing Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006)). Disputes concerning facts which are irrelevant or unnecessary do not preclude the district court from granting summary judgment. Id.
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the facts and record evidence presented "in the light most favorable to the non[-]moving party." North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 475 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686, 694 (2007)). Stated differently, "[i]n considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engagein any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence 'is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 261 (1986)).
If the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of fact for trial, "the non-moving party then bears the burden of identifying evidence that creates a genuine dispute regarding material facts." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 274 (1986)).
Where a defendant seeks summary judgment, the plaintiff cannot avert summary judgment with speculation, or by resting on the allegations in his pleadings, but rather he must present competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999); Woods v. Bentsen, 889 F.Supp. 179, 184 (E.D.Pa. 1995)(Reed, J.).
"Ultimately, [w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552(1986)) (internal quotations omitted and alteration in original).
Upon consideration of the pleadings, record papers, exhibits,5 affidavits, and depositions, and the parties' respective statements of undisputed material facts,6 and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, as required by the foregoing standard of review, the pertinent facts of this case are as follows.
During all events relevant to this case, plaintiff Heiko Goldenstein was a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, and an employee at the Wyndham Garden Hotel (previously known as The Inn at Chester Springs) in Exton, Pennsylvania.7
In April, 2012, plaintiff sought to obtain a loan to help him pay an electric bill.8 Plaintiff experienced difficulty finding a bank or other lender willing to extend credit to him, but was eventually able to obtain a title loan online from a company called Sovereign Lending Solutions, LLC ("Sovereign"), doing business as Title Loan America.9 Sovereign is a tribal lending entity of the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, a federally-recognized Indian tribe based in Watersmeet, Michigan.10
Sovereign approved plaintiff's application for a loan for $1,000, secured by plaintiff's vehicle - a 1998 Lincoln Town car.11 The interest rate on the loan was about 250% APR.12
Neither plaintiff nor defendants have a copy of plaintiff's loan agreement with Sovereign, but plaintiff and defendants have each provided the court with a sample Pawn Ticket Agreement from Sovereign containing its standard terms and conditions, including an arbitration clause, a statement of Sovereign's rights in the event of default, and statement ofsovereign immunity.13 Sovereign's general terms and conditions can also be found on the Title Loan America website.14
On April 19, 2012, Sovereign electronically wired $950 into plaintiff's bank account, retaining $50 as a fee for the wire transfer.15 After this deposit was made, no further correspondence took place between plaintiff and Sovereign.16 On June 1, 2012, and July 2, 2012, Sovereign debited plaintiff's bank account $207.90 for repayment of the loan.17 Because plaintiff did not recognize this account activity (described as "Sovereign Payroll") on his bank statement, he removed all funds from the account to attempt to stop the withdrawals, but did not close the account.18
On August 1, 2012, Sovereign attempted to again debit plaintiff's account, but payment was rejected because of insufficient funds.19 At no time did plaintiff contact Sovereign to attempt to void the loan, repay the principal, or renegotiaterepayment terms.20 On August 20, 2012, RS Financial Services, LLC, which services loans on behalf of Sovereign, contracted with defendant, Repossessors, Inc. for the recovery of plaintiff's vehicle as collateral for the loan.21
Repossessors, Inc. is a Minnesota corporation owned by defendant, Chad Latvaaho, which performs recovery operations in Minnesota,...
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