Goldeshtein v. I.N.S.
Decision Date | 13 October 1993 |
Docket Number | 92-70228 and 92-70711,Nos. 91-70573,s. 91-70573 |
Citation | 8 F.3d 645 |
Parties | Nir GOLDESHTEIN, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Bart Klein, Bernice Funk, Seattle, WA, for petitioner.
Anthony W. Norwood, Office of Immigration, Litigation, Civ. Div., Justice Dept., Washington, DC, for respondent.
Petition to Review a Decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Before: CANBY, WIGGINS and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
These consolidated cases present the question whether structuring financial transactions with domestic financial institutions to avoid currency reports, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3) and 5322(b), is a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). We hold that it is not. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review in No. 91-70573, reverse the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), and remand with instructions to terminate the deportation proceedings. 1
Nir Goldeshtein is a native and citizen of Israel; he last entered the United States in June 1984. In December 1984, he married Zoe Lawton; she is a United States citizen. On May 30, 1985, on the basis of his marriage, Goldeshtein became a lawful permanent resident of the United States. In March 1989, Goldeshtein pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate federal currency laws, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of structuring financial transactions with domestic financial institutions to avoid currency reports, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3) and 5322(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Goldeshtein was sentenced to concurrent forty-month prison terms on each count. He served his sentence and was released in February 1991.
Meanwhile, on August 20, 1990, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") instituted deportation proceedings against Goldeshtein. The INS alleged that Goldeshtein was deportable under section 241(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1988), because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after entry and had been sentenced to prison for more than a year. 2 The INS further alleged that Goldeshtein was deportable under section 241(a)(4)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (1988), because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. 3 In October and November 1990, and January 1991, deportation hearings were held before an immigration judge ("IJ"). Goldeshtein admitted his convictions, but denied an allegation that the money involved in the offenses had come from drug sales. On January 28, 1991, the IJ ruled that Goldeshtein was deportable under section 241(a)(4) of the INA because the offense of structuring financial transactions to avoid currency reports was a crime involving moral turpitude. The IJ ruled, however, that the INS had failed to establish deportability under section 241(a)(4)(B) of the INA because the evidence was insufficient to prove that Goldeshtein's offense was drug-related. Finally, the IJ denied Goldeshtein's request for a discretionary waiver of deportation under section 212(h) of the INA. The IJ ordered Goldeshtein deported to Israel. Goldeshtein appealed to the BIA. In August 1991, the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal. In September 1991, Goldeshtein filed a petition for review.
Goldeshtein contends that he is not deportable because structuring financial transactions to avoid currency reports does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1992). We agree. 4
Our prior decisions have made it quite clear that the question whether a crime is one of moral turpitude must be answered categorically. "Whether a crime is one with intent to defraud as an element, thereby making it a crime involving moral turpitude, is determined by the statutory definition or by the nature of the crime not by the specific conduct that resulted in the conviction." McNaughton v. INS, 612 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.1980); see also United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022, 1022-23 (2d Cir.1931) () . For a crime to involve moral turpitude within the meaning of the INA, the crime " 'must necessarily involve moral turpitude.' " Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d at 1003 (quoting Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 935 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892, 78 S.Ct. 265, 2 L.Ed.2d 190 (1957)) (emphasis in Tseung Chu).
The first question we must face, then, is whether, by its definition, the crime of structuring financial transactions with domestic financial institutions to avoid the filing of currency reports necessarily involves moral turpitude. The resolution of this question turns on whether evil intent--in this case intent to defraud--is an essential element of the crime. See Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir.1962) (); see also Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227, 71 S.Ct. 703, 706, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951) ( )(citing United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.1940)).
The statute under which Goldeshtein was convicted provides in pertinent part:
No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) ... with respect to such transaction--
* * * * * *
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions.
31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) (1988). 5 The penalties for "willfully violating" this provision are set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (1988). Thus, the language of these statutes does not make intent to defraud the government an essential element of the offense. 6
Indeed, in this circuit a defendant may be convicted of violating section 5324 without even having known that it is a crime to structure financial transactions to avoid currency reports. United States v. Hoyland, 914 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d 1280, 1283-87 (9th Cir.1992), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1942, 123 L.Ed.2d 648 (1993). Thus, in Hoyland, we upheld the conviction even though Hoyland contended that he was unaware that structuring had been criminalized by Congress. 7 We recognize that the Supreme Court will be reviewing the scienter issue in Ratzlaf, but even if that Court decides that the crime of structuring currency transactions includes an element of knowledge of illegality, it would not affect our conclusion on the issue of moral turpitude. As we have pointed out, section 5324 requires no intent to defraud the government (or the financial institutions) of anything. It does not require any false statements to be made or used. The statute requires only structuring to avoid a reporting requirement. That act is not inherently fraudulent. See United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir.1986) ( ). If the Supreme Court were to add a requirement of scienter, that construction would not of itself convert the crime into one of moral turpitude. A crime that involves no element of fraud is not made fraudulent by the mere fact that the violator knew of the illegality. Because "evil intent, such as an intent to defraud" is not necessarily an element of the crime of which Goldeshtein was convicted, and his offense is not of the gravest character, we conclude that this crime does not involve moral turpitude. Hirsch, 308 F.2d at 567; see Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d at 1003; McNaughton, 612 F.2d at 459; Tseung Chu, 247 F.2d at 935; Robinson, 51 F.2d at 1022-23.
The INS argues that evil intent exists if a conviction requires proof that a defendant did a forbidden act "willfully." This court previously has rejected this argument. See Hirsch, 308 F.2d at 567 ( )(quoting Neely v. United States, 300 F.2d 67, 72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864, 82 S.Ct. 1030, 8 L.Ed.2d 84 (1962)). Accordingly, conviction of willful conduct within the meaning of section 5322 does not establish the evil intent required for a crime of moral turpitude.
A review of the indictment reinforces our conclusion that Goldeshtein was not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. See Tseung Chu, 247 F.2d at 935-36 (). The two substantive counts of the indictment to which Goldeshtein pleaded guilty simply track the language of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(b) and 5324(a)(3). 8 Thus, the government was not required to prove intent to defraud to convict him of the offenses defined in the indictment.
Even if intent to defraud is not explicit in the statutory definition, a crime nevertheless may...
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