Goldfield Mohawk Mining Co. v. Frances-Mohawk Mining & Leasing Co.

• Decision Date: 02 December 1910
• Docket Number: 1,861.
• Citation: Goldfield Mohawk Mining Co. v. Frances-Mohawk Mining & Leasing Co., 33 Nev. 491, 112 P. 42 (Nev. 1910)
• Parties: GOLDFIELD MOHAWK MINING CO. v. FRANCES-MOHAWK MINING & LEASING CO.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

112 P. 42

33 Nev. 491

GOLDFIELD MOHAWK MINING CO. v. FRANCES-MOHAWK MINING & LEASING CO.

No. 1,861.

Supreme Court of Nevada

December 02, 1910

Appeal from District Court, Esmeralda County.

Action by the Goldfield Mohawk Mining Company, a corporation against the Frances-Mohawk Mining & Leasing Company, a corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and from an order overruling a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Order set aside and case remanded, with instructions.

Powers & Marioneaux and Frank J. Hangs (Thompson, Morehouse & Thompson, of counsel), for appellant. W. H. Bryant and Chester L. Lyman, for respondent.

SWEENEY J.

This action was commenced in the district court of Nye county Nev., on the 15th day of January, 1907, for the purpose of recovering two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) alleged damages for the violation of the terms of a written lease executed by the respondent, Goldfield Mohawk Mining Company to the appellant. A motion for a change of venue was interposed and granted, removing the cause to Esmeralda county, Nev., because the plaintiff and defendant were doing business in that county, and the alleged cause of action arose therein.

It appears from the testimony that the Mohawk No. 2 and Slim Jim Fraction mining claims, located near the town of Goldfield, Nev., were for some time prior to the 1st day of September, 1905, owned by the Goldfield Mohawk Mining Company. Upon said date a tract of said claims of some seven hundred (700) feet in length and three hundred and seventy-seven (377) feet in width was leased to one G. H. Hayes, for a period of sixteen (16) months, expiring at noon on the 1st day of January, 1907. Afterwards one M. J. Monnette became a partner with Mr. Hayes, and thereafter certain other partners were taken in. The lease being for a considerable tract of land, the ground was cut up into several smaller areas, and among others a part of the ground two hundred (200) feet long and three hundred and seventy-three (373) feet in width was assigned to D. Mackenzie & Co., and afterwards by D. Mackenzie & Co. assigned to the appellant, Frances-Mohawk Mining & Leasing Company, on or about the 10th day of May, 1906. The entire tract proved to be very valuable; that portion known as the Hayes and Monette lease yielding some six or seven million dollars in about four or five months. The small block of the claim leased to the Frances-Mohawk Mining & Leasing Company also became very valuable; it appearing in the testimony in this case that something over $2,000,000 was taken out. The lease originally expired on the 1st day of January, 1907, but on account of shutdowns caused by various labor troubles, it was extended to the 8th day of January, expiring at noon upon that day. Although the action was originally commenced on the 15th day of January, 1907, the case was not called until March 22, 1909, when, after a trial by jury lasting until the 10th day of April, 1909, a verdict in the sum of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) and costs was rendered in favor of the respondent. A motion for a new trial was regularly argued and submitted to the court and denied, from which order overruling the motion for a new trial the defendant appeals.

It is claimed by the respondent that in operating the lease above mentioned, the appellant failed to comply with its terms in that it did not timber said property properly, nor did it remove or cause to be removed therefrom the loose rock and rubbish, as provided in said lease. That as a result of this violation of the terms of the lease, the respondent suffered damages in the sum of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000). The appellant, on its part, claimed that it did comply with the terms and conditions of the lease; that said ground was timbered in miner-like fashion and in accordance with the custom of the district, and that the loose rock and rubbish were removed from the workings of said ground, as provided for in the said lease. That the respondent was not damaged at all as a result of any failure on the part of the appellant to carry out the terms of the said lease. The appellant claimed as a further defense that the respondent, being fully aware of all of the conditions of the said lease, did, on or about the 1st day of January, 1907, approve of the work done and the condition of the property, and that it was thereby estopped from afterwards claiming any damages on account of any alleged violation of the terms of said lease. This in brief states the substance of the controversy between the parties hereto. Each side had its own theory of the case, and upon what the measure of damage, if any, should be based.

The defendant moved for a new trial in the lower court, and in support of its motion therefor, among many assigned, alleged errors, interposed one of our statutory grounds for a new trial, to wit: "Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict." The court, in refusing to pass upon this ground for a new trial interposed by the appellant herein; among other things said: "I am not surprised that the defendant was dissatisfied with the verdict. A verdict of this kind could hardly result otherwise than as a surprise, and defendant naturally feels that justice has been outraged. I have had quite a long experience on the Bench, during which time I have seen many verdicts rendered that I regarded as an outrage upon justice. I have seen many verdicts that I felt ought to be set aside in the interests of justice and fairness. *** It is the duty of the judge to preside at the trial; to see that a fair and impartial trial is had; that all evidence, material and proper, should be submitted to the jury. The judge should properly instruct them upon the law. When that was done, I always felt that the judge's duty in relation to that matter was ended. *** I could never bring my mind to see that it was a just and proper exercise of judicial discretion for the trial court to set aside the verdict of a jury, for the reason that, in the mind of the judge, the evidence did not justify the result. If I could have seen it that way, there have been many verdicts in my experience that I should not have hesitated to set aside, because I have felt outraged myself and felt that justice had been outraged by such verdict. For the reason that I believe it would be contrary to the spirit and letter of the jury system for a court to say that the jury had not properly weighed the evidence, I have not done so. *** With that view of the law, for the court to say that, while it was the sole judge of the facts, if the jury did not decide the matter in accordance with the views of the court, the verdict should be set aside, would be exercising a discretion dangerous to the jury system. For that reason, I have never yet set aside a verdict of a jury on account of there being a question as to the preponderance of the evidence."

One of the main errors assigned in this court by the appellant, is, whether or not the refusal of the trial court to pass upon this particular ground in support of its motion for a new trial is not such a deprivation of a substantial right of appellant as to amount to error.

In our opinion the trial judge misconceived his judicial duty in failing and refusing to pass upon this vital ground of error assigned by appellant, at that particular stage of the proceeding, and laboring under his misconception of the law, by his refusal and failure so to consider this alleged error, deprived appellant of a substantial right to which it was entitled. The learned trial judge, during the progress of the trial, rightfully refused to express his opinion on the facts of the case to the jury, and in confining his instructions to the law of the case, leaving the jury to express its verdict as to the facts; but, on the motion for a new trial the situation was changed, and under our statutes which provide as a ground for a new trial "insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict," it became his judicial duty to pass upon the evidence and to determine whether or not the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict.

It makes no difference in law what personal opinion the trial court may entertain as to the propriety of setting aside a verdict of a jury, or the merits or faults of our jury system. The Legislature has provided what grounds may be interposed in support of a motion for a new trial, and among them is the ground that the "evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict," and it thereby becomes the plain judicial duty of every trial judge, irrespective of his personal views, when said ground is interposed, to review and pass upon the evidence to the end that he may properly rule on the motion.

Every litigant is entitled, on motion for a new trial, where this statutory ground for a new trial is properly interposed, to have the benefit of the judgment of the trial court, before his property or rights can be taken away from him, as to whether or not such a fair and impartial trial has been had as is contemplated by our Constitution and statutes, and whether or not the evidence is sufficient to justify the verdict; and it becomes, without question, the duty of the trial judge, who has heard the evidence and seen the witnesses on the stand during the trial, on motion for a new trial, to either grant or refuse a new trial, after a due consideration of the said ground assigned for a new trial. It is made his duty under the law, upon motion for a new trial, where this ground is assigned, to review the evidence, and if he is clearly satisfied in his judgment that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict to set it aside, and if sufficient to refuse to disturb it, and in the discharge of his official duty under his oath of office he is required to so act.

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