Goldgart v. People Ex Rel. Joseph Goar

• Decision Date: 29 March 1883
• Parties: GEORGE GOLDGARTv.THE PEOPLE ex rel. Joseph Goar, Collector.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

106 Ill. 25

1883 WL 10178 (Ill.)

GEORGE GOLDGART

v.THE PEOPLE ex rel. Joseph Goar, Collector.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Springfield Mar. 29, 1883.

APPEAL from the County Court of Coles county; the Hon. J. R. CUNNINGHAM, Judge, presiding.

Mr. CHARLES BENNETT, for the appellant:

At common law the situs of personal property is the residence of the owner,-- his movable property, in contemplation of law, accompanying him wherever he goes. Cooley on Taxation, 269, 270.

A personal tax can not be assessed against a non-resident, neither can the property of a non-resident be taxed, unless it has an actual situs within the State, so as to be under the protection of its laws. Cooley on Taxation, 14-16.

To tax, in one State, contracts owned in another, is held to impair their obligation, and inadmissible, even though they are made payable in the State imposing the tax, and secured by mortgage there. Cooley on Taxation, 65.

Mr. JAMES MCCARTNEY, Attorney General, for the appellee:

We insist, first, that being in this State for the conduct of his business, appellant was a resident of the State for the purposes of taxation, within the meaning of the statute relating to the revenue; and second, that the money loaned in this State is taxable as personal property in the State, regardless of the residence of the creditor.

The first proposition is sustained by Board of Supervisors v. Davenport, 40 Ill. 197, where the question of residence for the purpose of taxation is very fully discussed. Secondly, taxes are a compensation for the protection furnished, either to the life or property, and the State which furnishes protection to either may collect the tax. Section 1 of the Revenue act, clause 1, declares that “all real and personal property in this State” shall be taxed. This includes all property, moneys and credits in the State, without reference to the residence of the owner. Section 7 designates where the property shall be listed,--namely, where the owner resides,--and “if there be no principal office or place of business in this State, then at the place in this State where any such corporation or person transacts business.” Appellant transacted his business at Mattoon, in Coles county, and was not resident elsewhere in the State, and was properly taxable in Mattoon.

The word “property” includes credits and choses in action. It is properly used to denote “intangible rights, of value.” Trustees v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 138; People v. Rhodes, 15 Id. 304; People v. Worthington, 21 Id. 172.

The situs of personal property is not uniformly that of its owner. When the property is permanently located at a particular place, it is subject to taxation there, whether that be the domicile of the owner or not. Irvin v. New Orleans, St. Louis and Chicago R. R. Co. 94 Ill. 105. See, also, Mills v. Thornton, 20 Id. 300; First National Bank v. Smith, 65 Id. 44; Munson v. Crawford, Id. 185.

The rule that the situs of personal property is that of the owner, is one of convenience only, and may be changed by statute for the purposes of taxation. First National Bank v. Smith, 65 Ill. 44; Munson v. Crawford, Id. 185; Danville Banking and Trust Co. v. Parks, 88 Id. 170.

A city charter granting power to tax all personal property within its limits, includes power to tax personal property actually located within the city, but owned by a non-resident. Dunleith v. People, 53 Ill. 45.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Coles county, against certain real estate of the appellant, for alleged delinquent taxes for the year 1881. Appellant appeared and filed an objection, in writing, against the application for judgment, in substance that he had paid all taxes assessed against the real estate, and that the personal tax, on account of which, alone, judgment was sought, was illegal and void, because appellant was not a resident of the county, and had no personal property therein, so as to be liable to be taxed therein upon personal property for the year 1881. It was agreed upon the trial that all taxes against the real estate had been paid, and that the tax in controversy was solely that assessed for the year 1881 on moneys loaned by appellant in Coles county, and secured by mortgage on real estate therein. Evidence was introduced showing that appellant permanently removed from Coles county and this State on the 31st of March, 1881, with the intention of becoming a resident of the city of New York, since which time he has not resided in Coles county or this State; that when he so removed he took with him all his accounts, notes, etc.; that he has, since that time, had no agent in Coles county to look after and collect his loans; that he has, himself, only been there once since that time before he came to defend this suit, which was in September, 1881; that he then came for the purpose of having a plate glass front put in his business block, and not to collect interest or loan money, and intended to stay only about four weeks, but owing to delays in receiving the glass he remained about ten weeks; that during the time of such stay he made new loans to the amount of $4500, made two renewals of old loans, (one for $1700 and the other for $800,) and collected some $200 or $300 of interest upon loans; that he has had no office or regular place of business in Coles county since his removal therefrom, and that usually, when interest has been due him, parties have remitted it to him at New York. The court overruled the objection, and gave judgment that the real estate be sold for the payment of the tax.

The only question to be determined is, whether, under the circumstances in proof, the loans were properly taxable in Coles county. Our statute requires “credits” to be assessed for taxation, (Rev. Stat. 1874, chap. 120,) and this court has held there is no constitutional objection to such taxation, even where the property for which the credit was given is also taxable. ( The People v. Worthington, 21 Ill. 171.) The statute requires the “credi...