Goldman v. Feinberg
| Decision Date | 06 April 1944 |
| Citation | 37 A.2d 355,130 Conn. 671 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | GOLDMAN v. FEINBERG et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from City Court of New Haven; Hoyt, Judge.
Action by Louis Goldman against Albert Feinberg and another to recover damages for defrauding the plaintiff of a real estate commission, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the court. Judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.
No error.
Alfonse C. Fasano, of New Haven (Morris B. Snaider, of New Haven, on the brief), for appellant.
Joseph Weiner, of New Haven, for appellees.
Before MALTBIE, C. J., BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ., and INGLIS, Superior Court Judge.
This is an action to recover damages for wrongfully depriving the plaintiff of a broker's commission. The facts may be summarized as follows: Early in 1940 the named defendant, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, requested the plaintiff, who was a real estate broker in New Haven, to show him some houses which were for sale. During the next seven months the plaintiff attempted to interest the defendant in various properties, but to no avail. Finally, in early August, the plaintiff saw a list of properties which had been distributed to the public by the New Haven Savings Bank. This was a so-called ‘special list’ which described various pieces of real estate for sale by the bank at the prices shown with the statement that those prices were irreducible.
One of the properties so listed was 19-21 West Rock Avenue, and the plaintiff, having obtained permission from the bank to inspect that property, took the defendant and his father, the defendant Samuel Feinberg, to view it. Thereafter, the defendant asked the plaintiff to ascertain from the bank whether this property could be bought for less than $7,500, the price at which it was listed. The plaintiff reported to the defendant that that price could not be lowered, whereupon the defendant said, At this time the defendant was unwilling to purchase the property for $7,500.
During the following month, that is, in September, 1940, the defendant purchased the same property from the bank, paying $7,500 therefor, but the bank paid to the defendant Samuel Feinberg a commission of $225 as a result of the sale. The plaintiff never informed the bank that he was negotiating with the defendant as a prospective purchaser of the property nor did he ever introduce the defendant to the bank as a prospective purchaser.
The theory upon which the plaintiff predicates his cause of action is that the defendants conspired fraudulently to represent to the bank that Samuel Feinberg was the broker procuring the sale and thereby deprived the plaintiff of the commission which he otherwise would have been able to earn. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff, having acquired no right to receive the commission, suffered no damage by reason of any acts of the defendants; and for that reason, among others, entered judgment for the defendants. The crux of the case is in this conclusion. The plaintiff attacks it on the ground that the court should have found that, as a result of the conspiracy between the defendants, the plaintiff was damaged by the amount of ‘the commission which would have been paid to the plaintiff except for the interference of the defendant.’ The evidence, however, does not compel this finding. The only basis for the plaintiff's claim is the fact appearing in the evidence that a commission on the sale was actually paid to Samuel Feinberg, and we cannot say that the trial court was bound to infer from that that the bank would have been obligated to pay, or probably would have paid, a commission to the plaintiff if he had introduced the defendant to it. The trial court might well have inferred from the evidence that the payment of the ‘commission’ to the defendant's father was in essence a reduction of the purchase price rather than recognition on the part of the bank that it was obligated to pay anyone a commission on the sale. It is found, and the evidence justifies the finding, that the bank had not listed the property with the plaintiff. The bank did not know him as a broker in the transaction and he had never informed the bank that he was negotiating with the defendant. We therefore cannot hold that there was no reasonable basis for the conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff had not been damaged by any acts of the defendants. Murphy v. Linskey, 94 Conn. 475, 477, 109 A. 412. He had not been deprived of anything which, except for the interference of the defendants, he would probably have received. Accordingly, the question of law involved in the case is whether the plaintiff, in order to make out a cause of action, must prove that he would have made a profit except for the unlawful interference with his business by the defendants.
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Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, Civ. No. H-89-400 (PCD).
...defendant, there was a reasonable probability that plaintiff would have entered into a contract or made a profit." Goldman v. Feinberg, 130 Conn. 671, 675, 37 A.2d 355 (1944). The Town makes no such claim in the complaint and has offered no evidence thereof. At most, defendants caused the T......
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Breen v. Peck
...159, 130 A.2d 48 (App.Div.1957); McCue v. Deppert, 21 N.J.Super. 591, 91 A.2d 503 (App.Div.1952). Cf. Goldman v. Feinberg, 130 Conn. 671, 37 A.2d 355 (Sup.Ct.Err.1944); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N.Y. 443, 173 N.E. 674, 84 A.L.R. 1 (Ct.App.1930); Luke v. Du Pree, 158 Ga. 590, 124 S.E. 13 (Su......
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Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz and Schatz, Ribicoff and Kotkin, 15730
...We have stated, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover for "the mere possibility" of making a profit. See Goldman v. Feinberg, 130 Conn. 671, 674-75, 37 A.2d 355 (1944) (in context of tortious interference claim, plaintiff must show more than that he was "about to" enter into contract a......
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Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen
...197, 201-202, 374 A.2d 179 (1977); Busker v. United Illuminating Co., 156 Conn. 456, 461, 242 A.2d 708 (1968); Goldman v. Feinberg, 130 Conn. 671, 674, 37 A.2d 355 (1944). The trier of fact ordinarily may infer such intent from the defendant's conduct or acts in light of the circumstances o......