Goldman v. Sol Goldman Invs., LLC
| Decision Date | 14 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-06727 (AJN) |
| Parties | GOLDMAN, Plaintiff, v. SOL GOLDMAN INVESTMENTS, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Leah Seliger, Daniel Maimon Kirschenbaum, Joseph & Kirschenbaum LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Joshua Scott Bauchner, Ansell Grimm & Aaron, P.C., Woodland Park, NJ, Rahool Patel, Ansell Grimm & Aaron, P.C., Ocean, NJ, for Defendants.
Plaintiff brings claims under federal and state labor laws against Defendants for employment discrimination on the basis of age and disability and for retaliation. Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Defendant Sol Goldman Investments (SGI) is not Plaintiff's employer. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. Defendant Sol Goldman Investments (SGI) is an umbrella company that manages a network of commercial and residential real estate properties in New York City. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 10. Defendant Solil Management LLC is a payroll company that was set up to pay the salaries for the employees of SGI and SGI's real estate properties. Id. ¶ 11. Along with her brother Allen H. Goldman, Defendant Jane Goldman is a co-owner of both companies and controls their day-to-day management. Id. ¶ 13.
Plaintiff Jeffrey M. Goldman is an attorney who worked for Defendants for 20 years prior to his termination at age 69. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2-3. Plaintiff's job was to provide a wide array of legal services related to the management of Defendants’ real estate properties. Id. ¶ 17. After the Covid-19 pandemic hit New York City in March of 2020, Plaintiff began working remotely from his home. Id. ¶ 24-26. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Goldman announced that all staff would be required to return to work in the office by June 22, 2020. Id. ¶ 32. Because of Plaintiff's age and underlying health conditions, Plaintiff was especially at risk for suffering serious complications if he were to contract the virus. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff provided Defendant Goldman with a doctor's note stating that he should not return to the office, but Defendant Goldman still insisted. Id. ¶¶ 34, 39. Plaintiff declined to return to working at the office in line with his doctor's advice. Id. ¶ 40. Despite the fact that the vast majority of court proceedings were being conducted remotely and that Plaintiff continued to produce high quality work for Defendants from home, Defendant Goldman terminated Plaintiff on June 24, 2020. Dkt. No. 34-37, 44.
On August 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging claims for employment discrimination based on age and disability and for retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"). Dkt. No. 1. After Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff amended his complaint. Dkt. Nos. 14, 18. Defendants again filed a partial motion to dismiss, arguing only that Defendant SGI is not Plaintiff's employer and therefore Plaintiff's claims against SGI must be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 22.
The sole aim of Defendants’ motion is to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against SGI because, according to Defendants, SGI was not Plaintiff's employer. Defendants argue that dismissal of SGI as a defendant is appropriate under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). As described below, Defendants’ motion is not properly brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and Defendants are incorrect that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendant SGI is his employer.
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), which requires the Court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the Court determines that it lacks the constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate the case. See Makarova v. United States , 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). According to Defendants, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an ADEA claim "when a claimant sues an entity that never employed him." Dkt. No. 22-1 at 5. In other words – whether a defendant is a plaintiff's "employer" for purposes of an ADEA claim is jurisdictional requirement.
Courts generally have subject matter jurisdiction over federal causes of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, so long as the claim is "colorab[ly] plead[.]" Da Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp. , 229 F.3d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Bell v. Hood , 327 U.S. 678, 681-82, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ). Additionally, Congress can impose jurisdictional limitations on federal causes of action, such as amount in controversy requirements or limitations on which kinds of plaintiffs can sue. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 515 n.11, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) ; Da Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp. , 229 F.3d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 2000). Courts must be careful, however, not to "conflate" a requirement going to the merits of a claim with a threshold requirement for the Court to assert jurisdiction over that claim. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). To resolve whether an issue goes to the merits or to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must look to the language of the statute to determine whether Congress intended "that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional." Arbaugh , 546 U.S. at 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235. Further, courts should also consider the potential "consequences" of treating a limitation as jurisdictional. Da Silva , 229 F.3d at 365. Because courts are obliged to assure themselves of their jurisdiction independently before considering the merits of a claim, "the institutional requirements of a judicial system weigh in favor of narrowing the number of facts or circumstances that determine subject matter jurisdiction." Id.
There is no basis to hold that the "employer" element of an ADEA claim is jurisdictional. While the Second Circuit has not addressed the issue with respect to the ADEA specifically, the Circuit held in Da Silva that the issue of whether two defendants acted as plaintiff's "employer" for the purposes of plaintiff's Title VII claim was not jurisdictional. See Da Silva , 229 F.3d at 365. The reasoning of Da Silva applies to the ADEA with equal force. Substantively, the jurisdiction conferring provisions of ADEA and Title VII are highly similar, compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(c), and there is nothing in the text of either provision to support that Congress had intended for the employer requirement to be jurisdictional. The Court therefore declines to hold that Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that the defendant is an "employer" under the ADEA is jurisdictional. Accord Downey v. Adloox Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 514, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (); Newsom-Lang v. Warren Intern. , 129 F. Supp. 2d 662, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
Defendants challenge to Plaintiff's complaint is properly considered as one for failure to state a claim, not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A plaintiff is not required to provide "detailed factual allegations" in the complaint. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, however, a plaintiff must nonetheless assert "more than labels and conclusions." Id. Ultimately, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. When applying this standard, a Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See ATSI Commun's, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd. , 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ADEA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL claims on the grounds that "Solil employed Plaintiff, not SGI." Dkt. No. 29 at 3. Defendants claim that SGI has "no" employees and that Solil is listed as Plaintiff's employer on his W-2 and other employment related documents, which Defendants attach as exhibits to their motion. Id. Plaintiff argues in response that he has plausibly alleged that both SGI and Solil were his employer under the "single integrated employer" theory.
The "single integrated employer" theory provides that "two nominally separate entities" can constitute a "single integrated enterprise" for the purposes of employment law liability. Arculeo v. On-Site Sales & Mktg., LLC , 425 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). A common example is where two "separate corporations [are] under common ownership and management." Id. The Second Circuit has applied the single integrated employer theory to claims asserted under Title VII and the NYSHRL. See id. ; Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc. , 756 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2014). Given the similarities in the standards for employment discrimination claims between those statutes and the ADEA and NYCHRL, courts in this district have applied the single integrated employer...
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