Goldmount Veterinary Ctr., P.A. v. Watonwan Cnty.
| Decision Date | 27 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | A22-0081 |
| Parties | Goldmount Veterinary Center, P.A., Respondent, v. Watonwan County, Defendant, Animal Humane Society, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Martin County District Court File No. 46-CV-29-1224
Cory A. Genelin, Jonathan M. Janssen, Gislason &Hunter LLP Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent).
Katherine B. Freitag, Bloomquist Law Firm, LLC, Park Rapids Minnesota; and Karen R. Cole, Law Firm of Karen Cole, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant).
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross, Judge.
In this appeal from a jury's verdict awarding respondent Goldmount Veterinary Center $1,498,375 in contract damages, appellant Animal Humane Society (AHS) argues that the award is unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. In the alternative, AHS argues that the district court erred by denying its posttrial remittitur motion and motion for a new trial. We affirm.
These facts were established at trial and are presented in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See Navarre v. S. Wash. Cnty. Sch., 652 N.W.2d 9, 21 (Minn. 2002). On June 21, 2018, Watonwan County asked AHS to assist with an investigation into a herd of 72 miniature horses owned by Michael Johnson. When AHS agent Keith Streff arrived at Johnson's farm, he observed terrible conditions, including skeleton remains left in the horses' paddock. Streff told Johnson that day that the horses were "thousands of dollars away from being sound."
Watonwan County and AHS representatives obtained a warrant to seize the horses. Ultimately, the warrant was not executed because Johnson voluntarily surrendered his horses with a custodial release. While Johnson was considering whether to voluntarily surrender his horses, Streff told him that the care necessary to rehabilitate the horses would be very expensive and that AHS would pay for "the care and . . . keeping and maintaining" of the horses. This included paying for the costs of farrier services and "any veterinary treatment necessary to stabilize [the horses'] health and welfare." If the warrant was executed, Johnson was informed by Streff that Johnson would bear all the costs of rehabilitating the horses. Johnson understood Streff to mean that, if he surrendered his horses, AHS
Johnson agreed to voluntarily surrender his horses only if the horses were transferred to Goldmount-a veterinary clinic owned and operated by Dr. Shirley Kittleson. AHS became the owners of the horses when Johnson surrendered them. AHS transported the 72 horses to Goldmount on June 22, 2018.[1]
When AHS delivered the horses to Goldmount, Streff told Kittleson that AHS would provide payment for "general animal husbandry" and forensic reports of each horse to aid in the criminal prosecution against Johnson.[2] Kittleson understood "general animal husbandry" to mean the horses' boarding costs, as well as the specialized care needed to stabilize the horses. Streff understood that term to mean paying for the stabilization of the horses, but not general boarding costs. An expert at trial estimated that stabilization of the horses should take between four and six weeks, and Kittleson completed the initial farrier work to stabilize the horses by August 2018. The parties did not discuss the fee Goldmount would charge for the care of the horses, and the parties did not sign a written agreement.
In mid-July 2018, Goldmount sent Watonwan County an invoice for $43,037.20. The invoice included fees for hospitalization and "veterinary care," which Streff construed to mean boarding costs. The boarding costs totaled $25 per horse per day. On July 24, Streff and a representative from Watonwan County visited Kittleson to contest the invoice and told Kittleson that the boarding costs were outside the scope of their agreement. That day, Streff told Kittleson that AHS would pay for "vet treatment, related medical costs, forensic reports and farrier care" and that any boarding costs "were to be worked out between her and Michael Johnson." Streff offered to take the horses to an alternative site while the parties disputed the costs. The parties did not agree on the boarding costs.
Kittleson and Streff spoke again on the phone on August 10. In her notes from the call, Kittleson wrote that Streff stated that Kittleson could recover the boarding costs through "sales and adoption fees." At a meeting three days later, Streff again told Kittleson that AHS would not cover boarding costs and offered to Kittleson that he would transfer ownership of the horses to her. According to Streff's notes from this meeting, Kittleson stated that she would not release any reports, photos, documents, or horses until AHS paid the boarding costs.
On August 20, Kittleson sent a second bill to AHS and Watonwan County for $65,080. The bill included fees for boarding and farrier services but not the forensic evaluations or veterinary care. The same day, the Watonwan County Attorney sent Kittleson a letter warning her that the horses were evidence in the criminal proceeding against Johnson and that Kittleson would be criminally investigated if she released them without prior approval by AHS. The county attorney testified at trial that he "foresaw as a consequence of [the letter] that [Kittleson] would continue to board, feed, and water the horses" and that a reasonable person in Kittleson's position would continue to board the horses.
On September 14, Streff offered Kittleson two choices. Either AHS would take the horses back to be placed at a sanctuary while the dispute over fees continued, or Kittleson could own the horses and be repaid by the horses' adoption fees or sale price. Kittleson rejected both options. In response, Streff declared that Kittleson owned the horses and that she will now have to provide care to the horses indefinitely, and that, if Kittleson wanted to be paid for boarding costs, she needed to sue AHS.[3]
On September 17, 2018, Kittleson sent a third invoice for $49,700 for hospitalization fees. Two days later, the Watonwan County Attorney sent Kittleson a letter stating that the horses were no longer evidence in the criminal matter against Johnson and that she "may do with them what [she] see[s] fit." Kittleson was also told to submit a restitution claim for the boarding costs against Johnson. Kittleson never filed a claim. Kittleson sued Watonwan County and AHS for breach of contract in December 2019.
Kittleson continued to bill AHS $25 per horse per day for boarding up to trial, totaling $2,377,091.58. AHS did not pay this amount.[4]
After a three-day trial, the jury found in a special verdict that AHS and Watonwan County were responsible for the boarding and hospitalization costs for the horses, at the rate of $25 per day per horse, from June 22, 2018, to October 13, 2020.[5] This constituted an award of $1,498,375.
AHS moved for a new trial, or alternatively, for remittitur. The district court denied both motions. This appeal followed.
We first address AHS's appeal from the jury verdict and then address AHS's alternative arguments from the district court's denial of its motion for a new trial and remittitur.
AHS argues that the jury's verdict should be reversed because it is not supported by the evidence presented at trial. Specifically, AHS argues that there was insufficient evidence to find that AHS contracted with Goldmount because the parties did not have a meeting of the minds over the contract's terms. Alternatively, AHS argues that, even assuming there was a contract, Goldmount failed to mitigate its damages. It is a "fundamental rule that jury verdicts are to be set aside only if manifestly contrary to the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict." Ouellette by Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Minn. 1986). "A verdict will not be set aside unless the evidence against it is practically conclusive," id., or "if no reasonable mind could find as did the jury." Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 734 (Minn. 1997).
AHS first argues that Goldmount failed to present evidence proving there was mutual assent to the essential elements of the purported contract. The "existence of a contract is primarily a question of fact to be determined . . . on the basis of the evidence presented and the surrounding circumstances." Malmin v. Grabner, 163 N.W.2d 39, 41 (Minn. 1968). We apply the same standards of proof in cases involving oral contracts as we do in cases involving written contracts. See Vermillion State Bank v. Tennis Sanitation, LLC, 969 N.W.2d 610, 627-28 (Minn. 2022). "A contract requires a meeting of the minds concerning its essential elements." Minneapolis Cablesystems v. City of Minneapolis, 299 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Minn. 1980). The phrase "meeting of the minds" does not "require a subjective mutual intent to agree on the same thing in the same sense." Holt v. Swenson, 90 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn. 1958). Instead, mutual assent may be based on "objective manifestations whereby one party by his words or by his conduct, or by both, leads the other party reasonably to assume that he assents to and accepts the terms of the other's offer." Id.
A contract must include an agreement as to its "essential elements." SCI Minn. Funeral Servs. v Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). "While contracts that are too vague...
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