Goldrich v. Masco Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2023
• Docket Number: 22-CV-3769 (KMK)
• Parties: STEVEN GOLDRICH, Plaintiff, v. MASCO CORPORATION, WATKINS WELLNESS, and WELLNESS MARKETING CORPORATION, doing business as ENDLESS POOLS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

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STEVEN GOLDRICH, Plaintiff, v. MASCO CORPORATION, WATKINS WELLNESS, and WELLNESS MARKETING CORPORATION, doing business as ENDLESS POOLS, Defendants.

No. 22-CV-3769 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 27, 2023

Jordan M. Brooks, Esq. Cuddy & Feder Counsel for Plaintiff

Thomas V. Juneau, Jr., Esq. Armstrong Teasdale LLP Counsel for Defendants

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Plaintiff Steven Goldrich (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Masco Corporation (“Masco”), Watkins Wellness (“Watkins”), and Wellness Marketing Corporation d/b/a Endless Pools (“Endless” collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that a pool designed and manufactured by Defendants was defective and injured Plaintiff. Plaintiff's causes of action include strict products liability, fraudulent concealment, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (See generally First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Dkt. No 9).) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Dismiss the FAC (the “Motion”). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 18).) For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Allegations Appropriately Considered

In support of the instant Motion, Defendants argue throughout their briefing that the Court should consider Plaintiff's original complaint in its ruling, specifically as it relates to the relevant statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims. (See Defs' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss (“Defs' Mem.”) 3-4 (Dkt. No. 19); Defs' Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss (“Defs' Reply Mem.”) 3-5 (Dkt. No. 22).) The Court will address this argument at the outset, as it is a threshold question to decide the instant Motion to Dismiss.

An amended complaint “ordinarily supersedes the original, and renders it of no legal effect.” Dluhos v. Floating & Abandoned Vessel, Known as N.Y., 162 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted); see also Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329, 332 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is well established that an amended complaint . . . supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.” (quoting Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977))); Pratt v. City of N.Y., 929 F.Supp.2d 314, 319 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he general rule is that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders it without legal effect.” (citing In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2000); and Harris v. City of N.Y., 186 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1999))).

“To date, the Court is aware of no ironclad Second Circuit case on how courts must treat successive iterations of pleadings when a plaintiff has removed allegations so as to vitiate a potential affirmative defense-particularly one that has already been foreshadowed via a premotion letter.” Roman v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 21-CV-2214, 2022 WL 2819459, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2022) (emphasis omitted). “[C]ourts in th[e] [Second Circuit] have taken various approaches to dealing with allegations in an amended complaint that directly contradict allegations set forth in a prior version of the complaint.” Monterey Bay Mil. Hous., LLC v. Ambac Assurance Corp., 531 F.Supp.3d 673, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (collecting cases) (quoting Robles v. Medisys Health Network, Inc., No. 19-CV-6651, 2020 WL 3403191, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2020)). In some cases, courts have found that, irrespective of the contradictions, “once an amended pleading is filed, a court may not import information that was contained in the prior pleading but omitted from the amended pleading.” Kilkenny v. L. Off. of Cushner & Garvey, L.L.P., No. 08-CV-588, 2012 WL 1638326, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2012) (citing Tran v. Alphonse Hotel Corp., 281 F.3d 23, 32 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Phillips v. City of Middletown, No. 17-CV-5307, 2018 WL 4572971, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018) (noting that an amended complaint omitted allegations in original complaint that undermined excessive force claim, but concluding that “because [the] [p]laintiff has filed the Amended Complaint, the Court will not import information from the original Complaint”); Xie v. JPMorgan Chase Short-Term Disability Plan, No. 15-CV-4546, 2016 WL 3963113, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2016) (“Although the change in the Complaint . . . raises doubt, at the motion to dismiss stage the truthfulness of the allegations is assumed, and any attempt to use [the] [p]laintiff's prior pleadings against her as an admission is premature.”).

On the other hand, other courts have found that “[w]here a ‘plaintiff blatantly changes [the] statement of the facts in order to respond to the defendant[s'] motion to dismiss . . . [and] directly contradicts the facts set forth in his original complaint,' a court is authorized ‘to accept the facts described in the original complaint as true.'” Colliton v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, No. 08-CV-400, 2008 WL 4386764, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Wallace v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 95-CV-4404, 1996 WL 586797, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996)), aff'd, 356 Fed.Appx. 535 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order); Wheeler v. Slanovec, No. 16-CV-9065, 2019 WL 2994193, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2019) (“In cases ‘where allegations in an amended pleading directly contradict pleadings in the original complaint, courts have disregarded the amended pleading.” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brooks v. 1st Precinct Police Dep't, No. 11-CV-6070, 2014 WL 1875037, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2014))); see also Kilkenny, 2012 WL 1638326, at *5 (“There is authority supporting the notion that a court may disregard amended pleadings when they directly contradict facts that have been alleged in prior pleadings.”); Palm Beach Strategic Income, LP v. Salzman, No. 10-CV-261, 2011 WL 1655575, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011) (noting that some courts have held that “a district court has no obligation to accept as true an amended complaint's allegations, if they directly contradict the facts set forth in his original complaint” (citation, alteration, and quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 457 Fed.Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order); Wallace, 1996 WL 586797, at *2 (dismissing pro se amended complaint based on facts “set forth in [the] original complaint” where “[t]he plaintiff blatantly change[d] his statement of the facts in order to respond to the defendants' motion to dismiss”).

In Plaintiff's original Complaint, filed on March 25, 2022, Plaintiff alleged a series of “significant problems” that occurred with Plaintiff's Original Endless Pool (the “Pool”) beginning in 2015. (See Not. of Removal Ex. A (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 40-67 (Dkt. No. 1-1).) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges eight separate issues with the Pool between July 2015 and July 2020, (see id. ¶¶ 40-48), in addition to two additional issues after July 2020, (see id. ¶¶ 49-62). After removing this case to federal court, Defendants submitted a pre-motion letter, previewing that, among several other arguments, “all of Plaintiff's claims which first accrued in 2015 are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation based on Plaintiff's failure to file his Complaint until March 25, 2022.” (Letter from Thomas V. Juneau, Esq. to Jordan Brooks, Esq. (May 16, 2022) 2 (Dkt. No. 3).)

Specifically, Defendants stated that Plaintiff's “cause of action accrued in 2015 ‘when the product first injured [P]laintiff,'” thus barring the instant Action. (Id. at 3.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a letter in response stating an intention to amend the pleading while neglecting to detail what deficiencies would be cured in the amended complaint. (See Letter from Jordan Brooks, Esq. to Thomas V. Juneau, Esq. (May 31, 2022) (Dkt. No. 7).) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on June 24, 2022. (See FAC.)

The FAC's allegations severely narrowed the alleged defects with the Pool, removing all references to issues with the Pool prior to July 2020, and limiting the issues to two of the ten issues identified in the original Complaint. (See FAC ¶¶ 42-60.) Defendants argue that, “in an effort to avoid Defendants' dispositive argument that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, Plaintiff seeks to mislead the [P]arties and the Court by presenting his claims as not having arisen before July [] 2020.” (Defs' Mem. 3.) Moreover, Defendants appear to argue that Plaintiff is acting in bad faith, stating that “Plaintiff's purposeful deletion of facts establishing his claims are time barred . . . contradicts the allegations of the original complaint[] and is designed to obfuscate the true facts of this dispute.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues “each of the injuries sustained by [Plaintiff] during the period of 2020-2022 is a new injury as compared [to] those incurred by [Plaintiff] ¶ 2015,” and that, “by excluding from the FAC the issues plaguing the Pool during the period of 2015-2019, [Plaintiff] centered the FAC on the injuries that are timely.” (Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Mot. To Dismiss (“Pl's Mem.”) 6 (Dkt. No. 20).)

“[A] prior inconsistent pleading should not trump the Court's obligation under Rule 12(b)(6) to accept a complaint's allegations as true. Indeed, there are valid reasons why a plaintiff would amend a complaint in a contradictory fashion.” Palm Beach Strategic Income 2011 WL 1655575, at *6. “It would be a harsh rule of law indeed if a litigant were to change a statement in an amended pleading to repair a weakness cited by an adversary or by the [c]ourt, only to have the case dismissed because the conforming change in some way may conflict with an allegation in the earlier pleadings.” Kermanshah v. Kermanshah, 580 F.Supp.2d 247, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Morris v. City of N.Y., No. 20-CV-9314, 2022 WL 2866450, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2022) (“[C]orrective amendments often avoid...