Goldring v. District of Columbia

Decision Date26 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-7116.,04-7116.
Citation416 F.3d 70
PartiesWilliam GOLDRING, Parent and Next Friend of Lawrence Anderson, a Minor, et al., Appellants v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, a Municipal Corporation and Clifford B. Janey, Officially as Superintendent, D.C. Public Schools, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, (No. 02cv01761).

Michael J. Eig argued the cause for the appellants. Haylie M. Iseman was on brief.

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Attorney General, District of Columbia argued the cause for the appellees. Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General, District of Columbia and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General, District of Columbia, were on brief.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge.

After prevailing in administrative proceedings against the District of Columbia and District of Columbia Public Schools (collectively, the District) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487, the appellants — five children with disabilities and their parents — sued under the IDEA's fee-shifting provision, id. § 1415(i)(3)(B), to recover a portion of their costs that the District refused to pay. The district court granted summary judgment partially in their favor, but declined to include in their award fees paid to expert witnesses beyond the amounts permitted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920.1 See Goldring v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 02-CV-1761, slip op. at 1-10 (D.D.C. May 26, 2004), reprinted in Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 98-107. They now appeal, alleging that the district court erred because, as they see it, an award of expert witness fees to a party prevailing under the IDEA is not so limited. The question before us thus is whether "reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs," words that are used in section 1415, encompass "expert fees," words that are not. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). We say no — and therefore affirm the district court — because under United States Supreme Court precedent section 1415 of the IDEA precludes the awarding of expert witness fees as part of a prevailing party's costs.

I.

To "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education ... designed to meet their unique needs," 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), the IDEA conditions eligibility for federal education assistance on a state's implementation of "policies and procedures to ensure" that resident children "who are in need of special education and related services" are "identified, located, and evaluated" and receive "[a]n individualized education program." Id. § 1412(a)(3)-(4). Each child's individualized education program, or IEP, must be developed by a "team" including the child's parents, at least one "regular education teacher" and one special education teacher, a local educational agency representative who is knowledgeable about the school's "general education curriculum" and "the availability of resources" and — "whenever appropriate" — the disabled child himself. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)-(iv), (vii); see Reid ex rel. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518-19 (D.C.Cir.2005). Among other things, the IEP must contain a statement of the child's current performance level and "the special education and related services" the child will receive from the school. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i), (iii). Parents dissatisfied with "any matter relating to" their child's "identification, evaluation, or educational placement" or "the provision of a free appropriate public education" to him, id. § 1415(b)(6), may lodge their complaints with a state educational agency and have their complaints aired at an impartial due process hearing, see id. § 1415(f)(1), where they are accorded "the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of children with disabilities," id. § 1415(h)(1). Under the IDEA's fee-shifting provision, the district court "in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs ... to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." in such a proceeding or court action. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B).

Exercising their statutory rights under the IDEA, the appellant parents complained to the District about their children's educational placements. Following due process hearings, they requested the District to reimburse their fees and costs pursuant to the IDEA's fee-shifting statute. With respect to four of the children,2 the District did not dispute that their parents were the prevailing parties and paid a portion of their requested fees. The parents and children sued to recover the balance.

The district court granted partial summary judgment in their favor. See Goldring, No. 02-CV-1761, slip op. at 10. Relevant to this appeal, it concluded that they could not recover the entirety of their expert fees, "but instead must be limited to no more than what 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920 permit." Id. at 9. According to the district court, because Supreme Court precedent holds that "`when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound by the limit of [section] 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory authority to the contrary,'" the critical question was "whether the IDEA provides such `explicit statutory authority' permitting recovery of expert witness fees." Id. at 8 (quoting Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987)). The IDEA did not, it concluded; therefore, it awarded the appellants only $120.00 in expert witness fees — not the $6,836.50 they sought. Id. at 10.

The appellants sought reconsideration but were no more successful. See Goldring v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 02-CV-1761, slip op. at 1-10 (D.D.C. July 21, 2004), reprinted in J.A. at 113-20. The district court rejected both of their arguments — that is, that our decision in Moore v. Dist. of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165 (D.C.Cir.1990), held that a prevailing party is entitled to an award of expert fees under the IDEA and that the IDEA's legislative history demonstrates that the Congress intended a party prevailing under the IDEA to recover expert fees. See Goldring, No. 02-CV-1761, slip op. at 3-8.

The parents and children timely appealed on July 28, 2004. We have jurisdiction to entertain their appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and on de novo review, see, e.g., Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995), we affirm the district court.

II.

The question whether the IDEA's fee-shifting provision — section 1415 — enables a prevailing party to recover expert fees as part of his costs is one of first impression in our Circuit and one not free of controversy in others. To date four of our sister circuits have treated this issue and divided evenly into opposing camps, two holding an IDEA prevailing party cannot recover expert fees, see T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 481-82 (7th Cir.2003); Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1031-33 (8th Cir.2003), two holding he can, see Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332, 337-39 (2d Cir.2005); Arons v. N.J. Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58, 62 (3d Cir.1988). The district courts have likewise failed to reach a consensus on the question, compare, e.g., BD v. DeBuono, 177 F.Supp.2d 201, 207-08 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (allowing recovery of expert fees); Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.Supp.2d 226, 242-43 (D.Conn.2000) (same); Field v. Haddonfield Bd. of Educ., 769 F.Supp. 1313, 1323 (D.N.J.1991) (same), with Eirschele v. Craven County Bd. of Educ., 7 F.Supp.2d 655, 659-60 (E.D.N.C.1998) (refusing recovery of expert fees); Cynthia K. v. Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln-Way High Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 164381, at *2 (N.D.Ill., April 1, 1996) (same), including those within our Circuit, compare, e.g., Czarniewy v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 02-CV-1496, slip op. at 4-5, 2005 WL 692081 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2005) (allowing recovery of expert fees); Bailey v. Dist. of Columbia, 839 F.Supp. 888, 892 (D.D.C.1993) (same); Aranow v. Dist. of Columbia, 791 F.Supp. 318, 318 (D.D.C.1992) (same), with George v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 02-CV-1656, mem. at 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2004) (refusing recovery of expert fees); Goldring, No. 02-CV-1761, slip op. at 9 (same). The correct decision does not seem to us to be difficult to reach, for the Supreme Court has stated in fairly unequivocal terms that language nearly identical to that used in section 1415 is unambiguous and, more to the point, does not allow a prevailing party to shift his expert fees. Accordingly, today we join the Seventh and Eighth Circuits in holding that a prevailing party under the IDEA cannot recover expert fees.

The IDEA's fee-shifting provision provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs ... to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). That the crucial statutory language — "reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs," id. — fails to allow a prevailing party to shift his expert fees flows directly from the application of two Supreme Court decisions. One tells us that "when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses a federal court is bound by the limit of § 1821(b) absent contract or explicit statutory authority to the contrary." Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987). The other tells us that the IDEA's fee-shifting provision contains no such "explicit statutory authority to the contrary." See W. Va....

To continue reading

Request your trial
20 cases
  • Earthworks v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Civil Action No. 09-1972 (RC)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • October 26, 2020
    ...sites per mining claim. If Congress wanted to impose such a restriction, it could have said so expressly. See Goldring v. District of Columbia , 416 F.3d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining that a court's "job one" in determining Congress's intent is "to read the statute, read the statute, ......
  • U.S. v. E-Gold, Ltd.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • May 8, 2008
    ...must, from the fundamental canon that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself.'" Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70, 77 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Am. Fed'n of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 333 F.3d 168, 180 (D.C.Cir.2003) (fu......
  • Barry Farm Tenants v. D.C. Hous. Auth.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • April 30, 2018
    ...and Gonzaga , Congress has been "on notice" of the language required to create an enforceable right. See Goldring v. District of Columbia , 416 F.3d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that a statute did not allow shifting of expert fees because Congress did not use the "precise language" that......
  • Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Vir
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 26, 2006
    ...to whether Congress authorized the compensation of expert fees to prevailing parents in IDEA actions. Compare Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70, 73–77 (C.A.D.C.2005);Neosho R–V School Dist. v. Clark ex rel. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1031–1033 (C.A.8 2003); T.D. v. LaGrange School Di......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT