Goldsmith v. Pringle
| Decision Date | 04 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 74-A-982. |
| Citation | 399 F. Supp. 620 |
| Parties | Thomas Alfred GOLDSMITH, Plaintiff, v. E. E. PRINGLE et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Jonathon B. Chase, Boulder, Colo., for plaintiff.
Ruthanne Gartland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, Colo., for defendants.
Before LEWIS, Circuit Judge, and ARRAJ and FINESILVER, District Judges.
This action involves a constitutional challenge to the so-called "reciprocity rule" which governs admission to the Colorado bar of attorneys already licensed to practice law in other jurisdictions. Plaintiff Thomas Goldsmith is an attorney admitted to practice in Florida and California. He has established residence in the state of Colorado and has moved for admission to the Colorado bar as a "Class B" applicant, which is defined in Rule 202(2) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
Class B applicants are those who have been admitted by examination to the Bar of another state, territory, or district of the United States, by the highest court therein having such power, and who at the time of their admission had attained qualifications at least equal to those then required for admission by examination in Colorado, and who have practiced five years out of the seven years immediately preceding application here.1
Attorneys who fall within this class of applicants may be granted a license to practice law in Colorado without sitting for, and passing, the state's bar examination. Mr. Goldsmith was admitted "by examination" to the bar of Florida in 1966 and the bar of California in 1973. It also appears that he has practiced five of the seven years immediately preceding his application in Colorado and that he meets all other requirements for admission in this state as a "Class B" applicant.
Plaintiff's request for admission on motion was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court. In a letter informing him of the court's decision, Mr. Justice Groves stated, "We do not admit on motion attorneys admitted in Florida or California as neither of these states will admit our lawyers on motion." This policy of the Colorado Supreme Court is codified in Rule 202(7) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure:
If the jurisdiction from which an applicant in . . . Class B applies, imposes by any law, rule, or regulation, limitations, restrictions, or conditions upon the admission of members of the Bar of the State of Colorado seeking admission to the Bar of such jurisdiction, the Court may impose like restrictions, limitations, or conditions upon any such applicant seeking admission to the Bar of this State. . . .
After receiving notice that his motion had been denied and of the reason therefor, plaintiff commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. He seeks both injunctive and declaratory relief from the operation of Rule 202(7) on grounds that the Rule violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy is proper under 28 U.S. C. § 1343(3), and a three-judge district court has been convened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, as the latter provisions were interpreted by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rossiter v. The Law Committee of the State Board of Law Examiners, Nos. 73-1649 and 73-1650 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 1974) (unpublished opinion).
The matter is now before us on cross motions for summary judgment. The parties agree that no genuine issues of material fact remain and have submitted written memoranda in support of their respective positions. After considering these memoranda and the oral argument of counsel, we reach the following conclusions.
In their brief, defendants contend that Mr. Goldsmith lacks standing to maintain this action. In particular, they argue that plaintiff never made a formal motion for admission to the Colorado bar and that if he did make such a motion, it is not certain that it would be denied solely on the basis of Rule 202(7). But from the uncontested affidavits of the plaintiff and from paragraphs VIII through XI of the Complaint, which paragraphs are admitted by defendants in their Answer, it appears that plaintiff sent a letter to the Colorado Supreme Court requesting "a ruling on the reciprocity issue before he became embroiled in the application process." The court considered this request en banc and decided that Rule 202(7) would not be waived. Plaintiff was informed of this decision by the aforementioned letter from Justice Groves, which explicitly stated that plaintiff's application would be denied on grounds of reciprocity.
In National Student Association v. Hershey, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 56, 412 F. 2d 1103 (1969), the court observed:
A plaintiff need not invariably wait until he has been successfully prosecuted, dismissed, denied a license, or otherwise directly subjected to the force of a law or policy before he may challenge it in court. Id. at 1110 (footnote omitted)
What is required for standing in the present case is that plaintiff have a "personal stake" in the outcome and that the interests or personal rights he is asserting are directly threatened by the state action he is challenging. See, e. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) Under the circumstances of this case, we believe there is sufficient nexus between plaintiff's personal interests and the effects of Rule 202(7). Completion of the formal application process by plaintiff would have been little more than hollow formalism. It would add nothing to "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Id. 369 U.S. at 204, 82 S.Ct. at 703 We hold, therefore, that plaintiff does have standing to maintain this action.
Rule 202(7) results in a division of Class B applicants into two groups: (1) those admitted to practice in sister states which will admit Colorado lawyers on motion; and (2) those licensed in states which do not practice reciprocity with Colorado. The first group is exempted from the requirement of sitting for, and passing, the Colorado bar examination, while the latter group is or may be held to the examination requirement. This difference in treatment, according to plaintiff, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Plaintiff concedes that Rule 202(7) neither impinges upon a "fundamental right" nor makes use of any "inherently suspect criteria." Thus, the classification created by the reciprocity Rule is not to be subjected to "strict judicial scrutiny," and defendants need not demonstrate a "compelling necessity" for the Rule. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928, 95 S.Ct. 1127, 43 L. Ed.2d 400 (1975); Lombardi v. Tauro, 470 F.2d 798 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919, 93 S.Ct. 2734, 37 L. Ed.2d 145 (1973); cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955) Instead, the ultimate decision in this case will turn on an application of the so-called "rational basis" test. Under this formula, Rule 202(7) will withstand plaintiff's equal protection challenge so long as it "rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest." San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1308, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); see also, McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S.Ct. 1055 (1973) and cases cited therein at 270 For the reasons set forth below, we believe that Colorado's reciprocity Rule is constitutional when measured against this minimal standard.
We start with the premise that the personal well-being and professional development of an attorney may require that he periodically change jobs and that such changes may necessitate relocation to a different state than the one in which he is presently licensed. Colorado has a legitimate concern in easing the burdens of such relocation both as an abstract potential for all of its citizens and as an actual, concrete need for some. Specifically, Colorado has an interest in encouraging sister jurisdictions to recognize the professional license held by the Colorado attorney who wishes or needs to relocate. Rule 202(7) does provide such encouragement by lessening the burdens of admission to the Colorado bar only for those attorneys coming from states which lessen the burdens imposed upon Colorado citizens. This "selective mutuality" is the essence of reciprocity, and though the means employed may smack more of coercion than of comity, we cannot say they are wholly irrational.
Our research discloses two recently reported decisions which address the very issues presented here. In Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F.Supp. 676 (N.D.Miss. 1974) (three-judge court), the reciprocity Rule of Mississippi was upheld on the following grounds:
The attorney seeking admission through the reciprocity exemption must also come from a state which grants similar privileges to Mississippi attorneys. Although it is true, as plaintiffs argue, that whether a sister-state jurisdiction admits Mississippi attorneys by reciprocity has no bearing on the fitness of the individual applicant, it does not follow that the reciprocity requirement is therefore arbitrary, or that there are no other legitimate governmental objectives which it may promote. Reciprocity privileges are granted for the salutary purpose of facilitating professional persons in relocating elsewhere than in the state of original qualification. Certainly, reciprocity, which Mississippi practices with approximately 37 other states, does encourage attorneys to settle in the state. Also, out-of-state lawyers who may take up residence in this state are assured of ready access to practice in other states which have reciprocity with Mississippi. Finally, the reciprocity provisions assist Mississippi attorneys in...
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...for resident attorneys seeking admission to the bars of other states. See Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d at 1176-77; Goldsmith v. Pringle, 399 F.Supp. 620, 623 (D.Colo.1975). The pivotal question here is whether Rule 203(a)(2)(ii) reasonably furthers Pennsylvania's interest in securing mutual tr......
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...See Lombardi v. Tauro, 470 F.2d 798, 800 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919, 93 S.Ct. 2734, 37 L.Ed.2d 145; Goldsmith v. Pringle, 399 F.Supp. 620, 623 (D.Colo.); Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F.Supp. 1175, 1177-1178 (D.Mont.), aff'd, 419 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 216, 42 L.Ed.2d ...
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