Goldstein v. Ahrens

• Decision Date: 08 November 1954
• Citation: 108 A.2d 693,379 Pa. 330
• Parties: Lillian B. GOLDSTEIN and George S. Goldstein, Appellants, v. Julius H. AHRENS and Bessie J. Ahrens, his wife.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

108 A.2d 693

379 Pa. 330

Lillian B. GOLDSTEIN and George S. Goldstein, Appellants, v. Julius H. AHRENS and Bessie J. Ahrens, his wife.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 8, 1954

Action wherein the Common Pleas Court of Venango County at No. 1 August Term, 1951, Lee A. McCracken, J., dismissed the petition, and the petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court No. 178 March Term, 1954, Chidsey, J., held that where, in connection with refusal to open confessed ejectment judgment predicated upon lessees' breach of oil and gas lease convenant by cessation of operations, it was determined that there had been no interference with lessees' operations under lease, court should thereafter have refused to entertain lessees' action in equity to restrain alleged interference with their operations and to recover for damage caused by such alleged interference.

Appeal dismissed with directions.

Rynd & Olmes, Oil City, Louis Vaira, George S Goldstein, Pittsburgh, for appellants.

Breene, Brewster & Breene, McGill & McGill, Oil City, for appellees.

Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.

CHIDSEY, Justice.

On July 17, 1951 the appellants instituted in the Common Pleas Court of Venango County to No. 1 August Term, 1951, an action in equity against the appellees seeking to restrain the latter from alleged interference with appellants' operations under an oil and gas lease of premises of which appellees had become the owners subject to the lease. In their complaint the appellants also sought damages caused by such alleged interference. During the pendency of preliminary objections to the complaint filed by appellees, the latter caused a judgment in ejectment to be confessed, as provided for in the lease, on the ground that appellants had breached a covenant of the lease by their failure to conduct operations for the production of oil for a space of more than 30 days. It was provided in the lease that in case of such cessation of operations the lease and all rights and privileges should immediately terminate and become null and void. Appellants ceased operations on or about November 22, 1950 and had not resumed operations at the time appellees confessed judgment in ejectment against them on November 28, 1951.

Appellants petitioned the court to open the judgment, averring that their continued cessation of operations was due to appellees' interference with their rights, and set forth in their petition the same acts by appellees relied on in their complaint in equity as constituting the alleged interference. The appellees filed an answer to the petition to open judgment and depositions of considerable length were taken. After argument the court found from the testimony that appellants' discontinuance of operations was not caused by any acts or conduct on the part of appellees but was attributable to the failure and neglect of appellants, and discharged the rule to show cause issued on the petition.

Appellants appealed to this Court and on their petition that entire record in the equity suit as well as the record in the proceedings to open judgment were incorporated in the record on appeal and both were considered by this Court. In affirming the order of the court below we held there had been no abuse of discretion in refusing to open the judgment: See Ahrens v. Goldstein, 376 Pa. 114, 102 A.2d 164.

In answering appellants' contention that the court below having assumed jurisdiction in the equity case should have ‘ retained its jurisdiction and opened the judgment’, we said: ‘ * * * [Appellants] rely on the principle that where a court in equity has assumed jurisdiction for one purpose, it will retain it for all purposes. However, this principle is not inflexible in its application, being permissive rather than peremptory. Its exercise lies within the discretion of the court. Appellants proceeded to have the case heard on the merits in the ejectment proceeding, the disposition of which resolved the entire controversy between the parties. Only after a determination adverse to them did they question the propriety of the court's action. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court.'

Although all the issues in the controversy between the parties were fully resolved, as stated in our opinion, appellants sought to relitigate the issues...