Goldstein v. Gen. Motors LLC

• Decision Date: 03 February 2021
• Docket Number: Case No.: 3:19-cv-1778-JLS-AHG
• Citation: 517 F.Supp.3d 1076
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: GOLDSTEIN et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant.

517 F.Supp.3d 1076

GOLDSTEIN et al., Plaintiffs,

v.GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-1778-JLS-AHG

United States District Court, S.D. California.

Signed February 3, 2021

Amey J. Park, Pro Hac Vice, Russell D. Paul, Pro Hac Vice, Berger Montague PC, Philadelphia, PA, Christopher Decker Moon, Kevin O'Connor Moon, Moon Law APC, Gayle M. Blatt, Jeremy K. Robinson, Casey, Gerry, Schenk, Francavilla, Blatt & Penfield LLP, San Diego, CA, Cody R. Padgett, Mark Alan Ozzello, Steven Richard Weinmann, Tarek H. Zohdy, Trisha K. Monesi, Capstone Law APC, Los Angeles, CA, Gary S. Graifman, Pro Hac Vice, Melissa R. Emert, Pro Hac Vice, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, Patrice Lyn Bishop, Stull Stull and Brody, Beverly Hills, CA, Rosanne Mah, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, Rosemary M. Rivas, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff Matt Goldstein.

Christopher Decker Moon, Kevin O'Connor Moon, Moon Law APC, Gayle M. Blatt, Jeremy K. Robinson, Casey, Gerry, Schenk, Francavilla, Blatt & Penfield LLP, San Diego, CA, Cody R. Padgett, Mark Alan Ozzello, Steven Richard Weinmann, Tarek H. Zohdy, Trisha K. Monesi, Capstone Law APC, Los Angeles, CA, Gary S. Graifman, Pro Hac Vice, Melissa R. Emert, Pro Hac Vice, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, Patrice Lyn Bishop, Stull Stull and Brody, Beverly Hills, CA, Rosanne Mah, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, Rosemary M. Rivas, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs Percy Sutton, Julian Wilder, Lana Savage, Gladys Tubbs, Kendra Piazza, Rafael Martinez.

Christopher Decker Moon, Kevin O'Connor Moon, Moon Law APC, Gayle M. Blatt, Jeremy K. Robinson, Casey, Gerry, Schenk, Francavilla, Blatt & Penfield LLP, San Diego, CA, Gary S. Graifman, Pro Hac Vice, Melissa R. Emert, Pro Hac Vice, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, Patrice Lyn Bishop, Stull Stull and Brody, Beverly Hills, CA, Rosanne Mah, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, Rosemary M. Rivas, San Francisco, CA, Cody R. Padgett, Capstone Law APC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs Tonya Gruchacz, Katrina Howard, Earl Kladke, William Braden, David Conroe, Gini Michelle Cox, Robert Tyson, Joseph Palopoli, Jr., Normand Gagnon, Richard Schellhammer, Crystal Robinson, Benito Guzman, April Bradley, Cindy Uyenoyama, Nicole Blanchard, Shon Reeves, Mariano Lorenzo Macaisa, Charles Knox, Vanessa Rodriguez, Maxine Glenn, John Toda.

Gary S. Graifman, Pro Hac Vice, Melissa R. Emert, Pro Hac Vice, Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., Chestnut Ridge, NY, Gayle M. Blatt, Jeremy K. Robinson, Casey, Gerry, Schenk, Francavilla, Blatt & Penfield LLP, Kevin O'Connor Moon, Moon Law APC, San Diego, CA, Patrice Lyn Bishop, Stull Stull and Brody, Beverly Hills, CA, Rosanne Mah, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, Rosemary M. Rivas, San Francisco, CA, Cody R. Padgett, Capstone Law APC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff Shelia Cauthen.

Allyson Marie McKinstry, Pro Hac Vice, Crowell & Moring, New York, NY, Andrew John William Holmer, Crowell & Moring, Los Angeles, CA, Kathleen Taylor Sooy, Pro Hac Vice, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 55)

Janis L. Sammartino, United States District Judge Presently before the Court is Defendant General Motors LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Class Complaint. ("Mot.," ECF No. 55.) Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion ("Opp'n," ECF No. 56), and Defendant filed a Reply ("Reply," ECF No. 58). The Court took this matter under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See generally ECF No. 61. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion.

BACKGROUND

On May 13, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint in this putative class action against Defendant General Motors LLC. See generally Second Amended Complaint ("SAC," ECF No. 49). Plaintiffs are six purchasers of new and used Cadillacs in the State of California. Id. ¶¶ 103, 111, 118, 129, 141, 153. Plaintiffs allege, among other things, purported breaches of express and implied warranties and violations of various consumer protections laws based on allegedly defective Cadillac User Experience ("CUE") navigation and radio touch screen displays in 2013–2017 Cadillac ATS, SRX, and XTS vehicles and 2014–2017 Cadillac CTS, ELR, and Escalade vehicles (collectively, the "Class Vehicles"). See generally SAC.

Plaintiffs seek to represent all persons and entities who purchased or leased a Class Vehicle equipped with Defendant's CUE touch screen display in the state of California. Id. ¶ 165. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek to represent a Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") Sub-Class of "all members of the Class who are ‘consumers’ within the meaning of California Civil Code Section 1761(d)." Id.

The CUE "infotainment" system is an audio/visual interface comprised of a touch screen module that provides "entertainment and information delivery to drivers." Id. ¶ 39. The CUE controls the audio, phone, and climate inputs for the car and displays the rear-view camera when the vehicle is in reverse. Id. ¶¶ 40–51. The CUE is made of two major components: a projected capacitance touch screen and a plastic cover. Id. ¶¶ 56–58.

Plaintiffs allege that the CUE is defective. Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiffs allege that the "plastic cover is prone to delaminating or separating from the touch screen glass" due to either mechanical or thermal stress. Id. ¶¶ 60, 62. When the plastic cover separates, Plaintiffs allege it causes a "spider-web-like pattern on the display" to form, which in turn prevents the CUE from recognizing any touch input from a user (the "Defect"). Id. ¶ 60.

Plaintiffs allege that the CUE is "defectively designed" because of the placement of the screws and rubberized gasket that hold the plastic cover to the frame of the CUE. Id. ¶ 63. The plastic cover is anchored to the touch screen by eight screws. Id. ¶ 64. Plaintiffs allege that only two screws are placed on "the bottom portion of the plastic cover, which causes it to flex and move when pressure is applied." Id. According to Plaintiffs, this makes the plastic cover prone to separating from the touch screen glass. Id. ¶ 66. Plaintiffs also allege that the rubber gasket is cut in a way that creates excessive space between the touch screen and the plastic cover, which "allows for more flexibility in the plastic cover, which leads to the spider-webbing defect." Id. Plaintiffs further allege that the plastic cover delaminates as a result of temperature fluctuations. Id. ¶ 67. The touch screen assembly is "made up of materials with different thermal expansion coefficients." Id. ¶ 68. Plaintiffs allege that this difference in the thermal expansion coefficient between the separate materials can "cause delamination between the plastic cover and the touch screen glass." Id. Plaintiffs maintain that the Defect poses a safety risk and causes unsafe driving by distracting drivers and by not allowing drivers to make use of the backup camera when the vehicle is in reverse. Id. ¶¶ 73–78.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant "knew, or should have known, about the Defect ...." Id. ¶ 79. In support of this allegation, Plaintiffs cite to four service bulletins and service bulletin updates ("Technical Service Bulletins" or "TSBs") that Defendant allegedly issued to its dealers in the United States between December 2014 and August 2017. Id. ¶¶ 82–89. Plaintiffs claim that these Technical Service Bulletins demonstrated that Defendant "was aware of the Defect and recognized it was covered under its Warranty." Id. ¶ 89. These TSBs stated that "[s]ome customers may report that their radio screen appears bubbled, cracked, or is delaminating" and directed dealers to "replace the ICS (Integrated Center Stack) by following the SI replacement procedure." Id. ¶ 83. Plaintiffs also point to various consumer complaints filed with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") as evidence that Defendant was aware of the Defect. Id. ¶ 93. Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was aware of the Defect because of complaints made "by consumers on internet forums" that Defendant allegedly monitored. Id. ¶¶ 94–99. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant was aware of these complaints because Defendant responded to complaints through its agents by making online postings in the various internet forums. Id. Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was aware of the Defect "based on the large number of repairs performed to the CUE System's exhibiting delamination and spiderwebbing at its network of dealerships." Id. ¶¶ 100–02.

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although Rule 8 "does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ), it does "require[ ] more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do," Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (alteration in original). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must...