Goldstein v. Goldstein

• Decision Date: 03 July 1968
• Docket Number: No. 270-A,270-A
• Citation: 243 A.2d 914,104 R.I. 284
• Parties: Stanley P. GOLDSTEIN et al. v. Etta R. GOLDSTEIN et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 914

243 A.2d 914

104 R.I. 284

Stanley P. GOLDSTEIN et al. v. Etta R. GOLDSTEIN et al.

No. 270-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 3, 1968.

Reargument Denied July 26, 1968.

Higgins & Silverstein, Woonsocket, for plaintiffs.

Richard F. Kirby, Woonsocket, guardian ad litem for Eugene Stephen Goldstein and Larry Goldstein.

Thomas J. Kane, Woonsocket, guardian ad litem for Mark Steven Goldstein and Nancy Goldstein.

Orist D. Chaharyn, Woonsocket, guardian ad litem for Richard Goldstein and James Goldstein.

Gerald M. Brenner, Woonsocket, guardian ad litem of persons not now in being and not now ascertainable.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This case was brought pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956, § 9-24-28, as amended, for the construction of a provision of the will of Isreal Goldstein, hereinafter referred to as the testator, who died a resident of Woonsocket on February 18, 1959. Following a hearing in superior court, the cause was certified to this court, as provided in the above-cited statute, for hearing and determination of the cause so certified.

The plaintiffs are the present trustees under paragraph Fifth of the will of the testator. The defendants include testator's widow, Etta, his three sons living at the time of the institution of the instant suit, ¹ and his six grandchildren, two of whom were born subsequent to testator's death. ² In the proceedings below, guardians ad litem were appointed to represent minors and persons not in being and not ascertainable who may have an interest under the provisions of paragraph Fifth of the will.

Paragraph Fifth establishes a trust of the residue of testator's estate and provides that the trustees therein shall distribute said trust as follows: (1) during Etta's life, the net income to be paid at least annually to Etta, or to 'her children' in such proportions as shall be determined by the trustees; and (2) upon Etta's death '* * * leaving issue her surviving, this trust fund allocated in behalf of my wife shall be divided by my trustees into as many equal shares as there are children of my wife, than living * * * and the trustees shall allocate and hold one such share for each of said children * * *.' (Italics ours.)

On December 19, 1963, Etta irrevocably renounced and terminated ³ her interest as beneficiary of the paragraph Fifth residuary trust and also resigned as trustee thereunder. The question arising in this proceeding is whether the trustees may treat the renunciation by Etta as equivalent to her death for the purposes of administering and distributing the residuary trust, and whether they may thereby accelerate the interest of the children, and issue of the deceased child, of Etta living at the time of said renunciation.

The plaintiffs argue that Rhode Island follows the general rule of construction, proposed in 2 Restatement of the Law of Property at § 231, favoring acceleration of succeeding interests, absent the manifestation of a contrary intent, when an attempted prior interest fails because the person to whom it is limited renounces it. In Hayden for an Opinion, 51 R.I. 117, 118, 152 A. 254, 255, we said: 'The law favors the early vesting of an estate given by will and, in the absence of a clear manifestation of the intention of the testator to the contrary, estates are held to vest at the earliest possible moment.' See Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Churchill, R.I., 232 A.2d 603, 608. Pursuant to this rule, plaintiffs argue that Etta's renunciation, disclaimer, and termination should be treated by the trustees as equivalent to her death and the succeeding interests should be accelerated.

The plaintiffs acknowledge that before resorting to court-created rules of construction, an effort should be made to determine the testator's intent from the instrument itself. This is in accord with our rule that where the language of a will expressly states the testator's intention, resort to the rules of testamentary construction is without warrant; it is when the language under consideration is susceptible of being read as disclosing alternate or contrary intentions that the rules of construction properly may be invoked for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the testator from the language he employed. Cf. Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island v. Clark, 98 R.I. 434, 437, 204 A.2d 310, 312. It is our duty then to ascertain, if possible, the intent of the testator from the language he used in the instant instrument.

As has already been noted, paragraph Fifth requires that (1) the net income of the trust established therein is to be paid to Etta or to 'her children' and (2) upon Etta's death the trust is to be divided into '* * *...