Goldstein v. Kellwood Co.

• Decision Date: 05 January 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:94-CV-2883-WBH.
• Citation: 933 F. Supp. 1082
• Parties: Allen GOLDSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. KELLWOOD COMPANY, Administrator of Kellwood Company Pension Fund, Trustee, Kellwood Company Pension Fund, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

933 F. Supp. 1082

Allen GOLDSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. KELLWOOD COMPANY, Administrator of Kellwood Company Pension Fund, Trustee, Kellwood Company Pension Fund, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:94-CV-2883-WBH.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia.

January 5, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Matt Shade, Thompson & Associates, Atlanta, Georgia, for Plaintiff.

Marc H. Salm, Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Atlanta, Georgia, James N. Foster, Jr. and Geoffrey Gilbert, St. Louis, Missouri, for Defendants.

ORDER

HUNT, District Judge.

Plaintiff Allen Goldstein brings this suit against defendants Kellwood Company ("Kellwood"), the administrator of the Kellwood Company Pension Fund (the "Administrator"), and the trustee of Kellwood Company Pension Fund (the "Trustee").¹ Goldstein alleges that defendant Kellwood breached an oral employment contract and claims that he is entitled to severance pay, vacation pay, and pension benefits under the Kellwood Company Pension Plan (the "Kellwood Pension Plan") and the Kellwood Company Severance Assistance Plan (the "Severance Plan"). A portion of plaintiff's claims arise under the Employee Retirement Security Act ("ERISA"). The following motions currently are pending: 1) defendants' motion to transfer the case to a more convenient forum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 4; 2) defendants' motion for partial summary judgment 20; 3) defendants' motion requiring plaintiff to demand a jury trial if plaintiff desires a trial by jury 3; 4) plaintiff's motion demanding a jury trial 8; 5) defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's jury trial demand as to plaintiff's ERISA claims 9; 6) plaintiff's motion to compel defendant Kellwood to answer plaintiff's interrogatories and to produce documents 13; and 7) plaintiff's motion to extend time to respond to defendants' motion for partial summary judgment 21.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was affiliated with G & O Manufacturing Company ("G & O") as a Sales Representative and Regional Sales manager from 1984 until January, 1988. In January, 1988 G & O was acquired by defendant Kellwood, and plaintiff became affiliated with Kellwood. G & O maintained a pension plan for employees, the G & O Manufacturing Company Pension Plan ("the G & O Plan"). Participation in the G & O Plan was provided to all G & O employees who had attained one (1) year of service as an employee and reached age twenty-one (21). After Kellwood acquired G & O, the G & O Plan was merged into the Kellwood Pension Plan. The Kellwood Pension Plan is a benefit retirement plan that provides for the payment of retirement benefits to participants after termination of employment and attainment of stated retirement ages. Participants in the G & O Plan were credited in the Kellwood Pension Plan.²

Kellwood also maintains a severance plan which provides for payment of severance benefits to terminated employees. The payments are made only to employees terminated for certain reasons defined in the Severance Plan. Plaintiff contends, and defendants dispute, that he never received severance pay benefits.

With regard to both the Kellwood Pension Plan and the Severance Plan, the parties disagree as to whether plaintiff followed the requisite administrative steps required before filing suit. Both plans include a claim and appeal procedure. Defendants claim, however, that plaintiff failed to appeal the denial and forfeiture of his benefits and, therefore, cannot file suit for the benefits.

Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is connected to an alleged oral agreement. In March, 1992, Kellwood scheduled a sales meeting for all of its salespersons in Florida. Prior to the meeting, the former owner of G & O and the Kellwood president of the G & O facility, David Grossman, told plaintiff that Kellwood wanted plaintiff to move to New York. Plaintiff then wrote a letter to Leon McWhite, the head of his division, expressing his disappointment about his potential transfer to New York. Plaintiff followed his letter with a phone call to McWhite. In the ensuing conversation, McWhite told plaintiff not to worry and explained they could discuss the matter at the Florida meeting.

In Florida, plaintiff, plaintiff's wife, and McWhite played golf together. During the golf game, McWhite and plaintiff had a conversation about the New York transfer. According to plaintiff, McWhite stated:

Allen, I told you not to worry about Mr. Grossman. You work for Kellwood. You work for me. He cannot fire you and he cannot force you to move to New York.... Mr. Grossman will be retiring soon. I don't know exactly when, but he'll be retiring soon. And I guarantee you that I will not make changes with you for at least two years, because that's how long its going to take to get this mess cleaned up. And don't worry about it. I want you to go back with all the initiative to do your job knowing that you are not going to be fired or your status is not going to change.

McWhite and plaintiff had a similar conversation the following day. Based on the foregoing, plaintiff believed that he had an oral contract for employment for a period of two (2) years after Grossman retired. Grossman retired in March, 1993. In April, 1993, Craig Gendel, President of Kellwood, informed plaintiff that he would be transferred to New York. Plaintiff did not want to move and reminded McWhite of their conversation on the golf course. Kellwood and the plaintiff attempted to work out an agreement whereby plaintiff could remain in Atlanta on a nonemployee commissioned sales arrangement, but the parties were unable to reach a final agreement. Plaintiff claims that the agreement tendered by Kellwood was unacceptable. Kellwood then terminated plaintiff's employment through written correspondence dated February 3, 1994.

I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR TRANSFER TO A MORE CONVENIENT FORUM

Defendants' have filed a motion for transfer of this case to a more convenient forum, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) provides that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Defendants argue that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri is a more appropriate forum.

In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), the Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of forum non conveniens and noted that courts can transfer an action to another forum after considering factors such as access to the sources of proof, location of witnesses, and "other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Id. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843. The Supreme Court cautioned that "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Id. Defendants' burden of demonstrating inconvenience is not as high, however, under section 1404(a). As the Supreme Court explained in a subsequent case, "when congress adopted § 1404(a), it intended to more than just codify the existing law on forum non conveniens.... This is not to say that the relevant factors have changed or that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be considered, but only that the discretion to be exercised is broader." Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32, 75 S.Ct. 544, 546, 99 L.Ed. 789 (1955). Nonetheless, under section 1404(a), defendants still have the burden of demonstrating "good reasons for changing venue." Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. Universal Construction Co., Inc., 571 F.Supp. 487, 489 (N.D.Ga.1983). Defendants must prove "that the inconvenience to the moving party if the case is not transferred sufficiently outweighs the burden which the transfer would impose on the non-moving party." Spencer v. Department of Human Resources, 572 F.Supp. 1198, 1200 (N.D.Ga.1983).

The Court has considered carefully the arguments presented by defendants, but finds that the inconvenience to the defendants if this case is not transferred does not outweigh the burden which a transfer to the Eastern District of Missouri would place on the plaintiff. Considering the age of this case, the Court finds it most appropriate to address the pending motions at this time in this forum. Thus, defendants' motion to transfer the case to a more convenient forum 4 is DENIED.

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants submit a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claim that Kellwood breached the alleged oral contract of employment and with respect to plaintiff's claims for pension benefits and severance pay. Summary judgment shall be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party cannot prevail on summary judgment unless it shows that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support its position, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), or presents affirmative evidence showing that the nonmoving party will not prevail on the issue at trial, Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir.1993). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence, beyond the pleadings, that supports its position that there is a triable issue of material fact. Id. at 1116.

A) Plaintiff's Claim for Breach of Oral Contract

Goldstein maintains that he had an oral employment contract with Kellwood for two years after David Goldman's retirement. Because such a contract could not be performed within one year, Georgia law requires that it be in writing. O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30. However, even an oral employment contract that cannot be performed within one year is enforceable "where there has been such part performance of the contract as...