Goldstein v. Lustig
| Court | Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | O'CONNOR |
| Citation | Goldstein v. Lustig, 154 Ill.App.3d 595, 507 N.E.2d 164, 107 Ill.Dec. 500 (Ill. App. 1987) |
| Decision Date | 06 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1868,85-1868 |
| Parties | , 107 Ill.Dec. 500 Lance GOLDSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steven LUSTIG, Defendant-Appellee. |
Donald A. Shapiro, Ltd., Chicago, Donald A. Shapiro, for plaintiff-appellant Lance Goldstein.
Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, Chicago, D. Kendall Griffith, Thomas L. Browne, Lynn D. Dowd, for defendant-appellee Steven Lustig.
This is an appeal from a dismissal of a complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal plaintiff argues that the court erred: (1) in ruling that his complaint failed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice; (2) in ruling that defendant's conduct was an error of judgment rather than negligence; (3) in ruling that plaintiff was precluded from filing suit against his former attorney by virtue of the settlement of litigation between the plaintiff and his employer; and (4) in denying plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.
The following facts are pertinent to this appeal. Plaintiff Dr. Lance Goldstein (Goldstein) was employed by Endodontic & Periodontic Associates, Ltd. (Corporation) as a dentist from February 1, 1977, through January 31, 1982. In spring of 1981, Goldstein became involved in a dispute with the Corporation. The dispute arose out of allegations that he had allowed an attorney access to corporate billing letterheads which the attorney had allegedly used to generate fraudulent billing statements for submission to an insurance carrier.
On or about July 1, 1981, Goldstein took his employment agreement to defendant, Steven Lustig (Lustig), an attorney, told him that the Corporation had valid grounds to terminate him for misconduct and asked his legal advice as to the best course of conduct. Paragraph 8 of the agreement provided that if the doctor was terminated by the corporation for cause, pursuant to paragraph 2 he would be entitled only to the benefits set forth in Paragraph 8(b). If he resigned on his own option, he would be entitled to the benefits set forth in 8(c) and 8(d) as well as those set forth in 8(b).
Lustig advised Goldstein that it would not make any difference what he did and that if he waited and allowed himself to be terminated, he could then sue the Corporation. Goldstein took Lustig's advice, was terminated and filed suit against the Corporation. During the course of the litigation, Lustig advised Goldstein to settle the litigation. Goldstein and the Corporation signed a consent decree, a mutual release and a settlement agreement.
Goldstein then filed a professional malpractice action against Lustig, alleging that Lustig had negligently and carelessly misinterpreted and misadvised him as to the legal ramifications of his employment agreement.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to chapter 110 Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, par. 2-615 or alternatively 2-619. Attached as exhibits to the 2-619 motion were the following documents from plaintiff's action against the Corporation: a complaint for declaratory judgment with exhibits, plaintiff's second amended complaint; a counterclaim asserted by the employer; a motion to compel and for sanctions; the consent decree; the mutual release and the settlement agreement.
The exhibits reveal that following Goldstein's termination, he instituted an action against the Corporation for wrongful discharge. Defendant remained his general counsel, however he was represented by a separate law firm in that action. Pursuant to the mutual release, each party was forever released from any claims relating to the employment agreement, to Goldstein's ownership of corporation stock and to Goldstein's lawsuit against the corporation. Under the settlement agreement, Goldstein and the Corporation agreed that all of the obligations owed under the employment agreement were satisfied, and that Goldstein would receive full benefits from the retirement and profit sharing plans and an additional $30,000.
Goldstein filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss this case. Attached to the memorandum was a copy of his original complaint, an excerpt from the deposition of Richard Krause, a copy of the employment agreement, a copy of the letter from the Corporation and his own affidavit.
Goldstein's memorandum states that he told defendant that his former employer had valid grounds to believe that he was engaged in an insurance fraud scheme, and that defendant advised him to sue his employer in order to force a settlement. Goldstein verified in his affidavit that he participated in an insurance fraud scheme, that because the lawsuit filed had little if any merit he had to settle with his employer, and that following his discharge, his employer owed him no resignation benefits.
Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure was granted and plaintiff now brings this appeal.
Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in ruling that his complaint failed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice.
In order to state a cause of action for attorney malpractice, a client must plead facts establishing the existence of an attorney-client relationship, the breach of a duty owed by virtue of that relationship and that such negligence was the proximate cause of injury or loss to the client. Cook v. Gould (1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 311, 314, 64 Ill.Dec. 896, 440 N.E.2d 448.
When a motion to dismiss is filed pursuant to section 2-615, the court must consider the legal sufficiency of the complaint based only on the allegations of the complaint. (Davis v. Weiskopf (1982), 108 Ill.App.3d 505, 509, 64 Ill.Dec. 131, 439 N.E.2d 60.) Exhibits attached to a complaint become a part of the complaint and factual matters contained in the exhibits which are inconsistent with the allegations serve to negate such allegations. Sharkey v. Snow (1973), 13 Ill.App.3d 448, 451, 300 N.E.2d 279.
A motion to dismiss is not deemed to have admitted any allegations of the complaint which are in conflict with the facts set forth in the exhibits attached to the complaint. A complaint is properly dismissed when it does not contain sufficient allegations to set forth a cause of action. (Village of Wheeling v. Stavros (1980), 89 Ill.App.3d 450, 452, 44 Ill.Dec. 701, 411 N.E.2d 1067.) We believe that plaintiff here can plead no set of facts that will establish the element of cause required for a legal malpractice action, and therefore the complaint was properly dismissed.
If the Corporation had cause to discharge the plaintiff, he would not be able to enforce the contract and recover benefits, regardless of whether he resigned or waited to be terminated. Under contract law, a party seeking to enforce the contract has the burden of proving that he has substantially complied with all the material terms of the agreement. (George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co. (1975), 32 Ill.App.3d 249, 254, 336 N.E.2d 185.) A party who materially breaches a contract cannot take advantage of the terms of the contract which benefit him, nor can he recover damages from the other party to the contract. Robinhorne Constr. Corp. v. Snyder (1969), 113 Ill.App.2d 288, 297, 251 N.E.2d 641, aff'd. (1970), 47 Ill.2d 349, 265 N.E.2d 670.
In our opinion plaintiff's use of the corporate books and records to further an insurance fraud scheme constitutes a material breach of the employment agreement. Thus even if plaintiff had resigned, he would not have been entitled to enforce the contract against the Corporation in order to receive the resignation benefits.
Plaintiff cites Lamphere v. Old Second National Bank (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 610, 350 N.E.2d 272, appeal denied, 63 Ill.2d 557 as support for his theory that he would have been entitled to collect the resignation benefits had he resigned before the Corporation could discharge him. In Lamphere, plaintiff, the vice president of the defendant's bank, was discovered to have been embezzling company funds. After the Board of Directors voted to discharge plaintiff, but before they had actually done so, he resigned.
The plaintiff then brought suit to recover his benefits in the bank's profit sharing trust. Defendant argued that the plaintiff had forfeited his rights to these benefits because the profit sharing plan provided that an employee would not receive benefits if he were dismissed for cause. The appellate court disagreed and held that since the plaintiff had resigned, he was entitled to his benefits.
Lamphere is not contrary to the rule of law prohibiting a party who has breached a contract from later benefiting from its provisions. The Lamphere court reached the result it did based on its knowledge that under a bonding company's judgment, the proceeds of plaintiff's judgment would operate to effect restitution rather than accrue to plaintiff's direct benefit. (Lamphere v. Old Second National Bank (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 610, 613, 350 N.E.2d 272, appeal denied, 63 Ill.2d 557.) No similar circumstance exists here.
Alternatively, if Goldstein had been discharged without cause, under Illinois law he would have an action against the Corporation for wrongful or retaliatory discharge. (See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 184, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353; Claeson v. Hennessey (1959), 20 Ill.App.2d 437, 445, 156 N.E.2d 234.) Recovery would include the value of lost benefits under the employment contract. (See, e.g. Schwarze v. Solo Cup Co. (1983), 112 Ill.App.3d 632, 641, 68 Ill.Dec. 228, 445 N.E.2d 872, appeal denied, 94 Ill.2d 558.) Thus if no cause existed for plaintiff's termination, defendant's advice to wait for termination would not have precluded him from recovering his resignation benefits. Therefore even under this set of facts plaintiff cannot establish the necessary...
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