Goldstine v. Tolman
Decision Date | 01 May 1914 |
Docket Number | No. 53.,53. |
Citation | 157 Wis. 141,147 N.W. 7 |
Parties | GOLDSTINE ET AL. v. TOLMAN ET AL. |
Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Milwaukee County; Oscar M. Fritz, Judge.
Action by Max Goldstine and others against S. A. Tolman and another. From a decree in favor of plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
This action was brought to enforce specific performance of an alleged agreement to enter into a 99-year lease, and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs. On October 16, 1909, the plaintiffs and the defendant S. A. Tolman entered into the following agreement:
On October 20, 1909, the following supplementary agreement was made:
In pursuance of these agreements the defendant S. A. Tolman tendered a form of lease to the plaintiffs under date of October 28, 1909. The lease tendered was not satisfactory, and on November 5th the plaintiffs prepared and tendered to Tolman a lease which they claimed conformed to the agreement of the parties. This lease was accompanied by a form of bond. This form of lease was not satisfactory to Tolman, and he refused to execute it. Thereafter considerable negotiations were carried on, personally and by correspondence, in an endeavor to agree upon the terms of the lease. On or about February 28, 1910, Tolman prepared and submitted a second lease, which modified to some extent the terms of the one first presented, and offered to execute the same. This lease was not satisfactory to the plaintiffs, and they in turn prepared and on April 16, 1910, presented to Tolman a second lease, modifying to some extent the terms contained in the lease which they first presented, and demanded of Tolman that he execute the same. This he refused to do, and the negotiations between the parties practically ceased at this time. The premises covered by these agreements were occupied by seven different tenants when the agreements were made. The leases held by six of them expired on May 1, 1910, and, after the negotiations had practically come to an end, and on April 15, 1910, Tolman proceeded to renew the leases of his tenants. Part of the property covered by the proposed leases consisted of the Davidson Theater and the Hotel Davidson. It was necessary to make repairs on these buildings, and the sum of $26,840 was expended in making such repairs. Some attempt was made by the plaintiffs to renew negotiations during the summer of 1911; but nothing came of it. On October 10, 1911, the defendant Tolman leased the same premises to his codefendant, Stone, for a period of 99 years. In addition to the facts recited, the circuit court found: (1) That the expression “on the usual terms as applied to a ninety-nine year lease,” which appeared in the contract of October 16th, was used and intended by the parties to mean those terms which were usually applied to a lease for 99 years in the city of Chicago at that time; (2) that Tolman directed his attorneys to draw a lease which, in addition to the matters expressly provided for in the two preliminary agreements, should contain the usual terms applied to a lease for 99 years in the city of Chicago; (3) that in the lease so prepared, bearing date October 29th, there are the usual terms as applied to a 99-year lease in said city, but that certain provisions which related to matters expressly agreed upon in the preliminary agreements were not in accordance with the terms of these agreements; (4) that prior to November 5, 1909, plaintiffs did not propose any sufficient sureties or acceptable bond to said S. A. Tolman under said preliminary agreements, and that no contract or arrangement had been made with any sureties by the plaintiffs for the signature of the bond form tendered by the plaintiffs on November 5, 1909; (5) that during the months of August and September, 1911, the defendant Stone negotiated with the agent of the defendant Tolman for a lease of the property; that on or about September 7th the form of the lease was agreed upon, and on October 11, 1911, the same was reduced to writing, executed, and delivered; (6) that, at the time the defendants began their negotiations and thereafter, they believed that whatever rights the plaintiffs had under the preliminary agreements had terminated; (7) that the failure of Tolman to execute and deliver to the plaintiffs a lease of the premises in question was not caused by or due to any act of the defendant Stone; (8) that the said lease which was entered into between the defendants was made and entered into in good faith, and without intent or design to injure, cheat, or defraud the plaintiffs; that there was no conspiracy or agreement between the defendants to cheat or defraud the plaintiffs, or any or either of them; (9) that the...
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Huttig v. Brennan
...29; 13 C. J. 308. (b) The so-called contract, in the form it was left by the signers, was so indefinite as to be unenforcible. Goldstine v. Tolman, 157 Wis. 141; Hannon v. Scanlon, 158 Wis. 357; Rollin Pickett, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 552; Gigos v. Cochran, 54 Ind. 593; Vickers v. Henry, 110 N.C. 37......
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Huttig v. Brennan
...29; 13 C.J. 308. (b) The so-called contract, in the form it was left by the signers, was so indefinite as to be unenforcible. Goldstine v. Tolman, 157 Wis. 141; Hannon v. Scanlon, 158 Wis. 357; Rollin v. Pickett, 2 Hill (N.Y.) 552; Gigos v. Cochran, 54 Ind. 593; Vickers v. Henry, 110 N.C. 3......
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...negotiations it is understood that a formal written agreement is to be signed, no contract is entered into); Goldstine v. Tolman, 157 Wis. 141, 155-56, 147 N.W. 7 (1914) (writings will not be construed as a contract when intended only as preliminary negotiations to be followed by a formal c......