Goldstone v. Bloomfield Tp. Public Library

• Decision Date: 26 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 130150.,Calendar No. 2.,130150.
• Parties: George H. GOLDSTONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP PUBLIC LIBRARY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

737 N.W.2d 476

479 Mich. 554

George H. GOLDSTONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP PUBLIC LIBRARY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 130150.

Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 10, 2007.

Decided July 26, 2007.

Robert E. Toohey, Bloomfield Hills, for the plaintiff.

Seyburn, Kahn, Ginn, Bess and Serlin, P.C. (by Joel H. Serlin and Barry M. Rosenbaum), Southfield, for the defendant.

Clark Hill, PLC (by Andrew C. Richner, Paul C. Smith, and F.R. Damm), Detroit, for the Detroit Public Library.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Thomas F. Schimpf and Matthew H. Rick, Assistant Attorneys General, Lansing, for the Department of History, Arts and Libraries.

Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C. (by Stephen O. Schultz and Stephen J. Rhodes), Lansing, for the Michigan Library Association, the Michigan Townships Association, and the Michigan Municipal League.

MARKMAN, J.

We granted leave to appeal to consider whether Const 1963, art 8, § 9, which states that public libraries "shall be available to all residents of the state," requires each individual public library facility in Michigan to offer nonresident book-borrowing privileges.¹ The lower courts answered this question in the negative, and we agree, although for different reasons. Therefore, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a resident of the city of Bloomfield Hills. The city does not have its own public library, but from 1964 to November 12, 2003, had entered into a "library service agreement" with defendant Bloomfield Township Public Library that, for a fee, permitted city residents full access to the library and to other area libraries that were also signatories to the agreement. When the agreement expired in 2003, the city of Bloomfield Hills and the township library did not renew it. As a result, city residents, including plaintiff, were allowed by the township only to visit the library and to use its materials on site. They were not allowed to borrow library materials or to fully access online databases and other programs, services, and activities that were regularly available to township residents.

Plaintiff believed that, notwithstanding the lack of a service agreement between the township library and the city, the Michigan Constitution guaranteed availability to him and to all other state residents. Thus, he felt he had the right to full use of the library and its collections, including borrowing privileges. Plaintiff sought a nonresident library card and offered to pay a borrowing fee. Pursuant to its local policies, the township library refused and asserted that the access it allowed was sufficient to meet the requirements of Const. 1963, art. 8, § 9.

Plaintiff brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment against the township library, demanding borrowing rights equivalent to those of a township resident on the basis that such rights are assured by Const. 1963, art. 8, § 9. Anything less, plaintiff argued, such as that which was offered by the township — library access with no borrowing privileges — violated the constitutional guarantee. The township library argued to the contrary that, under Const. 1963, art. 8, § 9, there was no constitutional right to the unlimited access plaintiff sought, and that it could constitutionally enforce its policy.

The trial court granted summary disposition to the township library, ruling that, by allowing onsite use, the library satisfied the constitutional requirement that libraries be "available" to state residents. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the availability requirement of Const. 1963, art. 8, § 9 created no constitutional mandate that libraries provide nonresident borrowing privileges or make all resident services accessible to nonresidents. 268 Mich.App. 642, 652, 708 N.W.2d 740 (2005). After hearing oral argument on plaintiff's application for leave to appeal, this Court granted leave to appeal. 477 Mich. 919, 722 N.W.2d 891 (2006).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision granting or denying a motion for summary disposition. City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co., 475 Mich. 109, 115, 715 N.W.2d 28 (2006). Issues of constitutional construction are questions of law that are also reviewed de novo. Id. When interpreting constitutional provisions, our primary objective "`is to realize the intent of the people by whom and for whom the constitution was ratified.'" Studier v. Michigan Pub. School Employees' Retirement Bd., 472 Mich. 642, 652, 698 N.W.2d 350 (2005), quoting Wayne Co. v. Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445, 468, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004). That is, we seek the "`common understanding'" of the people at the time the constitution was ratified. Studier, supra at 652, 698 N.W.2d 350, quoting 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (6th ed.) at 81 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This involves applying the plain meaning of each term used at the time of ratification, unless technical, legal terms are used. Studier, supra at 652, 698 N.W.2d 350.

III. ANALYSIS

A. CONST. 1963, ART. 8, § 9

Const. 1963, art. 8, § 9 states:

The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment and support of public libraries which shall be available to all residents of the state under regulations adopted by the governing bodies thereof.

Defendant argues that a public library is "available" for purposes of our constitution when it is subject to entry and its resources subject to use on site. We disagree. Instead, we agree with plaintiff that a public library is only "available" when a person enjoys reasonable borrowing privileges. In particular, we agree with plaintiff that, in construing our constitution, "available" must be assessed specifically in conjunction with "public libraries." Although this may not necessarily be true with regard to research libraries or private libraries, we believe that the "common understanding" is that "public libraries" are only "available" to a person if he has reasonable borrowing privileges.²

However, we disagree with plaintiff's premise that Const. 1963, art. 8, § 9 requires that each individual public library facility in Michigan must be "available" on identical terms to all residents of the state. Rather than addressing the obligations of individual library facilities, this provision is better understood, in our judgment, as assuring the availability of public libraries in general.³ That is, the Legislature shall make public libraries available, not necessarily each individual library facility. Const. 1963, art. 8, § 9 does not refer to "each and every" public library or to "individual" public library facilities, but refers only to the legislative obligation to provide for the "establishment and support of public libraries." By this use of the plural, as well as the use of the broad terms "establishment and support," we believe that the constitution refers to "public libraries" as an entity, i.e., public libraries as an institution. It is this entity, this institution — the public library — that must be made "available" to all residents, not each individual library facility.⁴

By way of example, the very same article of the constitution reads, "[r]eligion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Const. 1963, art. 8, § 1. Such "encourage[ment]" of schools, to continue "forever," does not, we believe, prohibit the cities of Detroit or Saginaw, for example, from ever closing an underutilized or an out-of-date school, for individual school facilities are simply not the subject of this provision. Rather, it is schools as an entity, as an institution, that must "forever be encouraged."⁵ Likewise, in Const. 1963, art. 8, § 9, it is not each individual library facility that must be made available, but rather public libraries as an entity or as an institution that must be made available.

And this is precisely what the Legislature has done. Acting pursuant to its constitutional obligation to "provide by law for the establishment and support of public libraries which shall be available to all residents of the state," the Legislature has enacted numerous laws.⁶ The premise of these laws appears to be that the mandate of the constitution can best be achieved by (a) the encouragement of local control of public libraries;⁷ and (b) the establishment of a system in which communities with public libraries can enter into agreements with communities without public libraries in order to extend access to such libraries.⁸

By these principles— local control and the encouragement of interjurisdictional agreements— the Legislature has sought to satisfy its constitutional obligations by incentivizing communities both to build and to maintain libraries, and to extend their availability to communities that lack a library. Had the Legislature acted unwisely in the adoption of these principles, it nonetheless would be entitled to considerable deference from this Court, for it is the Legislature explicitly that has been given primary responsibility by the constitution for the "establishment and support of public libraries." However, it seems clear that the Legislature, with the support of the public library community, has acted wisely.

Justice Cavanagh acts considerably less wisely in seeking to substitute his own judgment for that of the Legislature. He would undo the incentives enacted by the Legislature for the establishment and maintenance of public libraries. He would disincentivize communities from building libraries by making them identically available to persons who had and who had not paid for them; he would disincentivize communities from maintaining libraries by making improvements and new accessions identically available to persons who had and who had not paid for them; he would disincentivize non-library communities from entering into cooperative...