Goldwater v. Carter
| Decision Date | 13 December 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-2246,79-2246 |
| Citation | 199 U.S.App.D.C. 115,617 F.2d 697 |
| Parties | Senator Barry GOLDWATER et al. v. James Earl CARTER, President of the United States et al., Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C.Civil Action No. 78-2412).
John M. Harmon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Carl S. Rauh, U. S. Atty., and Robert E. Kopp, William Kanter, Michael F. Hertz, and Linda M. Cole, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellants.
Paul D. Kamenar and Northcutt Ely, Washington, D. C., with whom Daniel J. Popeo, Robert F. Pietrowski, Jr., and Ralph J. Gillis, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellees.
Charles N. Brower, Washington, D. C., with whom Paul L. Friedman, Washington, D. C., was on brief, for amici curiae International Law Institute of the Georgetown University Law Center et al., urging reversal and dismissal of the complaint.
Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and McGOWAN, TAMM, LEVENTHAL *, ROBINSON, MacKINNON, WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court PER CURIAM.
The court en banc has before it for review the judgment of the District Court that the notice of termination given by the President pursuant to the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China is ineffective absent either (1) a manifestation of the consent of the Senate to such termination by a two-thirds vote or (2) an approving majority vote therefor by both houses of Congress. The preliminary questions we confront are, first, whether the District Court was without jurisdiction because appellees lacked standing, and, second, whether it should in any event have declined to exercise jurisdiction by reason of the political nature of the question it was called upon to decide. Since a majority of the court does not exist to dispose of the appeal on either of these bases, 1 we reach the merits and reverse. 2
In doing so, however, we think it important at the outset to stress that the Treaty, as it was presented to the Senate in 1954 and consented to by it, contained an explicit provision for termination by either party on one year's notice. The Senate, in the course of giving its consent, exhibited no purpose and took no action to reserve a role for itself by amendment, reservation, or condition in the effectuation of this provision. Neither has the Senate, since the giving of the notice of termination, purported to take any final or decisive action with respect to it, either by way of approval or disapproval. The constitutional issue we face, therefore, is solely and simply the one of whether the President in these precise circumstances is, on behalf of the United States, empowered to terminate the Treaty in accordance with its terms. It is our view that he is, and that the limitations which the District Court purported to place on his action in this regard have no foundation in the Constitution.
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In the aftermath of the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, the United States and the Republic of China (ROC) negotiated a Mutual Defense Treaty, primarily directed against the perceived threat from the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Treaty was signed by representatives of both nations on December 2, 1954. It was approved by the Senate, and finally signed by the President on February 11, 1955. Article V of the Treaty provided that, in the event of an attack on Taiwan, the Pescadores, or United States territories in the western Pacific, each nation "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Article X of the Treaty provided that it would remain in force "indefinitely," but said that "(e) ither Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party."
At that time both the ROC and PRC claimed and still claim to be the sole legitimate government of China; both considered Taiwan a part of China. Since then over 100 nations, including all of our NATO allies and Japan, have officially recognized the PRC as the sole government of China, breaking off relations with Taiwan. In 1971 the United Nations admitted delegates from the PRC to the seats reserved for China in the General Assembly and Security Council, and expelled those from the ROC.
In the early 1970's the United States began to pursue a policy of closer relations with the PRC. The early stage of this effort culminated in President Nixon's visit to the mainland of China, during which the two nations released the "Shanghai Communique," declaring the goal of "normalization of relations between China and the United States." The PRC stipulated that full mutual diplomatic recognition was preconditioned on United States agreement to cease all diplomatic and other official relations with the ROC, to withdraw United States military units from Taiwan, and to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC.
In September 1978 Congress passed and the President signed the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub.L.No.95-384, 92 Stat. 746. Section 26 of that Act, called the "Dole-Stone Amendment," provided:
It is the sense of the Congress that there should be prior consultation between the Congress and the executive branch on any proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.
On December 15, 1978 President Carter announced that the United States would recognize the PRC as the sole government of China, effective January 1, 1979, and would simultaneously withdraw recognition from the ROC. In addition, the United States announced that the ROC would be notified that "the Mutual Defense Treaty is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty." On December 23, 1978 the State Department formally notified the ROC that the Treaty would terminate on January 1, 1980.
While severing all official ties with the ROC, the United States has sought to preserve "extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan." 3 The Taiwan Relations Act, Pub.L.No.96-8, 93 Stat. 14, signed into law on April 10, 1979, established the statutory framework for such relations. 4 It provided:
For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law.
On December 22, 1978 plaintiffs-appellees filed this suit in District Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent termination of the Treaty without senatorial or congressional consent. The complaint alleged that the President violated his sworn duty to uphold the laws, including the treaties, of the United States. It asserted that the President has no unilateral power under the Constitution to abrogate treaties, and that the United States, not the President, is the party invested by Article X of the Treaty with the power of termination.
On June 6, 1979 the District Court dismissed the suit, without prejudice, for lack of standing. The court observed that three resolutions then pending in the Senate might resolve the controversy without need for judicial intervention. 5 The court concluded:
If the Congress approves the President's action, the issue presently before the Court would be moot. If the Senate or the Congress takes action, the result of which falls short of approving the President's termination effort, then the controversy will be ripe for a judicial declaration. . . .
JA 631-632.
Within hours of the District Court order the Senate called up Senate Resolution 15 which, as amended by the Foreign Relations Committee, would have recognized some fourteen grounds that would justify unilateral action by the President to terminate treaty obligations of the United States. 6 By a vote of 59 to 35 the Senate substituted for its consideration an amendment drafted by Senator Harry Byrd, Jr.:
That it is the sense of the Senate that approval of the United States Senate is required to terminate any mutual defense treaty between the United States and another nation.
125 Cong.Rec. S7015, S7038-S7039 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). Later that day, during the course of debate on the amended resolution, a dispute arose among the Senators over whether the resolution would have retrospective, or merely prospective effect. No final vote was ever taken on the resolution, and the Majority Leader returned the resolution to the calendar. 7
On June 12, 1979, after the Byrd amendment was voted on, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion in District Court for alteration or amendment of the June 6 order of dismissal. They contended that the Senate's action on the Byrd amendment satisfied the court's stated criteria for creating a justiciable controversy. On October 17, 1979 the District Court granted this motion, ruling that the plaintiffs had suffered the requisite injury in fact because of the denial of their right to be consulted and to vote on treaty termination. The court also ruled that the case did not present a nonjusticiable political question. Reaching the constitutional question, the court granted plaintiffs' cross-motion for...
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