Golembiewski v. Barnhart
Decision Date | 31 August 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-3382.,03-3382. |
Citation | 382 F.3d 721 |
Parties | Michael E. GOLEMBIEWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, William C. Lee, Chief Judge.
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Barry A. Schultz (argued), Evanston, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
James B. Geren (argued), Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BAUER, CUDAHY, and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.
Michael Golembiewski appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denying his petition for an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). We reverse; the government was not substantially justified in supporting the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") ruling and since the government did not complain about the computation of fees, we simply remand for the court to enter the fees requested by Golembiewski.
This case arises from Golembiewski's application for disability insurance benefits on April 27, 1999. Golembiewski claimed he had become disabled because of problems associated with a spinal cord injury and epileptic seizures. The ALJ issued a final decision to deny Golembiewski's application on July 11, 2000.
On March 28, 2001, Golembiewski filed for judicial review of the ALJ's decision. The district court affirmed the final decision of the ALJ. Golembiewski then appealed to this court and we vacated and remanded with instructions to remand the case to the agency, urging the Commissioner to assign a new ALJ to handle further proceedings. Specifically, we remanded the case because: (1) the ALJ improperly discredited Golembiewski's testimony about pain without explaining reasons for rejecting testimony; (2) the ALJ mischaracterized the evidence; and (3) the ALJ was required to consider the entire constellation of ailments affecting Golembiewski once the ALJ found that one or more of his ailments was severe. Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 913 (7th Cir.2003). The ALJ found in favor of Golembiewski in the new proceedings. Thereupon, Golembiewski filed a petition and supporting memorandum seeking attorney's fees under the EAJA on May 7, 2003. The district court denied the petition, finding that the government's position was substantially justified and attorney's fees were therefore not appropriate under the EAJA. This appeal followed.
Golembiewski asks this court to find that the government had no substantial justification for its position and that the district court judge abused his discretion in denying attorney's fees. We review the district court's denial of a petition for attorney's fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988); United States v. Hallmark Construction Co., 200 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir.2000). This "deferential standard does not dilute our meaningful examination of the district court's decision." Id. (citing Jackson v. Chater, 94 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir.1996)).
The EAJA provides that a district court may award attorney's fees where (1) the claimant is a "prevailing party"; (2) the government was not substantially justified; (3) no "special circumstances make an award unjust"; and (4) the fee application is submitted to the court within 30 days of final judgment and is supported by an itemized statement. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), (B); Hallmark Construction, 200 F.3d at 1079. Golembiewski is the prevailing party, no "special circumstances" are alleged, and the fee application was timely. The only question remaining is whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that the government's position was substantially justified.
The Commissioner's position is substantially justified if her conduct has a "reasonable basis in law and fact, that is, if a reasonable person could believe the position was correct." Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n. 2, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988)). The Commissioner bears the burden of proving that her position was substantially justified. Marcus, 17 F.3d at 1036. Id. A decision by an ALJ constitutes part of the agency's pre-litigation conduct. Sutton v. Chater, 944 F.Supp. 638, 639 (N.D.Ill.1996).
The Seventh Circuit has set forth a three-part standard for reviewing EAJA petitions. Hallmark Construction, 200 F.3d at 1080. It requires the government to show that its position was grounded in: (1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory propounded. Id.
When the Court of Appeals reverses a decision of the Commissioner, the district court should analyze the actual merits of the government's litigating position. Hallmark Construction, 200 F.3d at 1079. Strong language against the government's position in an opinion discussing the merits of a key issue is evidence in support of an award of EAJA fees. Marcus, 17 F.3d at 1038. The district court judge below found that "[a] review of the evidence ... as well as a review of both judicial decisions, reveals a rather complex case." Br. of the Appellant at 15. Actually, our opinion does not reveal a complex case, but one in which the ALJ and Commissioner violated clear and long judicial precedent and violated the Commissioner's own Ruling and Regulations. We found that despite the mandate of SSR 96-7p and court precedent, the body of the ALJ's decision contained no discussion of credibility and that he failed to apply the factors for evaluating symptoms set forth in Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Golembiewski, 322 F.3d at 915. We found that the Commissioner's defense of the ALJ's decision failed because she argued that the ALJ's credibility determination could be "implied," contrary to her own ruling, and she relied upon facts not discussed by the ALJ to try and bolster his credibility determination. Id. at 916. We went on to find that the ALJ's decision was compromised by a mischaracterization of medical evidence: finding no evidence of herniated discs when there was clear evidence of herniated discs. Id. at 916-17. We said, "[w]hat is more (not that more is needed), we also agree with Golembiewski that the ALJ ignored significant evidence supporting his claim." Id. Indeed, the ALJ improperly ignored three distinct lines...
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