Golf View Realty Co. v. Sioux City
| Decision Date | 27 October 1936 |
| Docket Number | 43550. |
| Citation | 269 N.W. 451,222 Iowa 433 |
| Parties | GOLF VIEW REALTY CO. v. SIOUX CITY. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; A. O. Wakefield, Judge.
This is an action to require defendant to specifically perform a written contract for the purchase of real estate in Sioux City, Iowa, alleged to have been purchased for use as a municipal golf course.From a decree in favor of plaintiff requiring specific performance, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
H. C Harper and John D. Beardsley, both of Sioux City, for appellant.
Crary & Crary, of Sioux City, for appellee.
On May 17, 1929, the city council of Sioux City adopted a resolution authorizing and directing the mayor and city clerk to enter into a contract to purchase certain real estate then held by the city under a lease, and known as the Highview Municipal Golf Course, for $45,000.Pursuant to said resolution, the mayor and city clerk of Sioux City entered into a contract with the owners of said real estate for the purchase thereof under the terms set forth in the resolution.
The property had been leased to the city in 1924 for use as a city park, or a municipal golf links, and was used and operated by the city as a municipal golf course from the time it was leased in 1924 until shortly after the contract of purchase was executed in 1929.
As a defense to this action, defendant alleges that the property was purchased for a public golf links and not for a park.
It is conceded that the city of Sioux City had at that time a population of 80,000.
The evidence tending to show the purposes for which the real estate was purchased was the recital in the lease under which it was held by the city before its purchase; the fact that it was used as a municipal golf course for a period of less than two months after the contract of purchase was entered into and the testimony of J. L. Levitt, who signed the contract of purchase for one of the grantors, that he knew at the time of the purchase that the city intended to continue operating a golf course on said premises.
There is no statement in the contract of purchase as to the purpose for which the property was to be used, and there is not a word of direct evidence that the property was not to be used for park purposes.
The resolution authorizing the purchase of the property recites among other things, the following:
Neither the resolution authorizing the purchase of said real estate nor the contract for its purchase contains any direct statement as to the purposes for which the real estate was to be used.Within two months after its purchase, the use of the property as a golf course was discontinued, but the city continued making payments thereon for over two years, as provided in the contract of purchase.Appellee contends that it is just as fair to presume from the record that the property purchased was to be used as a city park as it is to presume that it was to be used as a municipal golf course.
The lower court held that the contract of purchase was valid and entered a decree for specific performance.The defendant appeals.
The only question raised against the validity of the contract is the contention that the property was purchased for use as a municipal golf course, and that when the contract of purchase was entered into, the city had no power to purchase or acquire property for such use.The sole question before this court, therefore, is whether or not, under the law as it then stood, the city of Sioux City had a legal right to purchase the property in question.No constitutional question is involved.
It is conceded that at the time the contract was entered into, the only statutory authority for the purchase of the property was contained in section 6195 of the Code of 1927, which provides as follows:
" Cities and towns shall have power to purchase * * * pay for out of the general fund or the specific fund, as may be provided, enter upon and take any lands within or without the territorial limits of the city or town, for the following purposes:
1.For parks, commons, cemeteries, crematories, or hospital grounds.
2.* * *"
Appellant contends that because section 6195 of the Code of 1927(section 880,Code 1897) contains no provision specifically authorizing the purchase of property for a municipal golf course, that the city had no authority to purchase real estate for that purpose, and that the contract for the purchase of property for such purpose was therefore, ultra vires and void.
In support of this contention, appellant also refers to the provisions of section 6606 of the Code of 1931, adopted by the 37th General Assembly in 1917, and section 6066-fl of the Code of 1935, adopted by the 45th General Assembly, Ex.Sess., in March, 1934.
Section 6606 of the Code of 1931 provides that: " The council of any city * * * having a population of fifty thousand, shall have the power to establish in, and in connection with the parks, swimming pools, bathing beaches, bathhouses, * * * ice rinks, dance pavilions, shelter houses, wading pools, and river walls, and to pave, macadamize, and otherwise improve the roadways, drives, avenues, and walks in and through such parks."This law was enacted in 1917 by the 37th General Assembly, chap. 194.
Section 6066-fl of the Code of 1935 provides that: " Cities and towns are hereby authorized and empowered to own, acquire, construct, equip, operate and maintain within and/or without the corporate limits of such city or town, a sewage treatment plant or plants * * * also swimming pools and/or golf courses, and shall have authority to acquire by gift, grant, purchase, or condemnation, or otherwise, all necessary lands * * * therefor."This law was enacted in 1934 by the 45th General Assembly, Ex.Sess., chap. 71.
Appellant contends that because section 6606(adopted in 1917) grants to cities and towns of 50,000 population, the power to establish in, and in connection with the parks, swimming pools, bathing beaches, bathhouses, ice rinks, dance pavilions, shelter houses, wading pools, and river walls, etc., and because it does not include authority to establish a golf course, that such power was not included within the powers granted by section 6195 of the Code of 1927.
It is further contended that because the additional power to acquire a golf course was included in section 6066-fl of the Code of 1935, it should necessarily follow that such power was excluded from the power granted in section 6195 to purchase land for parks, etc.
Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow.First, because swimming pools, bathing beaches, bathhouses, ice rinks, dance pavilions, shelter houses, wading pools, and river walls, could not in and of themselves as separate entities be considered parks; and for the further reason that if a golf course, as such, could be considered in the nature of a park, the reasoning would not apply.
The further contention, that because section 6066-fl of the Code of 1935 provides that cities and towns are empowered to own, acquire, and construct swimming pools and golf courses, and to issue revenue bonds to pay the cost of such improvement to be financed only through the federal government under certain conditions therein enumerated, that the power to acquire and operate golf courses was not included in section 6195 of the Code of 1927.Nor does such construction necessarily follow, because section 6066-fl of the Code of 1935 also grants to cities and towns the power to acquire, construct, and operate swimming pools, because that power was conferred on cities and towns in 1917, and long prior to the time section 6066-fl of the Code was adopted.Seesection 6606 of the Code of 1924(37th Gen.Assem. chap. 194).
Therefore, if public golf courses can be considered parks, section 6066-fl of the Code of 1935, which was adopted in 1934 by the 45th General Assembly, Ex.Sess., chap. 71, could not be held to imply that golf courses could not have been included within the meaning of the term " parks" contained in section 6195 of the Codes of 1927 and 1931.
That the construction contended for by appellant does not necessarily apply is also evidenced by the fact that section 6066-fl of the Code of 1935(being 45th Gen.Assem.,Ex.Sess., chap. 71), was enacted as an amendment to chapter 111 of the Acts of the 45th General Assembly, which, by its enacting clause, shows that it was adopted to " authorize cities and towns to issue revenue bonds payable solely from the revenues of such works, as an emergency measure to be financed only through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation."
As this latter statute was enacted during the depression, and to provide labor for the unemployed, it is reasonable to conclude that the term " golf course" was included therein for the purpose of clarifying any doubt as to whether or not the power to purchase land was included in section 6195 of the Code, and so as to avoid any difficulty that might arise in financing the projects through the...
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