Golf Vill. N., LLC v. City of Powell

• Decision Date: 06 September 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:16-cv-668
• Citation: 338 F.Supp.3d 700
• Parties: GOLF VILLAGE NORTH, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF POWELL, OHIO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

338 F.Supp.3d 700

GOLF VILLAGE NORTH, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.The CITY OF POWELL, OHIO, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-668

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Filed September 6, 2018

Joseph R. Miller, Elizabeth S. Alexander, Kara Marie Mundy, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, LLP, John M. Kuhl, Christopher Logan Ingram, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Thomas B. Allen, Frost Brown Todd LLC, West Chester, OH, Michelle Yvonne Harrison, Stephen Jesse Smith, Yazan S. Ashrawi, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE

Defendants the City of Powell and David Betz ("Betz," collectively, the "City" or "Defendants") move to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 45, filed by Golf Village North, LLC and Triangle Properties, Inc., (collectively, "Golf Village" or "Plaintiffs"). Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 50. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This dispute involves two parcels of real property owned by Golf Village covering approximately 8.1 acres located in Powell, Ohio, at the northeast corner of Sawmill Parkway and Seldom Seen Road ("Property"). The Property is currently vacant and zoned for planned commercial use. Plaintiffs seek to develop a portion of their planned development, the Golf Village Community, as a residential hotel.

In April 2016, Plaintiffs, through counsel, sent a letter to the City of Powell's Director of Development, Betz, seeking approval of their proposed use of the Property. Plaintiffs requested a "prompt decision pursuant to Section 113.05(a) [of the City's Zoning Code] that the proposed residential hotel is a permitted use" so that they could then submit a final development plan to the City for approval. Ex. 3 at 6, ECF No. 45-3. A month later, on May 5, 2016, Betz responded, declining to provide Plaintiffs with the requested decision. He stated that the Zoning Code does not establish a process for providing applicants with "advisory opinions," but instead requires "that an applicant must submit a full and complete application" for "a Zoning Certificate approval." Ex. 4 at 3, ECF No. 45-5.

Thereafter, on May 24, 2016, Plaintiffs submitted an Application for Appeal to the City's Board of Zoning Appeals challenging the Zoning Administrator's decision not to provide Golf Village with the requested interpretation of the Zoning Code. No hearing was held. On June 9, 2016, however, the City's Law Director emailed Plaintiffs, asserting that the Zoning Administrator's May 5, 2016, response was not an appealable administrative action. For that reason, he stated, the City would take no action on Plaintiffs' Application for Appeal.

On July 8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal in the Delaware Court of Common Pleas, appealing the City's June 9, 2016 refusal to hear their administrative appeal.¹ See Golf Vill. N., LLC v. City of Powell, Ohio , 2018-Ohio-151, ¶¶ 5–7, 2018 WL 456217, slip op. at *1 (5th Dist.) (recounting procedural history of trial court proceedings). On March 15, 2017, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' appeal. Id. The court found that dismissal was warranted in part because Plaintiffs had not received a final appealable order and therefore the court had no subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The trial court also held that the City's zoning code is not unconstitutionally vague, that there was no violation of due process, and that there was no Equal Protection violation. See id. at ¶¶ 8–13, *2. Golf Village appealed the trial court's decision to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. On January 11, 2018, during the pendency of this motion, the Fifth District affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that "because there was no final appealable order ... [t]he trial court ... did not have subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at ¶ 22, *3. Thereafter, Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio who declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. Golf Vill. N., L.L.C. v. Powell , 2018-Ohio-1990, 152 Ohio St. 3d 1482, 98 N.E.3d 296 (table) (Ohio 2018).

On July 11, 2016, days after filing their state court action, Plaintiffs also filed the present case. In this federal action, Plaintiffs bring the following claims against the City, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 : (1) deprivation of property and liberty interests without due process of law; (2) deprivation of property and liberty interests without due process of law by refusing to hear their appeal; (3) unequal protection of the law; and (4) deprivation of property and liberty interests pursuant to an unconstitutionally vague act. Plaintiffs also request a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated the zoning code.

After Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 45, Defendants moved to dismiss. ECF No. 50. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, ECF No. 52, and Defendants replied, ECF No. 53. This matter is now ripe for the Court's review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) permits dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Supreme Court has explained that subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold determination. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) ; Am. Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon , 501 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2007).

" Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction generally come in two varieties: a facial attack or a factual attack." Gentek Bldg. Prods. v. Sherwin–Williams Co. , 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States , 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990) ). "A facial attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction alleged in the complaint questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading." Id. "When reviewing a facial attack, a district court takes the allegations in the complaint as true," and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a safeguard similar to that employed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. ; see also United States v. Ritchie , 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). "If those allegations establish federal claims, jurisdiction exists." Gentek Bldg. Prods. , 491 F.3d at 330. A factual attack is a challenge to the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Ritchie , 15 F.3d at 598. "When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the factual basis for jurisdiction, the district court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter." Golden v. Gorno Bros., Inc. , 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2005).

In this case, Defendants have neither pointed to any disputed facts that they have called upon the Court to resolve in their motion to dismiss, nor asked the Court to weigh any evidence presented by the parties to decide jurisdictional facts. See generally, RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 78 F.3d 1125, 1135 (6th Cir. 1996) ; Leader Techs. Inc. v. Zacks , No. 2:07-cv-473, 2008 WL 440423, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2008). For these reasons, the Court concludes that Defendants have mounted a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. The Court thus construes the Amended Complaint in Plaintiffs' favor and accepts the factual allegations contained in the Amended Complaint as true.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, arguing the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the claims are unripe and that the Court should abstain from hearing the case under the Younger abstention doctrine.

A. Ripeness

The doctrine of ripeness emanates from Article III of the United States Constitution, which, inter alia , limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to consideration of actual cases and controversies, and precludes federal courts from rendering advisory opinions. Arnett v. Myers , 281 F.3d 552, 562 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Adcock v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. , 822 F.2d 623, 627 (6th Cir. 1987) ). The doctrine "focuses on the timing of the action," United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers , 330 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir. 2003), and encompasses "Article III limitations on judicial power" as well as "prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction." Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior , 538 U.S. 803, 808, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Enforcing ripeness discourages "premature adjudication" of legal questions and judicial entanglement in abstract controversies. Warshak v. United States , 532 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). "[It] is more than a mere procedural question; it is determinative of jurisdiction. If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint must be dismissed." River City Capital, LP. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 491 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

To determine whether a case is ripe for judicial resolution, the Court generally asks two questions: (1) is the dispute fit for a judicial decision in the sense that it arises in a "concrete factual context" and involves "a dispute that is likely to come to pass"; and (2) what is the hardship to the claimant if the federal court withholds consideration? Warshak , 532 F.3d at 525 ; see also Miles Christi Religious Order v. Twp. of Northville , 629 F.3d 533, 537 (2010). In certain land-use contexts, however, "the demands of ‘a concrete factual context’ and ‘a dispute that is likely to come to pass’ converge in an insistence on ‘finality[.]’ " Miles Christi , 629 F.3d at 537.

1. Finality

Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs did not receive a final decision from the City on their zoning application—and in fact have not filed a zoning application at all—their claims are not ripe for this Court's review under Williamson County . Defendants also insist...