Goliday v. GKN Aerospace-St. Louis Aerospace
| Decision Date | 13 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:11CV729 JCH |
| Parties | L.C. GOLIDAY, JR., Plaintiff(s), v. GKN AEROSPACE-ST. LOUIS AEROSPACE, Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on April 30, 2012. (ECF No. 36). This matter is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
Plaintiff L.C. Goliday ("Plaintiff" or "Goliday") began working for Defendant GKN Aerospace North America, Inc. ("Defendant" or "GKN") in January 2001. (Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's SUMF"), ECF No. 38, ¶ 2, citing Ex. A, Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 34). Plaintiff is black. (Id., ¶ 1, citing Ex. A, p. 15). On August 29, 2007, Plaintiff was promoted to Operations Manager in Composites, effective September 3, 2007. . Plaintiff received a salary increase effective March 3, 2008. .
As Operations Manager, Plaintiff's supervisor was Bart Weihl, Vice President/General Manager of Composites. (Id., ¶ 4, citing Ex. A, pp. 109-10; Ex. C, Deposition of Bart Weihl, pp. 100-01). In November 2008, Weihl reassigned Plaintiff back to a Team Leader position. (Id., ¶ 6, citing Ex. A, pp. 78-79; Ex. C, pp. 6, 102-03). According to Defendant, Weihl removed Plaintiff asOperations Manager because Weihl believed Plaintiff was a weaker Operations Manager as compared to the other Operations Managers in terms of getting results and overall performance. (Id., ¶ 10, citing Ex. C, pp. 36-37, 42-43, 56, and 100-02). According to Plaintiff, however, he was demoted from his position because he refused to give George Allen, a black employee, a poor rating. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Response"), ECF No. 39, p. 1). It is unclear from the record what, if any, effect this rating would have had on Allen's employment. Plaintiff also states that three white employees who were also Operations Managers were less qualified than he was, and that Weihl only had problems with black Team Leaders. (Id., pp. 2, 3). When Plaintiff was moved from Operations Manager to Team Leader, his base salary was not changed. (Defendant's SUMF, ¶ 7, citing Ex. A, p. 103; Ex. C, pp. 102-03).
In November 2008, Weihl discharged Operations Manager Jeff Oathout because Weihl questioned whether Oathout had the ability to perform as an Operations Manager. (Id., ¶ 11, citing Ex. B, p. 103). Oathout is white. (Id., ¶ 12, citing Ex. A, p. 79; and Ex. B, pp. 103-04).
As a Team Leader, Plaintiff reported to Operations Manager Bill Pierson. (Id., ¶ 13, citing Ex. D, Deposition of Charles W. Pierson, p. 12; and Ex. E, Declaration of Charles W. Pierson, ¶ 3). According to Plaintiff, Pierson told Plaintiff and Henry Allen, a black employee, that they needed to report to work on time despite the fact they had not reported late to work. (Plaintiff's Response, p. 4). Pierson noted on Plaintiff's and Allen's evaluations that they needed to report to work on time and that reporting to work late in the future would not be tolerated. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, a white employee named Reginald Saunders was frequently reporting to work late or missing work and was not disciplined. (Id.).
According to Defendant, Pierson pulled the "gate rings" (i.e., recordings of the dates and times when employees enter and exit the facility) of all the Team Leaders who reported to him,including Plaintiff and Saunders. (Defendant's SUMF, ¶ 14, citing Ex. A, pp. 155, 157-58; Ex. D, pp. 8, 30-33; and Ex. E, ¶ 9). Pierson had conversations with Plaintiff about ensuring that he and the people who reported to him were accurately keeping track of their time in AutoTime, the company's time-tracking system. (Id., ¶ 16, citing Ex. D, pp. 35-38, 47-49). Pierson took no disciplinary action against Plaintiff for not accurately recording time in AutoTime. (Id., ¶ 17, citing Ex. A, pp. 175-76; and Ex. D, pp. 47-49). Pierson also spoke with Saunders about ensuring that his AutoTime was correct, and Pierson documented this counseling in Saunders's 2010 Performance Development Plan. (Id., ¶ 18, citing Ex. D, pp. 11, 40-41; and Ex. E, ¶¶ 5, 11-12).
Plaintiff also alleges Weihl treated Plaintiff differently after Plaintiff's demotion. (Plaintiff's Response, p. 3). According to Plaintiff, Weihl harassed Plaintiff by "calling him continuously on the phone all night," "sitting one [sic] the parking lot looking into the building," and "coming in to check on him at various times at night." (Id.).
Plaintiff received a salary increase effective March 2, 2009. . In March 2010, Plaintiff did not receive a salary increase. . According to Defendant, Plaintiff did not receive a raise at this time because Plaintiff's current salary was in the upper portion of the salary range for his job position. (Id.).
On January 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed a joint Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR"). (First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 18, ¶ 4). In this Charge, Plaintiff states he was demoted "because [he] refused to give a black employee an unfair rating" and that he has "been subjected to continuing harassment and scrutiny" since his demotion. (Charge of Discrimination, ECFNo. 37-1). On January 4, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Amended Charge of Discrimination reiterating those allegations and also stating that he is "disciplined for being late based on gate rings, while certain white individuals are frequently late but receive no discipline." (Amended Charge of Discrimination, ECF No. 37-2).
Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint against Defendant on April 25, 2011. (See ECF No. 1). Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint contains five counts1 : discrimination on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, discrimination on the basis of race and harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), retaliation in violation of Title VII, and retaliation in violation of the MHRA. As noted above, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on April 30, 2012.
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party mustset forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The Court's function is not to weigh the evidence but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249.
Because Plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff's remaining § 1981 claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310, 315 (8th Cir. 1996). Under this framework, Plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Harris v. Hays, 452 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2006). Once Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to Defendant to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. at 718. If Defendant articulates such a reason, the burden of production shifts back to Plaintiff to establish the proffered reason is a mere pretext for discriminatory animus. Id. (citation omitted).
In order to establish a prima facie case under § 1981, Plaintiff must show the following: "(1) membership in a protected class; (2) the intent to discriminate on the basis of race on the part of the defendant; and (3) discrimination interfering with a protected activity (i.e., the making and enforcement of contracts)." Daniels v. Dillard's, Inc., 373 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir. 2004) (citationomitted). "One way for the [plaintiff] to establish the second element, the defendant's intent to discriminate, is to show that he was treated differently from similarly situated nonmembers of the protected class." Holman v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., No. 4:05CV1032, 2006 WL 2460795, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2006) (citations omitted).
In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he applied for management-level positions in 2005 and 2006 but...
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