Golphin v. State

Decision Date14 December 2006
Docket NumberNo. SC03-554.,SC03-554.
PartiesLORENZO GOLPHIN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

James S. Purdy, Public Defender and Noel A. Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Wesley Heidt and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review the decision in Golphin v. State, 838 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), which certified conflict with the decision in Baez v. State, 814 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), quashed, 894 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2004). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we determine that the totality of the circumstances of Golphin's encounter with law enforcement indicates that he was not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when the police officer held in her hand at that specific site the identification he had consensually and voluntarily provided and viewed it as she conducted a computerized check for warrants in his presence and without moving away from that location where the identification had been consensually and voluntarily produced. Further, even if the encounter had amounted to a seizure, we conclude that the evidence discovered during the search of Golphin need not be suppressed pursuant to the application of the three-part test announced in State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2006). We therefore approve the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal.

FACTS

The instant action arises from a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirming the trial court's denial of Golphin's motion to suppress drug evidence discovered on his person during the course of a search incident to an arrest on an outstanding warrant. See Golphin v. State, 838 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). On the evening of November 13, 2002, Officers Maria Deschamps and Lindsey Doemer were on patrol in the area of Taylor Avenue and Ridgewood Avenue in Daytona Beach——an area well known for prostitution and narcotics traffic. The officers had been dispatched to conduct field interviews of possible prostitutes and other individuals in this area. Upon observing a group of approximately five men near the corner of Taylor and Ridgewood, the officers parked on the opposite side of the street, exited their vehicle, walked across the street and approached the group. As the officers approached, some individuals began to leave the area, but at least one ultimately remained to speak with the officers.

Officers Deschamps and Doemer parted, with Officer Doemer moving to approach Golphin. It is uncontroverted that although others in the group walked away, Golphin never attempted to leave the area. Officer Doemer requested Golphin's identification, which he voluntarily provided, and apparently without moving away simply commenced a computer check for outstanding warrants. A male officer who was part of a K-9 unit also arrived on the scene as the events were unfolding, although apparently after identification had been consensually produced.

After Officer Doemer had initiated the computer check, but prior to obtaining any results, Golphin made a statement that he might have an open warrant. The system reported that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and Golphin was arrested. The male officer affiliated with the K-9 unit who had arrived on the scene then assisted in the search incident to that arrest. This search revealed drugs and paraphernalia giving rise to the charges underlying the instant matter.

Golphin submitted a motion to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the encounter was not consensual and that he had been unlawfully seized when the officer held his identification while initiating the computer check process. Golphin further argued that the unlawful seizure resulted in the discovery of the arrest warrant, subsequent arrest, and incidental search which revealed the drug evidence. The trial court concluded that the warrant was discovered as a result of a consensual encounter and denied Golphin's motion. See Golphin, 838 So. 2d at 706. Golphin appealed the trial court's ruling, relying on the decision in Baez v. State, 814 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), in which the Fourth District held that an otherwise consensual encounter matures into a seizure when an officer retains a person's identification for the purposes of conducting a warrants check.

In affirming the trial court's determination, the Fifth District expressly disagreed with the Fourth District's decision in Baez and certified a conflict to this Court. The Fifth District rejected what it perceived to be a bright line rule regarding the impact of retaining an individual's identification, and relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), as providing the proper "totality of the circumstances" analysis. See Golphin, 838 So. 2d at 706-07. Applying that standard to the facts of the case, the Fifth District determined:

In sum, we believe Baez1 to be wrongly decided first, because it creates a per se rule, which the Supreme Court in Bostick rejected in favor of the "totality of the circumstances" test, and second, because it reaches what we believe to be the wrong conclusion when the proper test is applied. See People v. Cole, 256 Ill. App. 3d 590, 194 Ill. Dec. 545, 627 N.E. 2d 1187 (1994).
In applying the Bostick test to the instant case, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion. The police behavior in approaching the men obviously failed to communicate an intent to restrict the men. Indeed, some of the men walked away from the police without incident. There was no indication that police sought out Appellant or threatened him or intimidated him in any way. Appellant was fully cooperative and volunteered information about his arrest history. Finally, Appellant did not manifest any desire to leave, nor did he request that his identification be returned. The police communicated nothing, by word or act, to lead Appellant to reasonably conclude that he was not free to leave.
The trial judge found that Appellant consented to the encounter with police, and we concur that Appellant's consent, when all circumstances are considered, was not the product of intimidation or harassment as viewed from the position of a reasonable person.

Golphin, 838 So. 2d at 708. The Fifth District certified a conflict with the Fourth District's decision in Baez.2 This Court accepted jurisdiction, see Golphin v. State, 888 So. 2d 17 (table) (Fla. 2004), and the instant review followed.

ANALYSIS
WHETHER A SEIZURE OCCURRED

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 12 of Florida's Declaration of Rights guarantee citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. Florida's constitutional protection expressly provides that the right shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. Items obtained in violation of Florida's constitutional protection shall be excluded from evidence if such items would be excluded pursuant to United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. See id.

The Fourth Amendment requires all warrantless "seizures" of a person to be founded upon at least reasonable suspicion that the individual seized is engaged in wrongdoing. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (determining that reasonableness will depend on the existence of specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion). This requirement "governs all seizures of the person, `including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.'" Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).

Not all encounters between law enforcement and individual citizens, however, constitute "seizures." See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 ("Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves `seizures' of persons."). As the United States Supreme Court has determined: "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a `seizure' has occurred." Id. This Court has defined three levels of police-citizen encounters. See Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993). First are those referred to and defined as "consensual encounters," which involve minimal police contact and do not invoke constitutional safeguards. See id. at 186. "During a consensual encounter a citizen may either voluntarily comply with a police officer's requests or choose to ignore them." Id. Second are those designated investigatory stops, at which time a police officer "may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime." Id. (citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)).3 The third level is an arrest, which must be supported by probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed. See id.

The State does not contend that the actions of Officers Deschamps and Doemer were predicated on reasonable articulable suspicion that Golphin was engaged in criminal activity.4 Indeed, the record establishes that the officers were only engaged in general field interviews in this area known for narcotics and prostitution and approached the group of men simply, in Officer Doemer's words, to see "what they were up to." The rationale voiced by this officer clearly would not provide the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion...

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  • Misdemeanor defense
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Florida Small-Firm Practice Tools - Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • April 1, 2023
    ...temporary detention always concerns the 4th Amendment’s search and seizure clause and is not a voluntary encounter. [ Golphin v. State , 888 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2006).] When there is a violation of the traffic control laws, a police officer has probable cause to stop the driver of the offending......

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