Golson v. Cartledge
| Decision Date | 26 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | C/A No.: 1:16-743-BHH-SVH |
| Parties | Stanley Golson, #200479, Petitioner, v. Warden Leroy Cartledge, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Stanley Golson ("Petitioner") is an inmate at the McCormick Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections who filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's motion for summary judgment and return. [ECF Nos. 20, 21]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's motion. [ECF No. 22]. Petitioner filed a response on July 25, 2016, and Respondent filed a reply on July 29, 2016. [ECF Nos. 24, 26].
Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted.
Jannie Wiseman ("Wiseman") worked as a confidential informant for the Lexington County Sheriff's Department ("LCSD"). [ECF No. 21-1 at 62-63, 67, 90-91]. On May 25, 2004, Detective Michael Burke ("Burke") equipped Wiseman with audio surveillance equipment and gave her $40. Id. at 62, 69-70, 93. Detective J.J. Jones ("Jones") then dropped Wiseman off on a street adjacent to Petitioner's house. Id. at 100-101.1 Wiseman went to Petitioner's house and asked Petitioner for $40 worth of crack cocaine, and Petitioner gave Wiseman two rocks of crack cocaine, his phone number, and told her "not to deal with anybody else but him." Id. at 95-97. Wiseman walked back to Jones's car, showed him the crack cocaine, and Jones drove Wiseman to another location where she gave the crack cocaine to Burke. Id. at 97-98. On July 1, 2004, Wiseman was shown a photographic lineup and identified Petitioner as the person she "dealt with May 25, 2004." Id. at 105-106.
Petitioner was indicted by the Lexington County grand jury during the October 2006 term of court for distribution of crack cocaine within proximity of school (2006-GS-32-3491) and distribution of crack cocaine (2006-GS-32-3494). Id. at 333-36. Joshua S. Kendrick, Esq., represented Petitioner at a jury trial on April 3-4, 2007, before the Honorable R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge. Id. at 3 et seq. The jury found Petitioner guilty as charged, and Judge McMahon sentenced Petitioner to life without the possibility of parole ("LWOP"). [ECF Nos. 21-1 at 206-207; 21-19].
Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the South Carolina Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals"). On appeal, Petitioner was represented by Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, Esq., of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, Division of Appellate Defense, who filed a final brief on or about June 19, 2009. [ECF No. 21-2]. Attorney Franklin-Best raised the following issue:
The circuit court erred in sentencing appellant Golson to a sentence of life without parole for distribution of .17 grams of crack cocaine and distribution of .17 grams of crack cocaine within proximity to a school in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
On July 6, 2010, the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished decision dismissing the appeal. [ECF No. 21-4]. The remittitur was issued on July 22, 2010. [ECF No. 21-5].
Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") on September 2, 2010, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [ECF No. 21-1 at 225-40].
A PCR evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable Frank R. Addy, Jr., on April 17, 2013, at which Petitioner and his PCR counsel, Charles Brooks, Esq., appeared. Id. at 247-315. On February 26, 2014, Judge Addy filed an order of dismissal. Id. at 322-32.
Petitioner appealed from the denial of PCR and was represented by Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak of the South Carolina Commission of Indigent Defense,Division of Appellate Defense. [ECF No. 21-6]. Attorney Pachak filed a Johnson petition2 for writ of certiorari in the South Carolina Supreme Court on or about April 18, 2014, and petitioned to be relieved as counsel. Id. The petition raised the following issue: "Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial judge providing audio equipment that allowed the jury to listen to the tape of the controlled buy with the confidential informant?" Id. at 3.
On October 7, 2014, the South Carolina Supreme Court denied Attorney Pachak's motion to be relieved as counsel and directed the parties to address the following question: "Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to object to the trial judge providing audio equipment that allowed the jury to listen to the recording of the controlled buy with the confidential informant?" [ECF No. 21-7]. On or about October 29, 2014, Attorney Pachak filed a petition for writ of certiorari raising the following issue: "Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial judge providing audio equipment that allowed the jury to listen to the tape of the controlled buy with the confidential informant?" [ECF No. 21-8].
On April 22, 2015, the South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari. [ECF No. 21-10]. Attorney Pachak filed a brief of petitioner on or about May 19, 2015, raising the following issue: "Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial judge providing audio equipment that allowed the jury to listen to the tape of the controlled buy with the confidential informant, when that unduly emphasized that portion of the State's case?" [ECF No. 21-11]. On December 23, 2015, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued an order dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted. [ECF No. 21-13]. The remittitur was issued on January 8, 2016. [ECF No. 21-14].
In the interim, Petitioner had filed a second PCR application on October 30, 2014, alleging illegal sentence and conviction, fraud, perjury, invalid indictments, and prosecutorial misconduct claims. [ECF No. 21-15]. According to a Lexington County Public Index search, a conditional order of dismissal was issued on June 20, 2016.3
Meanwhile, Petitioner filed this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus on March 1, 2016. [ECF No. 1-26 at 2].4
Petitioner states the following grounds in his federal habeas petition:
Ground One: The Circuit Court erred in sentencing Appellant Golson to a sentence of life without parole for distribution of .17 grams of crack cocaine and distribution of .17 grams of crack cocaine within proximity to a school in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Supporting Facts: See Attach Sheets- (A) 1-12, (B) 1-6, (C) 1-7
Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel.
Supporting Facts: See - Attached Sheet 1-5
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. At the summary judgmentstage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. However, Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Because Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the AEDPA, review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2); seeWilliams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000). Id. at 410. Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption...
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